Opinion
Rehearing Denied June 11, 1974.
Page 312
Kettelkamp & Vento, P.C., W. C. Kettlekamp, Jr., Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas E. Jagger, Pueblo, for defendants-appellees.
COYTE, Judge.
This appeal involves a review of disciplinary proceedings initiated against appellant, William Schonlau, an officer of the Pueblo Police Department. Following notice and a hearing, appellant was discharged by the chief of the Pueblo Police Department for violations of the rules and regulations of the department as well as the general charge of 'conduct unbecoming an employee of the City of Pueblo.' Schonlau appealed the order of discharge to the Pueblo Civil Service Commission which denied his appeal and sustained the order of discharge without modification. Thereafter, Schonlau filed a petition for review in district court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a). The district court upheld the order of discharge and Schonlau brought this appeal. We affirm.
Section 6--5--23 of the City of Pueblo ordinances authorizes department heads such as the Chief of Police to impose disciplinary action on subordinates. City Ordinance 6--5--24 states that the grounds for discipline by discharge shall include the following:
'(c) Violation of these rules, departmental regulations, general regulations of law;
(d) conduct unbecoming an employee of the City . . ..'
The charges against appellant which are relevant to this appeal are as follows:
'Removing or causing to be removed from the records of the Pueblo Police Department a traffic ticket issued by another police officer.
'Failure to report that a 'payoff' had been made on a traffic ticket he removed or caused to be removed from the records of the Police Department being the same ticket be (sic) marked or caused to be marked a warning ticket.'
The Commission sustained the order of discharge on the basis of the charges quoted above. After hearing, the Commission made findings of fact and entered an order as follows:
'In reference to Counts 6 and 7, the Commission does find that Sgt. Schonlau by his own admission did cause a ticket charging excessive speed and reckless driving to be removed from the records of the Pueblo Police Department, on the request of Concialdi (a Pueblo tavern operator). The Commission finds that this was done with the knowledge of Officer Dolman and Officer Fox, together with their expressed or implied consent. There were no written Regulations in the Department covering this matter. The Commission further finds that laxity did exist in the Department as it related to the manner in which tickets on specific occasions might be fixed and/or adjusted.
'In relation to Count 8, the Commission finds that Sgt. Schonlau did fail to report that a 'pay-off' had been made to Concialdi on the traffic ticket he removed from the records of the Police Department.
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'The Commission does find that Sgt. Schonlau's failure to report the fact that Concialdi had obtained money from Carreon for 'fixing' a ticket, which Concialdo, by imposition of purported friendship had induced Sgt. Schonlau to strike from the records of the Department, is of sufficient gravity to sustain the severe penalty of discharge imposed by the Chief.'
I.
On appeal, Schonlau first contends that the findings of the Commission are insufficient because they do not specifically state that his conduct violated the rules and regulations of the police department or constituted conduct unbecoming a city employee. Schonlau asserts that the case of State Civil Service Commission v. Conklin, 138 Colo. 528, 335 P.2d 537, compels reversal of the order of discharge. Schonlau's reliance upon Conklin is misplaced. There, the court refused to sustain the order of the Civil Service Commission because the findings of the Commission made no reference to the charges preferred against the employee, and because the Commission had upheld the action of dismissal on different grounds than those originally asserted against the employee.
In the instant case, the order of the Commission recites the various allegations against Schonlau and then states specific findings with reference to each of the charges. In its conclusion of law, the Commission stated that two of the charges were sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal. Thus, the findings of fact and conclusions of the Commission were not subject to the infirmity which required reversal in the Conklin case.
Furthermore, the findings of the Commission are sufficient in content to apprise the parties and the reviewing court of the factual basis of the action of the administrative agency so that the parties and the reviewing tribunal may determine whether the decision has support in the evidence and in the law. Neverdahl v. Linder, 141 Colo. 186, 347 P.2d 512; Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo. 536, 313 P.2d 980. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sufficient.
II.
Schonlau next contends that there was no competent evidence that he failed to report a 'pay-off.' We disagree.
There was considerable testimony adduced at the hearing with respect to the various charges brought against appellant. However, it is unnecessary to recite all the testimony. Schonlau by his own testimony admitted his role in 'fixing' a traffic ticket by removing it from police department files. And, further, his testimony demonstrated that he had knowledge that a third party had received money for arranging to fix the ticket. It is undisputed that Schonlau did not report these facts. This testimony alone was sufficient to support the pertinent findings of the Commission and these findings therefore will not be disturbed on review. Civil Service Commission v. Doyle, 174 Colo. 149, 483 P.2d 380; Stevens v. Civil Service Commission, 172 Colo. 446, 474 P.2d 156. In turn, these findings were sufficient to support the conclusion that the charges brought against Schonlau were proven. See Bennett v. Price, 167 Colo. 168, 446 P.2d 419; Thomas v. City and County of Denver, 29 Colo.App. 442, 487 P.2d 591 . III.
Finally, Schonlau argues that the penalty imposed--discharge--was too severe in relation to the violations committed by him. Schonlau asserts that the arbitrary nature of the Commission's action is demonstrated by the fact that another officer involved in the ticket-fixing situation received a suspension, while he received a discharge.
The penalty imposed in disciplinary proceedings will not be set aside unless it bears no reasonable relationship to the conduct of the individual. Bennett v. Price, Supra. Here, the punishment was reasonably related to the conduct, and it will not be disturbed. We see no legal significance in the fact that another officer who engaged in somewhat different, although related conduct, received a different punishment.
Judgment affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and ENOCH, J., concur.