Opinion
April, 1899.
William Steele Grey, for appellant.
A.G.M. Vermilya, for respondents.
The plaintiffs' assignor, who was the plaintiff first above named, was employed by the defendant to do certain painting and decorating on his premises near Suffern, and he, in turn, employed workmen drawn partly from that neighborhood and partly from the city of New York. Some of the latter were paid by the piece, and some by the day. In addition to the per diem charge and the charge by the piece, the assignor charged for the transporation and for the board of the men from the city of New York. The bills, including one containing a charge for transportation, presented by the assignor and by the plaintiffs, were paid by the defendant, until he noticed a charge for board. That he refused to pay. The action was brought as for a balance due for moneys expended for paying board of painters and decorators employed on the premises of the defendant, at his request and upon his promise to pay for the same.
It was not contended that the defendant agreed to pay the board of the men hired by the plaintiffs, but plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to the balances, because of an alleged usage or custom in that particular trade, entitling the master decorator to charge for the board of the men employed. There is nothing in the evidence in reference to the alleged usage, or that the defendant ever had any knowledge or notice of such usage. Walls v. Bailey, 49 N.Y. 464. The judgment should be reversed.
FREEDMAN, P.J., concurs.
The custom which the plaintiffs invoke was not such a uniform, continuous and general usage that the defendant must be presumed to have contracted with reference to it. Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N.Y. 65, 77. It was rather local, partial or personal, having reference to a particular trade. Such a custom raises no conclusive presumption (Walls v. Bailey, 49 N.Y. 464), and it was, therefore, necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the defendant had knowledge of its existence. Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92, 100. Not only is there no evidence of knowledge, or notice on the part of the defendant, but the latter affirmatively testified that no such custom obtained, and that if it did, he was entirely ignorant of its prevalence. No claim is made that the usage was expressly incorporated in the contract.
The court below erred in that it applied the principles appertaining to a general custom, of which no one can be heard to profess ignorance, instead of those relating to a special custom, knowledge, of which must be brought home to the contracting parties. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.
Judgment reversed, with costs to appellant to abide event.