Opinion
Civil Action 21-1805 Re: ECF 29
10-19-2022
MICHAEL SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. WESLEY BIRICOCCHI, Narcotics Agent CHAIRMAN SEAN KERTES, Chairman for Westmoreland County Commissioner's Office-, WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON, Greensburg Municipal Hempfield Township-. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES INC., Westmoreland County's Medical Department-, ERIC B. SCHWARTZ, Deputy Warden of Treatment', and LEISHA REHARD, Operations/Manager Designee; Fiscal Dept, Defendants.
Nora Barry Fischer District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Maureen P. Kelly Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Scott (“Plaintiff') is an inmate currently confined in the Westmoreland County Prison (“WCP”). He has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which he has been granted leave to prosecute in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 10, 11. Plaintiff brings claims against a Pennsylvania Attorney General Drug Strike Force officer, WCP, Westmoreland County officials and administrators, and Wexford in its capacity as WCP's contracted medical services provider. Plaintiff's claims arise out of his arrest on May 12, 2021, and his subsequent incarceration at WCP. ECF No. 11 at 6.
Plaintiff alleges that on May 12, 2021, he was arrested during a traffic stop conducted by the Arnold Police Department and detectives with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. ECF No. 11 at 5. Plaintiff claims that his wallet and house and car keys were confiscated, and have not been returned. Among the items missing are his driver's license, Social Security card, several credit cards, and cash in the amount of $926.00. Plaintiff further asserts that as a pretrial detainee, he has suffered unauthorized deductions of money from his inmate account. Relevant to the pending motion, Plaintiff alleges that he contracted coronavirus and that he was denied mental health treatment for the isolation and psychological harm related to his Covid-19 diagnosis and to an unrelated motorcycle accident.
Plaintiff identifies additional conduct as the subject of prison grievances, but fails to include these claims (or any supporting facts) in his statement of claims, the description of his injuries, or his request for relief. ECF N. 11 at 5-6, 7-9. The list of additional conduct Plaintiff states he has grieved includes broad references to “[WCP] mail policy, right to be free from illegal body searches/P.R.E.A. violations, prison conditions, overcrowding, cleanliness, with coronavirus pandemic C.D.C. standards, ... right to adequate mental health, and medical care, informational privacy, HIPAA, and A.D.A. violations, due process in disciplinary hearings, access to courts-law libraries, legal assistance, right to leam the law and go to court, discrimination on basis of disability [ies], required provision of treatment for medical.” Id. at 7. In addition, Plaintiff refers to retaliation for filing this litigation including “illegal body scans, harassment, cell searches,” strip searches in the presence of other inmates, and medical and WCP staff “forcing” inmates to be vaccinated against COVID-19 (although Plaintiff states he refused a vaccine citing “religious issues over the tactics used in this prison”). Id. at 9.
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 10, 2021, and upon curing service-related deficiencies, his Complaint was filed on May 5, 2022. ECF Nos. 1-11. Plaintiff alleges claims against all Defendants under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 3. He seeks declaratory relief in the form of a court order acknowledging that Defendants have violated Plaintiff s constitutional rights and an injunction requiring WPC to return funds withdrawn from his inmate account and to cease further withdrawals. He also demands compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 6.
WCP and Westmoreland County Defendants have filed an Answer to the Complaint, ECF No. 31, and Wexford has filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has filed his response in opposition, ECF No. 37. The Motion is ripe for consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v, Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v, Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]” of his claim).
Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance' ”); Freeman v. Department of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds}; see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
However, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility: “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim ... they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
B. DISCUSSION
Wexford moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims on four grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his mental health or medical needs; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a Monell claim against Wexford; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages; and (4) Plaintiff s demands for declaratory and injunctive relief are improper. The Court will address Wexford's arguments in order.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical and Mental Health Needs
Parsing Plaintiff's claims related to the pending Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to provide adequate mental health and medical care during his incarceration at WCP.
At the relevant time, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until ‘after sentence and conviction.'” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)). Thus, Plaintiffs rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment and “the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged denial was ‘imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it [was] but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.'” Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 657 Fed.Appx. 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 158).
See Commonwealth v. Scott, No. CP-65-CR-0002212-2012 (CCP Westmoreland County) (https://uisportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-65-CR-0002212-2021&dnh=9mTbO7rHAGPg91PIN5SdRg%3D%3D))
In this case, Plaintiffs status makes little difference because constitutional medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees arise under the Fourteenth Amendment but are analyzed “under the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. n.5 (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003)).
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison authorities to provide medical care to inmates who must rely on them for treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Because the denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering that does not serve any penological interest, the law has long recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (citations and footnotes omitted).
That said, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 105.
It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” As the Estelle Court noted: “[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'” Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285; see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation.”); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ertainly no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor. There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness.”)(emphasis omitted). “Deliberate indifference,” therefore, requires “obduracy and wantonness,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.312,319,106S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (stating that “it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”).Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)
Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need. Id. See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). A serious medical need may also be found to exist where the denial or delay of treatment causes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
To establish deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff must make an ‘objective' showing that the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious,' or that the result of defendant's denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the plaintiff must make a ‘subjective' showing that defendant acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts setting forth a plausible claim that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to his medical or mental health needs under either prong. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege facts that would establish that he suffered a serious medical or mental health need. While COVID-19 may lead to a serious medical condition, absent allegations suggesting a substantial risk of harm, Plaintiff has not asserted a plausible claim that he suffered a condition requiring medical or mental health treatment. As to the second prong, Plaintiff states his mental health was impacted by virus-related isolation, but he does not allege any facts that would plausibly reflect that Wexford knew that he suffered a serious mental health need such that the rejection of care would constitute deliberate indifference. While he alludes to “medical mistreatment,” Plaintiff does not allege the contours of his claim. He fails to identify who treated or mistreated him, when he was mistreated, or how this mistreatment occurred. Without facts supporting a claim that Wexford knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff s medical or mental health, he has failed to state a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs claim of deliberate indifference to medical or mental health needs.
B. Monell Liability
Wexford next moves to dismiss Plaintiffs possible claim against it for failing to adhere to Center for Disease Control policies relative to Covid-19. ECF No. 30 at 8 (citing Plaintiffs summary of grievances submitted to WCP officials at ECF No. 11 ¶ VII.C). Wexford contends that to the extent that Plaintiffs assertion regarding the submission of a grievance may be interpreted as a claim for liability under Monell v. Dept, of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to state a claim.
Plaintiff has not substantively responded to Wexford's argument. ECF No. 37. However, considering his pro se status, the Court has examined the viability of a Monell claim based on the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, and is compelled to agree with Wexford that \ dismissal is warranted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that a private company providing prison health services “cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Rather, to be held liable, the plaintiff must identify a relevant policy or custom adopted by the company and establish that the policy or custom resulted in the asserted constitutional violation. Id., at 583-84 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oki, v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997)). At this stage of the litigation, “[t]o satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTeman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019)(“a plaintiff presenting an unconstitutional policy must point to an official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant subject”). Once a policy or custom is identified, a plaintiff must also allege facts stating a plausible connection between the policy and the alleged constitutional harm. See also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 232 (3d Cir. 2017) (“To state a claim against a private corporation providing medical services under contract with a state prison system, a plaintiff must allege a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations at issue.”).
Alternatively, a plaintiff may state a plausible basis for Monell liability against a medical services provider such as Wexford by “alleging failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline ... [and alleging facts showing] that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106. In this context, the provider's “failure to train or supervise must amount to a policy or custom in disregard of an obvious risk that its employees or agents would commit constitutional violations.” Ponzini v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 269 F.Supp.3d 444, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Ponzini v. Monroe Cnty, 789 Fed.Appx. 313 (3d Cir. 2019).
Here, Plaintiff fails to identify a policy or custom adopted by Wexford that resulted in his alleged constitutional injury, nor does he allege facts plausibly connecting any failure to train, supervise, or discipline staff to the violation of his rights. As argued by Wexford, “Plaintiff has failed to identify any official proclamation, decision or policy that led to his contraction of Covid-19. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated a widespread custom that led to his contraction of Covid-19. Further, Plaintiff failed to detail how WHS filed to follow CDC guidelines regarding Covid-19 in prisons.” ECF No. 30 at 13. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a Monell claim against Wexford and it is recommended that any such claim be dismissed.
C. Punitive Damages
Wexford moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages because, like his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting an inference of deliberate conduct required to state a claim. Id. at 14. The Court agrees.
Punitive damages are recoverable pursuant to Section 1983 only if the conduct giving rise to the claim was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). In this case, Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to set forth a cognizable deliberate indifference claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges no facts plausibly suggesting that Wexford knew that he suffered a serious mental or medical heath condition requiring treatment, as is necessary to establish that it recklessly or intentionally disregarded a known risk to Plaintiffs safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (a person acts with deliberate indifference when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (to survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible). Under these circumstances, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff s claims for punitive damages.
D. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs Complaint seeks relief in the form of a declaration by the Court that “the Defendants have acted in violation of the United States Constitution,” and “granting Plaintiff Scott a declaration that these acts and omissions described [in the Complaint] violates rights under the Constitution [and] laws of the United States.” ECF No. 11 at 6. The Complaint also seeks an injunction ordering “Defendants to cease withdrawals from his inmate account.” Id. Wexford seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs demands for declaratory and injunctive relief as improperly stated. ECF No. 27 at 4.
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs demand for declaratory relief is properly dismissed because “[declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and it is not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 Fed.Appx. 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs request for declaratory relief.
The Court has reviewed the Complaint and, broadly interpreted, he requests that “Defendants” be ordered to cease withdrawals from his inmate account. ECF No. 11 at 6. Because Plaintiffs claims against Wexford do not implicate his inmate account, the request for prospective injunctive relief is not directed at Wexford. Thus, Wexford's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is properly granted.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiffs claims against Wexford suffer from insufficient factual averments, he could be in possession of additional facts to support his claims. Therefore, it is recommended that Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint as to his Fourteenth Amendment, Monell, and punitive damages claims. However, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief should be dismissed with prejudice and without an opportunity to amend.
The Court should further instruct Plaintiff that any Amended Complaint must be filed within thirty days, must fully allege every claim he wishes to pursue against all parties, and be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original Complaint. See Young v. Minnick, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v, Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.