Opinion
Case No. A2-98-76
July 15, 1999.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a motion by defendants for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. #73). Plaintiff resists the motions.
A. Factual Background
Between 1991 and 1997, plaintiff Gene Schneeweis and the Grand Forks police department have had extensive contact. There have been 43 incident reports filed relating to plaintiff of which 24 involved the police department responding to complaints from private citizens about plaintiff's behavior. Seventeen incident reports related to complaints made by plaintiff about harassment, vandalism, and other disputes with third parties. Of the remaining two contacts, one resulted in the arrest of plaintiff for disorderly conduct which led to a conviction, and the other involved a confrontation between plaintiff and a police officer at the police station over parking tickets.
In August 1995, plaintiff enrolled in the Paramedicine Program at Northwest Technical College. As a part of the program, students would receive training and work at Altru Hospital in what was referred to as the clinical portion of the program. On October 20, 1995, while plaintiff was on a clinical rotation, Grand Forks Police Officer Harlan Jensen transported a patient to Altru Hospital. Officer Jensen talked to plaintiff about a hearing to which plaintiff had subpoenaed several officers, but not Officer Jensen.
Plaintiff alleges that the comments Officer Jensen made were overheard by staff members at the hospital and were defamatory. Plaintiff complained to the city, and the then Mayor's assistant, Pat Owens, called a meeting to discuss the incident. Officer Jensen, Owens, and Assistant Director of Human Resources for Grand Forks, Daryl Hovland, attended the meeting on November 8, 1995, where Officer Jensen apologized. That same day, Hovland wrote a letter reiterating the apology from Officer Jensen and apologizing on behalf of the city as well. After receiving this letter, plaintiff asked the then Mayor and Chief of Police about it, and both stated it had been written without their authorization.
On December 17, 1995, plaintiff was again on a clinical rotation at Altru Hospital, and Grand Forks Police Officer Mark Ellingson transported a patient to the hospital. Officer Ellingson had a conversation with another employee of the hospital. Plaintiff alleges he overheard parts of that conversation, including the phrases "what was he doing here" and "do you know about him." Plaintiff alleges that these phrases were about him, and that the contents were defamatory.
In the summer of 1997, plaintiff brought a suit against Northwest Technical College, the City of Grand Forks, Pat Owens, Daryl Hovland, Harlan Jensen, Ronald McCarthy, Job Service of North Dakota, James J. Hirsch, Larry Anderson, and Altru Hospital in United States District Court, District of Minnesota. A hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss was scheduled for December 11, 1997, in Duluth, Minnesota. On December 10, 1997, plaintiff was arrested by Grand Forks police on an outstanding warrant for failure to pay the disorderly conduct fine. Due to his detention, plaintiff was unable to personally attend the hearing in Duluth but did participate via telephone.
United States District Court, District of Minnesota, dismissed Northwest Technical College, Job Service of North Dakota, James J. Hirsch, Larry Anderson, and Altru Hospital, and transferred the case, this case, to the District of North Dakota. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint lists claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, the First Amendment, and for Obstruction of Justice.
The Court agrees with defendants' characterization of plaintiff's pleadings, they are inartfully presented and difficult to understand. The Court has made great effort in this regard and has very liberally construed the allegations in the complaint.
B. Dismissal Standard
A district court should not dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief. See Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998). In addition, a complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts that a plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. See Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Captain Ronald McCarthy
None of the factual allegations mention or involve Captain Ronald McCarthy. Since no factual allegations are made in support of a claim against Captain McCarthy, the complaint against him is properly dismissed.B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
There are two elements to a section 1983 claim which a plaintiff must allege in order to prevail. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Jones v. Gutschenritter, 909 F.2d 1208, 1211 (8th Cir. 1990). Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted under color of state law.Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150; Jones, 909 F.2d at 1211.
1. Defamation
In order to determine whether plaintiff has been deprived of a federal right, the Court assumes that plaintiff's allegations are true. Thus, for purposes of discussion, the Court assumes Officers Jensen and Ellingson did defame plaintiff. The law is clearly established that one does not have a constitutional right to be free from defamation. See generally Paul v. Davis, 42 U.S. 693 (1976). Plaintiff's claims against Officers Jensen and Ellingson fail an essential element of a section 1983 claim, that plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
2. First Amendment Claim
In the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants violated his First Amendment rights. First Amendment rights are clearly secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. However, plaintiff doesn't make any specific factual allegations in support of how his First Amendment rights were violated by any of the defendants.
The court should liberally construe the allegations of a pro se complaint. Edgington v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 52 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
No specific allegations are made indicating how any of the defendants interfered with plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The Amended Complaint is conclusory and therefore insufficient to state a claim under section 1983. See id.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claim
The Supreme Court has set out four basic elements necessary to state a claim under this statute: (1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) resulting injury or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1982).
The second requirement of these four basic elements requires that there be some racial, or other "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," motivating the conspirators. Id. Courts have held that discrimination based on race, gender, and religion satisfy this second requirement. Id. at 648-49. The crux of the test is whether the classification is sufficiently "invidious."Id. at 649.
The plaintiff in Shortbull argued that he was part of a protected class since he was politically opposed to the defendants. Shortbull, 677 F.2d at 649. The court in Shortbull held political opposition was not sufficient to raise a class-based claim. Id. Here, plaintiff was in political opposition to Owens when they competed in the mayoral election, but that is not sufficient to raise a class-based claim. Id. Nowhere in the record has plaintiff identified himself as a member of any protected class or that class-based animus motivated the alleged conspirators. The section 1985 claim is appropriately dismissed.
D. Obstruction of Justice
Plaintiff alleges that his arrest on December 10, 1997, one day before a hearing scheduled before the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota was done to obstruct justice since plaintiff was unable to personally attend the hearing. However, plaintiff did participate in the hearing by telephone and certainly was not prejudiced by a lack of personal attendance. In any event, the Court is not aware of, nor has plaintiff provided legal support of a private right of action for Obstruction of Justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (criminal statute). The Court finds no merit to the obstruction of justice claim.
E. Equal Treatment
Plaintiff makes allegations about how his complaints to the Grand Forks Police Department are not treated in the same manner as complaints about him. The Court fails to see how this generalized grievance rises to the level of a federally protected right.
F. Qualified Immunity
The Court notes that even if the complaint were sufficient in any of its allegations, it would nevertheless fail on the basis of qualified immunity. Public officials are immune from suit when carrying out their executive duties as long as their conduct doesn't violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." See Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing qualified immunity). All the public officials named were acting in their executive capacities while the alleged conduct took place, and they did not violate plaintiff's federal rights. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (doc. #73), is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for oral argument, (doc. #81), is DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery, (doc. #69), is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff's complaint and cause of action is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.