Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 02-0129, SECTION "T" (1)
February 5, 2003
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 42], pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed on behalf of the Defendant, Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., and Wayne Moore. The Court, having considered the memoranda of counsel, the Court record, the applicable law and jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
This suit involves a tort claim for injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Arts. 2315, 2316, 2317, and 2320. The action was originally filed in the 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, and was removed on January 15, 2002. Plaintiff contends that Defendants, Rite Aid Corporation, Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., and Wayne Moore, are jointly, severally, and in solido legally bound unto the Plaintiff to fully and justly compensate the Plaintiff for injuries that he sustained, for his past and future medical, drug and hospital expenses incurred as a consequence of the accident in the suit, for his past and future pain and suffering, physically and mentally; his past and future mental anguish; his past and future inability to engage in normal, social and physical activities, his past and future loss of income; his permanent bodily disability and disfigurement; and for all other appropriate, general and equitable relief to which he may be entitled, including legal interest from the date of the judicial demand until paid, and for all of these proceedings, including expert fees.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about January 11, 2001, he entered the Rite Aid Store No. 7237, located at 725 Veterans Boulevard, Metairie, Louisiana. At approximately, 12:00 p.m. (Noon), Plaintiff claims that, while standing at the pharmacy counter, he was approached by a Rite Aid employee, who requested that Plaintiff assist defendant, truck driver Wayne Moore, push a pallet of merchandise up a ramp from a delivery truck into the stock room of the pharmacy. At the time, Wayne Moore was operating under a contract between Ryder and Rite Aid to deliver materials which had been assembled at Rite Aid distribution centers. Plaintiff alleges that in the process of assisting defendant, Wayne Moore, push the pallet of merchandise up a ramp in to the stockroom, Plaintiff suffered a severe lumbar injury which has been diagnosed as a herniated disc by his treating physician and confirmed by diagnostic testing. As a remedy, Plaintiff seeks damages due to numerous allegations of negligence and strict liability on part of the Defendants. Plaintiff did not receive any form of payment or compensation from either Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., or Wayne Moore for his assistance. Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to assist in moving the merchandise, and Plaintiff was not approached or solicited by Wayne Moore to assist in moving the merchandise. Furthermore, the Plaintiff could have, at any time prior to his alleged injury, refused Rite Aid's request to assist Wayne Moore and chose not to do so.
Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, p. 2, PP. 7.
Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, p. 2, PP. 5, 6.
Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, p. 2, PP. 8.
Defendants, in response, filed an answer denying Plaintiffs allegations citing lack of sufficient information, and failure of Plaintiff to use reasonable judgment as a prudent person. Defendants, Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., and Wayne Moore, filed the current motion on January 9, 2003.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES:
A. Arguments of the Defendant in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment:
Defendant seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to and cannot establish that either Ryder Integrated Systems or Wayne Moore owed him a duty, that there was a defect present in the merchandise sought to be moved that was the responsibility of either Wayne Moore or Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., or that Wayne Moore committed any tort for which Ryder can be culpable. Without a duty present, the Plaintiff cannot establish the four elements of negligence in his claims against Wayne Moore and Ryder Integrated Systems, Inc. under the appropriate Louisiana duty-risk analysis.
Defendants maintain that whatever the alleged injury to the Plaintiff, it was a result of his own voluntary action. In his depositions, Defendants point out that it was the Rite Aid employee who approached Plaintiff, not Wayne Moore, the Ryder employee.
Depo. of Robert Sciacca, dated April 2, 2002, and August 1, 2002, Exhibit D, Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment, in globo.
Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, p. 2, PP. 7.; Exhibit `C', PP. 7, Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants also state that the Plaintiff cannot maintain a strict liability claim against the Defendants. In applying a strict liability analysis to the claims alleged in the petition, the Defendants note that the Plaintiff has not alleged any defect with the merchandise, cannot find any defect with the merchandise, and cannot produce any jurisprudence that would allow him to recover under a La. C.C. art. 2317 framework of strict liability. As Plaintiff has admitted, his injuries occurred because he agreed to unload the pallet full of Rite Aid merchandise. Furthermore, Defendants argue that neither Wayne Moore nor Ryder employees were engaged in the packing or loading of the pallets of merchandise onto the Ryder truck, all of which was done by Rite Aid employees. Wayne Moore simply picked up a loaded Ryder truck in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and unloaded the goods on the vehicle at various Rite Aid stores in Louisiana. Defendants submit that if the weight of pallet presents a defect under La. C.C. art. 2317, then the party responsible for the presence of the defect is Rite Aid, not Ryder nor Wayne Moore.
Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.
B. Arguments of the Plaintiffs in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment:
Plaintiff presents for argument the notion that while the truck driver did not solicit the help of the Plaintiff, he did accept his help. Plaintiff states that Wayne Moore had superior knowledge of the contents of the load and the process of unloading the merchandise. Furthermore, Plaintiff identifies several La. C.C. articles which fall under the rubric of Modes of Acquiring Ownership of Things, Conventional Obligations or Contracts, Consent, Art. 1927, alleging that acceptance of a contract between Ryder and Plaintiff occurred when Wayne Moore consented to the assistance of the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Wayne Moore had a responsibility `not to put Plaintiff into any hazardous situations, or entrap him . . .'
Plaintiff, Supplementary Opposition p. 3.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Motion for Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56©). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56©), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "A dispute about a material fact is `genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Skotak, 953 F.2d at 913, citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B. Louisiana's `Duty-Risk' Analysis under La. C.C. art. 2315:
Plaintiff has predicated his claims on Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315, 2316, 2317 and 2320. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, a duty-risk approach is appropriate in this matter. Under the Louisiana approach, the Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (duty element); (2) proof that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (breach element); (3) defendant's breach of duty was a cause in fact of the injuries complained of (cause in fact element); (4) proof that the defendants substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of the liability or scope of protection element); and (5) plaintiff suffered actual damages. Boykin v. Louisiana Transit Company, 707 So.2d 1225, 1230 (La. 1998). Under this analysis, the Plaintiff must affirmatively prove the first four elements of the duty-risk approach. Peterson v. Gibraltar Savings and Loan, 753 So.2d 1198, 1204, (La. 1999); McCalmont, v. Jeff Parish Sheriff's Office, 748 So.2d 1286, 1288 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2000). The duty element represents a legally enforceable obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct and whether a duty is owed is a question of law. Stroik, 699 So.2d at 1077; Peterson, 733 So.2d at 1204; Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, 455 So.2d 1364, 1371 (La. 1998). This duty may be imposed by legislation or by rule of law, and the inquiry to be made is "whether the plaintiff has any law — statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault — to support his claim." Harrison v. Shipp, 724 So.2d 864, 868 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1998). Whether a duty is owed must be decided by the Court from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Harris, 455 So.2d at 1371; Harrison, 724 So.2d at 867. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that "when no duty exists, a court will dismiss a petition as a matter of law for failure to state a cause of action." Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151, 1158 (La. 1988).
C. Louisiana's Strict Liability Standard under La. C.C. art. 2317:
Under Louisiana Civil Code art. 2317 and jurisprudence, strict liability is distinguished from negligence in that when attempting to prove strict liability, a plaintiff does not have to show that the defendant knew or should have known of the existence of the defect. Oubre v. Union Carbide Corp., 747 So.2d 212, 226 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1999). Thus, to prove liability under La. C.C. art. 2317, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the thing which caused the damage was in the care and custody of the defendant; (2) the thing had a vice or defect that created an unreasonable risk of harm; and (3) the defect caused the injury. Id.; Gordon v. State Farm Ins. Co., 700 So.2d 1117, 1119 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must prove that the defect of the thing is a condition which poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Celestine v. Union Carbide Co. of California, 652 So.2d 1299 (La. 1995); Oubre, 747 So.2d at 226. If a plaintiff cannot show that a defect was present, strict liability cannot be imposed. Id. at 1119; Orillion v. Alton Ochsner Med. Foundation, 695 So.2d 1063, 1064 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1997).
D. Court's Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that the accident and the resulting injuries were caused through no fault of his own, but was caused by the negligence, carelessness and the strict liability of the Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that La. Civil Code Articles 2315, 2316, and 2317 was violated due to Defendant's: (1) failure to maintain its business premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees; (2) negligence in failing to employ physically capable personnel to conduct its business operations; its negligence in failing to employ sufficient personnel to conduct its business operations in a safe and proper manner; (3) negligence in requesting your plaintiff to assist an employee which defendant knew and/or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known was physically incapable of performing the duties of his employment; (4) negligent action allowing an employee to operate a motor vehicle who was physically handicapped; (5) failure to properly train and supervise its employees to insure that they were capable of performing their assigned duties without requesting physical assistance from business invitees on its premises; (6) negligently failed to inform Plaintiff that defendant was physically incapable of assisting Plaintiff to discharge cargo; (7) negligent movement of a pallette load of merchandise; (8) negligently failed to secure other employees of defendant to assist in unloading pallette into the storeroom; (9) negligently or deliberately failing to disclose to the Plaintiff the weight of the pallette; (10) negligently requesting and allowing a business invitee to assist one of its employees perform assigned duties; (11) Defendant is strictly liable; and, (12) Defendant is negligent.
Under a `duty-risk' analysis, a duty represents a legally enforceable obligation. In looking at the arguments and the evidence provided by the parties, this Court is drawn to the duty which Ryder and Wayne Moore owed to the Plaintiff, Robert Sciacca. The Court must bear in mind that Plaintiff had no contract with either Defendant, Ryder or Wayne Moore. He had no relationship with Ryder or Wayne Moore at all until he was asked by the Rite Aid employee to assist in moving the pallette. When the Plaintiff entered the store, he had a reasonable expectation that the store would be free from hazardous conditions, but that is a reasonable expectation which comes directly from Rite Aid. Yes, when a person enters a commercial establishment, there is a reasonable expectation that the store will be free from falling objects and other hazardous conditions or materials; however, no situation like that exists here. Defendants are correct in their assertion that Plaintiff has not cited any law or offered any evidence that supports the allegation that Defendants, Ryder and/or Wayne Moore, owed him, as a Rite Aid patron, any duty or duties which give rise to the claims asserted in his petition for damages. It was the Rite Aid employee who asked Plaintiff to assist in moving the pallette. While Plaintiff argues that once Wayne Moore accepted his assistance, Ryder owed a duty to Plaintiff, the Court does not accept this argument. Was there an immediate duty not to accept his assistance? The Court cannot find a duty here with regard to the voluntary actions of Plaintiff. Under his own free will, Plaintiff voluntarily assisted the Ryder employee, Wayne Moore, who did not even ask for his assistance in the first place. Defendant's acquiescence to the voluntary assistance provided by Plaintiff does not automatically create a duty on behalf of Wayne Moore. It was Plaintiff who chose not to walk away from assisting Wayne Moore with the pallette. In fact, it was Plaintiff, who testified in his deposition that he voluntarily assisted the Defendant, and it was the Plaintiff who was free to leave whenever he wished. With no duty, the Court cannot complete an analysis under the `duty-risk' framework which is applicable in Louisiana.
Depo. of Robert Sciacca, dated April 2, 2002, and August 1, 2002, Exhibit D, Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment, in globo. P. 60.
Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151, 1158 (La. 1988).
According to the record, including the deposition of the Plaintiff, see Exhibit B, there existed no hazardous conditions in the store, no hazardous conditions on the ramp where the pallet was being loaded, nor any indications of inclement weather. With this in mind, the Plaintiff cannot point to any vice or defect to the merchandise, or pallette, that would allow recovery under a strict liability standard. The reason that the Plaintiff cannot point to some unreasonable harm is because he cannot identify any unreasonable harm that was present.
However, this is not a simple slip and fall case. The events in this matter did not involve the Plaintiff slipping on a slick area due to the failure of an employee of the commercial establishment to notice a spill. The events did not involve an object falling off of the shelves onto the person of the Plaintiff, thereby causing an injury. Many questions arise in the analysis that let us examine any duties that are owed between the parties to this litigation; however, all of the duties that arise exist between Plaintiff and Defendant, Rite Aid. None of the duties which arise exist between Ryder and/or Wayne Moore and the Plaintiff.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant more than adequately carries its burden of identifying the possibility of an absence of genuine issue of material fact; subsequently, under Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and its progeny, the non-movant Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the disputed actions of the Ryder and/or Wayne Moore present genuine issue for trial. As such, this Court, with the material presented before it, grants the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the defendant, Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. and Wayne Moore, be and the same is hereby GRANTED.