Opinion
CLAIM NO. E006693
OPINION FILED AUGUST 14, 1998
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE HANI HASHEM, Attorney at Law, Monticello, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by the HONORABLE MARK ALAN PEOPLES, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondent appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on February 23, 1998. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the respondent was estopped from asserting the defense of the Statute of Limitations. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be reversed.The injury upon which this claim is based occurred on January 31, 1990. On that date, the claimant suffered a partial amputation of his left hand in an admittedly compensable injury. Even though this claim is not based upon injuries to the claimant's right hand, it is relevant to note that the claimant also suffered a compensable injury to his right hand on October 14, 1988.
At the present time, the claimant is requesting that the Commission order the respondent to provide him certain additional medical care for treatment for his left hand and related temporary total disability benefits. The respondent contends that the Statute of Limitations acts as a bar to the claim presently before the Commission. The claimant acknowledges on appeal that the present claim was filed more than two years after his left hand injury occurred and more than one year after he last received compensation for his compensable left hand injury. However, the claimant asserts that the respondent should be estopped from asserting that defense based primarily upon alleged representations made to the claimant shortly after the injury to his left hand occurred.
Since this claim concerns a request for additional compensation, this case is governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (b). In essence, that statute provides that a claim for additional compensation must be filed within two years of the date of the injury or within one year of the last payment of compensation, whichever is greater. As the parties have conceded, that statute does appear to act as a bar to the claim for benefits being asserted herein. However, it has been held that conduct of the respondent can estop them from asserting the Statute of Limitations defense. In Rider v. Julian Martin, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 144, 789 S.W.2d 743 (1990), the Court of Appeals held that because the respondent had not properly posted information regarding workers' compensation rights, they were estopped from denying the claimant's claim pursuant to the Statute of Limitations defense.
In the present case, the claimant is asserting estoppel based upon a conversation which allegedly took place between the claimant and his wife and Mr. Jerry Hudson, the respondent's personnel manager, near the time of the claimant's 1990 injury. Apparently, it was the procedure of the respondent in workers' compensation claims to require injured workers to obtain written authorization when they needed to see their treating physician. According to the claimant and his wife, some time in 1990 they traveled to the respondent's place of employment to see Mr. Hudson about getting an authorization form to see the claimant's physician. When asked to describe the discussion, Mrs. Scott testified as follows:
A: Okay. We went in there to get the form, and when he gave us the form, we asked him if we always had to come and get that form before we could go to the doctor, and he said yes, because this was then workers' compensation and it would always be workers' compensation.
Q: And what did you interpret and understand that to mean?
A: We understood that no matter what happened or what length of time it would always be paid for.
The claimant gave essentially the same testimony except that he also stated that one of the purposes in contacting Mr. Hudson at that time was to determine if they would continue to pay for treatment of his hand. The claimant stated during his testimony that he was concerned as to whether the employer would continue to pay benefits or whether there was a Statute of Limitations that applied to his case. The claimant also stated that he understood Mr. Hudson's alleged statement that the claim would always be workers' compensation, to mean that the respondent would always pay for any medical care sought by the claimant.
Mr. Hudson also testified at the hearing. He stated that while he had spoken with both the claimant and the claimant's wife on several occasions, Mr. Hudson could not remember ever having a meeting involving both of them at the same time. He categorically denied ever having made any such statements as had been ascribed to him by the claimant and Mrs. Scott in their testimony.
The administrative law judge found that the claimant had established sufficient evidence so that the respondent should be estopped from asserting the defense of the Statute of Limitations. In reaching that conclusion, the administrative law judge relied not only upon the testimony of the claimant and his wife, but also upon the fact that the respondent apparently had paid for some medical expenses for both the claimant's left hand and right hand after the limitations period had run.
In order for estoppel to apply, certain elements must be satisfied. Those elements were set out in Southern Hospitalities v. Britain, 54 Ark. App. 318, 925 S.W.2d 810 (1996), as follows:
1. The party to be estopped must know the facts;
2. He or she must intend that his or her conduct shall be acted upon or must act so that the party asserting the estoppel has the right to believe the other party so intended;
3. The party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts;
4. The party asserting the estoppel must rely upon the other party's conduct to his or her injury.
The claimant's argument for the application of estoppel rests on two points. In the first place, the claimant contends that the alleged statements made to he and his wife led them to believe that the respondent did intend to continue paying for medical care regardless of the applicable Statute of Limitations. Secondly, the claimant contends that the respondent's continuation of paying for medical care for his right hand condition after the Statute of Limitations had run on that claim, led him to believe that the respondent was waiving any Statute of Limitations defense and that he, accordingly, refrained from filing a claim for additional benefits based on his left hand injury in a timely fashion.
We find that the evidence in this case does not support application of the doctrine of estoppel for several reasons. First, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the conversation between himself, his wife, and Mr. Hudson ever occurred. In reaching that conclusion, we accord greater weight to the testimony of Mr. Hudson (that no conversation between the three ever occurred and that he never made the purported statement to either) than the weight we accord the claimant's testimony or his wife's testimony. Second, even if we were to assume that the conversation between the claimant, his wife, and Mr. Hudson did in fact occur as described by the claimant and his wife, a finding we do not make, we do not believe that the statements supposedly made by Mr. Hudson would be sufficient to establish the second element of estoppel. It is clear from the testimony of the claimant and his wife that the purported statements being carried on between themselves and Mr. Hudson were in regard to authorizations (paperwork) for continued medical care. We do not believe that the statements allegedly made by Mr. Hudson would be intended by the respondent to convey the impression that the Statute of Limitations was being waived or that medical care would be indefinitely paid in regard to the claimant's injury irregardless of the applicable Statute of Limitations. Likewise, if the statement had been made by Mr. Hudson in the manner asserted by the claimant and his wife, we do not believe that the subjective interpretation that the claimant purports that he himself placed on the alleged comment would satisfy the second estoppel element. Again, as we interpret the alleged statement, that alleged statement could only be reasonably interpreted to address the necessity of the paperwork required to receive medical care, and could not be reasonably interpreted to mean that the employer was indicating an intention to waive the employer's Limitation defense under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law.
We also do not believe that the respondent engaged in any other conduct which could be relied upon to establish the four elements of estoppel. The alternative conduct asserted by the claimant is that the respondent continued to pay for medical care for treatment of both the claimant's hands after the Statute of Limitations would have run. However, it appears from our review of the doctor's progress notes, as well as the payment records offered as evidence in this case, that any payment that may have been made on the claimant's right hand after the Statute of Limitations had run for that injury, were also made after the Statute of Limitations would have run on the claimant's left hand injury as well. Since all of these payments were made after the end of the applicable limitations period for the claimant's left hand, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the claimant could possibly have relied upon this conduct in not pursuing his present claim in a timely fashion.
For the reasons set out above, we find that the claimant has not established sufficient grounds to justify an estoppel of the respondent's assertion of the Statute of Limitations defense. In addition, we therefore find that the Statute of Limitations set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (b) acts as a bar to the claim for benefits being pursued herein. For that reason, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be, and hereby is, reversed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Humphrey dissents.