Opinion
Civil Action 22-557
01-08-2024
DAMIEN M. SCHLAGER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WETZEL SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY and JOHN/JANE DOE MAILROOM EMPLOYEE AT SCI FAYETTE OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, Defendants.
Marilyn J. Horan District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NOS. 37 AND 47
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Damien M. Schlager (“Schlager”), ECF No. 37, as to his procedural due process claim and award nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. It is also recommended that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Schlager's claims for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. It is further recommended that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendant John Wetzel, former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Wetzel”), ECF No. 47, as to Schlager's procedural due process claim, but grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to any First Amendment access-to-court claim. Finally, it is recommended that the Court dismiss all claims against “John/Jane Doe Mailroom Employee at SCI Fayette” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), and dismiss any claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Schlager is a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI - Fayette”). Schlager brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.He alleges that in accordance with prison mail policies implemented by Defendant Wetzel, John and Jane Doe Defendants failed to provide notice that mail addressed to him was refused by prison staff and returned to the sender. ECF No. 4. Thus, Schlager asserts claims against Wetzel and John and Jane Doe Mailroom Employees at SCI - Fayette for the violation of his procedural due process rights under Fourteenth Amendment.
Schlager asserts claims for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. ECF No. 4 ¶ 1. To establish a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show “(1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property, or the deprivation of any right.” Whitehead v. Wetzel, 720 Fed.Appx. 657, 662 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997)). Schlager fails to allege facts or present evidence of any element of this claim. Thus, Schlager's claim under § 1985(3) fails as a matter of law. Likewise, Schlager's claim under § 1986 fails. A § 1986 claim requires an underlying violation of § 1985. “[I]f the claimant does not set forth a cause of action under the latter, [his] claim under the former must also fail.” Id. (quoting Rogin v. Bensalem Twp, 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980)). The Court therefore recommends that each of these claims be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim for relief.
On August 26, 2020, Schlager learned that DOC personnel refused his mail when he received a package from the District Attorney's Office of York County. Id. at 2-3. The package contained “copies of letters, [m]otions[,] and envelopes that Assistant District Attorney McCabe (“ADA McCabe”) sent Schlager at SCI - Fayette ... pertaining to Schlager's pending legal case in the [United States District Court for the] Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Id. at 3. Upon review, the contents revealed that mail sent by ADA McCabe had been rejected by SCI - Fayette mail room staff and returned to the District Attorney's Office of York County. Id.
Schlager's reference is to a collateral challenge to his 2006 criminal conviction for first degree murder and murder of an unborn child. See Schlager v. Coleman, No. 3:14-cv-01964 (M.D. Pa.). The district court in that case granted Schlager's motion to stay all proceedings on October 22, 2020. Id. at ECF Nos. 76 and 77. Schlager renewed his motion to stay on September 16, 2021, to permit him additional time to prosecute a new state court action for postconviction relief. Id. at ECF No. 87. On January 2, 2024, the district court lifted the stay at Schlager's request and granted him 45 days to supplement his habeas petition “concerning exhaustion of state court remedies.” Id. at ECF No. 104, ECF No. 105. His state court PCRA action was resolved against him by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on May 31, 2023. Commonwealth v. Schlager. 299 A.3d 935 (Table), 2023 WL 3736807 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 31, 2023) (unpublished disposition). On December 19, 2023, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Schlager's Petition for Allowance of Appeal. Commonwealth v. Schlager, No. 337 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 8726091 (Table) (Dec. 19,2023).
Schlager provides a copy of an envelope stamped “REFUSED: Go to WWW.COR.PA.GOV.” ECF No. 40-1. The website provides a link for inmate mail that in turn instructs those wishing to correspond with inmates that “[a]ll general incoming correspondence” must be sent to the Smart Communications address. The webpage instructs senders that mailing addresses must contain the inmate's full name and inmate number, and explains the procedure for all legal mail, including the use of an Attorney Control Number as well as a secondary authentication number (valid for one week) on the outside of the envelope. Id.
See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Pages/Mail.aspx. Smart Communications is a vendor contracted by DOC to act as the central incoming mail processing center for non-privileged correspondence for inmates in the custody of the DOC. See DOC Policy Statement DC-ADM 803 § 1(A)(3) (August 10, 2020).
After learning that his mail had been rejected, Schlager filed a grievance in accordance with the DOC's administrative remedy process and raised the failure to provide notice that his mail had been rejected. ECF No. 4-1. In the Initial Review Response, the grievance officer explained that correspondence from “District Attorneys [is] not considered legal mail, therefore get[s] rejected here and must go to smart comm.” Id. The grievance officer added that “[t]he mailroom does not have to notify you when mail is rejected/refused.” ECF No. 4-2. This response was upheld at each step of the grievance appeal process. ECF No. 4 at 4, ECF Nos. 4-2, 4-6.
Schlager alleges that contrary to the representations of DOC officials, the requirement to provide notice of rejected mail was resolved in favor of prisoners by “the Procunier decision” and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182 (3d Cir. 2021). Id. at 5. In Vogt, the Third Circuit held that under Procunier, a prisoner's receipt of mail is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 186. Thus, “prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected.” Id. at 184.
The Court understands this to be a reference to Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
For the violation of his rights, Schlager seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the DOC to stop rejecting legal mail without notice. Id. at 5-6.
Fact discovery is complete. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with supporting briefs, concise statements of fact, appendices of exhibits, and responsive briefs and statements of fact. ECF Nos. 37 - 40, 47 - 50, 51-52, 54. At this stage of the litigation, the John and Jane Doe defendants remain unidentified and have not been served with a summons or a copy of the Complaint.
As to Wetzel, it is undisputed that in accordance with the policies implemented by him, prison officials rejected the correspondence referenced in the Complaint without notice to Schlager. ECF No. 40-1 at 15-16 (“...Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was not given notice that the identified mail was refused...”). Yet Wetzel contests liability because ADA McCabe provided Schlager with notice, and it is undisputed that Schlager had an opportunity to challenge the rejection of his mail through the inmate grievance process. ECF No. 48 at 4; ECF No. 51 at 3. Thus, Wetzel's implementation of the DOC mail policy did not result in a violation of Schlager's procedural due process rights
Schlager contends that in the absence of notice that his mail was rejected, he lost the opportunity to litigate a discovery motion in his federal habeas case. Schlager's motion sought to compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to produce firearms and a truck that were exhibits in his 2006 criminal trial. ECF No. 38 at 6. See also Motion for Discovery, Schlager v. Coleman, No. 3:14-1964 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (ECF No. 42). Schlager states that he retained a firearms expert and sought production of the exhibits to permit an independent examination in aid of his petition for post-conviction relief. Id. The docket of Schlager's federal habeas action reflects that the Commonwealth, through ADA McCabe, filed a response in opposition to the motion. Id. (Jul. 13, 2020) (ECF No. 66). Schlager claims the Commonwealth's response was rejected by prison mailroom staff. Thus, unbeknownst to him, he lost the opportunity to timely file a reply. On July 14, 2020, the district court denied his Motion for Discovery. Id. (ECF No. 69) (Jul. 14, 2020); ECF No. 4 at 3; ECF No. 38 at 5; ECF No. 40-4 at 2.
In his brief, Schlager also claims that “potentially,” the rejection of mail interfered with his ability to “fully present and [exhaust] required State remedies concerning newly discovered evidence.” ECF No. 38 at 7. Schlager states that because prison officials rejected his mail without notice, he was unable to respond to a “§ 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss” issued by the Court of Common Pleas. The notice disclosed that the trial court intended to deny Schlager's petition for post-conviction relief. Id. Schlager's Complaint does not allege a separate claim arising out of the rejection of his state court mail and he has not supplemented the Complaint. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied Schlager an opportunity to file a belated response to the § 907 Notice because his petition for post-conviction relief, filed eleven years after conviction, was untimely. Commonwealth v. Schlager, 299 A.3d 935 (Table), 2023 WL 3736807, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 31, 2023) (unpublished disposition).
The district court considered the motion and concluded that Schlager failed to establish that habeas relief would be appropriate even if the assumed facts were fully developed through the requested discovery. Schlager, No. 3:14-1964, 2020 WL 3980206 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2020). On July 28, 2020, Schlager filed a motion for reconsideration and asserted that he had not yet received the Commonwealth's brief in response to his motion. Motion for Reconsideration, Schlager v. Coleman, No. 3:14-1964 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2020) (ECF No. 71 at 2). Schlager conceded that he had filed his discovery motion without a supporting brief and that the district court denied his motion because he “failed to explain how each item would entitle him to habeas relief.” Id. at 3. Schlager then addressed each item and requested that discovery be permitted. Id. His motion for reconsideration remains pending because Schlager filed a series of motions to stay all proceedings. On August 29, 2020, Schlager also filed a letter addressed to ADA McCabe and requested that “[f]or future mailings, if you do not obtain the DOC numbers required” that mail be send “by way of Florida.” Correspondence, Schlager v. Coleman, No. 3:14-1964 (M.D. Pa. August 29, 2020) (ECF No. 74). “Florida” is an apparent reference to Smart Communications' offsite mail handling facility.
The stay was lifted on January 2, 2024. See, n. 2, infra.
In light of the lost opportunity to file a reply, Schlager seeks compensatory and punitive damages for “the years [in prison] he must continue to suffer” as a consequence of Wetzel's actions. Id. at 7-8.
In support of his claim for injunctive relief, Schlager asserts that prison officials continue to reject mail without notice. ECF No. 39 ¶ 12; ECF No. 40-5 at 2-11. Schlager provides copies of letters postmarked January 2022 through April 2022 and addressed to him that were rejected. The envelopes reflect the following reasons for refusal: (1) the address did not include both his first and last name (id. at 4-6); (2) the address omitted his inmate number (id. at 2); (3) the address was not scannable by Smart Communications (Id. at 3); (4) the mail was not sent through Smart Communications and did not qualify as exempt privileged mail (Id. at 10); and (5) the mail qualified as exempt privileged mail, but the sender did not include a DOC-issued control number on the envelope (Id. at 7). Schlager asserts that as to each item, he was not provided notice or an opportunity to challenge the prison's refusal to deliver his mail before it was returned. ECF No. 39 ¶ 12. Schlager has not moved to supplement his Complaint to include a claim arising out the rejection of any of this correspondence and he acknowledges that he filed a grievance as to each item and learned the reason for refusal. ECF No. 38 at 5.
The cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. See also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof.”).
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc, v. P'ship Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1991). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (the non-movant must present affirmative evidence-more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance-which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary judgment). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are pending, a district court “should consider cross-motions for summary judgment separately and apply the appropriate burden of production to each motion.” Beenick v. LeFebvre, 684 Fed.Appx. 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2017) (not precedential) (citing Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)). “If upon review of cross motions for summary judgment [the court] find[s] no genuine dispute over material facts, then [the court] will order judgment to be entered in favor of the party deserving judgment in light of the law and undisputed facts.” Iberia Foods Corp, v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998)).
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Schlager is proceeding pro se, thus he is entitled to liberal reading of his pleadings and documents filed in opposition to the pending motion. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att'y Gen, of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”)). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991).
Even so, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“merely because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se does not relieve him of the obligation under Rule 56(e) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact”); Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 11-584, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
In consideration of Schlager's pro se status, the Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37)
Schlager contends that in accordance with the inmate mail policy implemented by Wetzel, prison officials rejected his mail without notice to him. As a result, he claims that his procedural due process rights were violated. Thus, he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor and the award of compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. ECF No. 38.
Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, “[s]tates may not deprive “any person” of their liberty ‘without due process of law.'” U.S. CONS, amend. XIV § 1. In assessing procedural due process claims, “the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest... is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law .... Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
The court “must first ‘determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.'” Montanez v. Sec'v Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010)). If the court determines that “the interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id. In turn, the analysis of the process due is conducted by weighing the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976): (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used” and the value of “additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) the governmental interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 483.
Here, it cannot be disputed that state prisoners have a protected liberty interest “to correspond by mail.” Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th at 186 (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. at 418). Therefore, the Court must weigh the three Mathews factors.
a. Private and Government Interests
As the United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found in Vogt, inmates have a protected liberty in receiving mail addressed to them. However, that interest is limited due to the circumstances of confinement. See, Pelino v. Wetzel, No. 21-1363, 2022 WL 1239050, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 27, 2022) (quoting Mosby v. Mabry, 697 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“reasoning that ‘ [t]he Supreme Court implicitly approved the opening of nonprivileged mail to inspect for contraband in' Wolff [v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974)].”). See also Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (the DOC has a legitimate penological interest in inspecting and opening incoming prison mail “[t]o ensure that inmates cannot obtain contraband through the mail system.”). The government interest extends to preventing staff exposure to drug-soaked mail by rejecting correspondence that lacks a court or attorney control number and by requiring such non-privileged mail to be sent through Smart Communications. See ECF No. 50-1 at 87-91; Pelino v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 1239050, at *2 n.**. That leaves for consideration the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards when mail is rejected.
b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The Third Circuit has held that when there is “low risk of error” in “routine matters,” a predeprivation process is not required.
[I]n the “unusual case” where “the value of predeprivation safeguards ... is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue,” the state is not constitutionally required to provide any predeprivation process. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. 975. Following this rule, we have held that assessments against inmate accounts to defray the costs of medical treatment, Reynolds[ v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997)], or the application of a fixed fee to defray the costs of room and board, Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000), present the types of situations where pre-deprivation hearings are impractical or would be meaningless. Most pertinently, the court in Tillman reasoned that a program involving “routine matters of accounting, with a low risk of error,” requires no predeprivation process. Id. at 422.Montanez, 773 F.3d at 483-84.
DOC's Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications Policy and Procedures Manual (DC-ADM 803, effective 10/03/2018), and its successor (effective 08/10/2020), direct prison officials to refuse mail that does not contain a Court Control Number (“CCN”), Attorney Control Number (“ACN”), or that is addressed with incomplete sender or receiver information. ECF No. 50-1 at 12-13.
As reflected in the Complaint and the exhibits provided by Schlager, the risk of error by prison officials applying DC-ADM 803 is very low. It is undisputed that mail addressed to Schlager was rejected because it lacked an Attorney Control Number, or the sender failed to set forth Schlager's complete inmate identification information. There is no evidence that any prison official failed to adhere to the criteria set forth in the policies at issue, or that once the new . process was adopted, the criteria were not uniformly applied to all incoming inmate mail. Thus, the Court agrees “the routine review of incoming mail for required identifiers appears to be a ministerial matter with a low risk for error.” Housman v. SMART Communication, et al.. No. 22-1264 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2023) (ECF No. 30), report and recommendation adopted, (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2023) (ECF No. 31) (rejecting the need for a predeprivation process and dismissing potential procedural due process claim arising from rejection of mail addressed to inmate).Accordingly, a predeprivation hearing is not required to prevent errors. Montanez, 773 F.3d at 484; Saucon Valley Manor, Inc, v. Miller, 392 F.Supp.3d 554, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344-45) (“[i]f the process requires rote calculations or application of facts to specifically outlined, mechanical standards, then it is less likely that due process requires a predeprivation hearing to prevent erroneous deprivation.”).
In Housman, the plaintiff learned that mail sent to him by his attorney and his girlfriend had been rejected for violating the inmate mail policy and was returned without first providing notice to him. The district court granted motions to dismiss filed by prison officials and DOC's mail contractor because the plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim. The district court accepted as true the plaintiff's allegation that his mail had been rejected without notice. Thus, the plaintiff plausibly alleged that he was deprived of a liberty interest. IT at 9. However, the district court noted that the plaintiff failed to “allege that the state failed to provide due process” and did not “specifically address the adequacy of the grievance process as a post-deprivation remedy.” Id. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that the processing of mail involved “routine matters” with “low risk of error.” Id. Therefore, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, DOC's post-deprivation grievance process was sufficient to provide the process that was due. Id. (citing Tillman, 221 F.3d at 421). Here, Schlager directly addresses the alleged inadequacy of the grievance process and brings a procedural due process claim. Thus, while the Court finds, as in Housman, that predeprivation notice is not required, the adequacy of the post-deprivation process is subject to review.
The Third Circuit confirmed, however, that when a predeprivation process is not required, “inmates are entitled to some pre-deprivation notice of the prison's ... policy.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 484. Schlager does not allege that he was unaware of the DOC mail policy and there is no evidence (or claim) that prison officials impeded his ability to communicate the policy with individuals with whom he corresponded.
c. Adequacy of Post-Deprivation Process
The Court turns next to the adequacy of the DOC's post-deprivation process to determine whether, under Mathews, additional safeguards are warranted. A “fundamental requirement of procedural due process is an opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'” Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650, 665 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See also Vogt, 8 F.4th at 186 (due process requires a “reasonable chance to challenge the original official's decision.”).
Schlager argues that absent direct notice to him, he did not have an opportunity to appeal the refusal of mail before it was returned. Thus, his procedural due process rights were violated. ECF No. 38 at 2, 4-5, 8. For the reasons explained above, Schlager fails to establish that a predeprivation hearing is required. However, as held in Vogt, Schlager is entitled to both notice from the prison that his mail has been rejected and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the decision. Vogt, 8 F.4th at 186-87.
Wetzel contends that the post-deprivation process satisfies due process because Schlager received notice (and his mail) from ADA McCabe “no more than 44 days from the first rejection and no more than 20 days from the second.” ECF No. 51. At that time, Schlager was able to participate in the inmate grievance process and learned that his mail from ADA McCabe was properly rejected because it had not been sent to Smart Communication for processing.
Wetzel cites Ingram v. Medoza, No. 21-17399, 2022 WL 3716502 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2022), and Coe v. Zook, No. 1:18-714, 2020 WL 520578 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2020)) for the proposition that post-deprivation notice is sufficient if a grievance process available. In Ingram, prison officials rejected materials mailed to the plaintiff and returned the items without notice.
Two months after his mail was rejected, the plaintiff “received a ‘blank' confiscation report, which indicated that items had been confiscated ... but did not specify who conducted the confiscation or why the items were confiscated.” Ingram, 2022 WL 3716502, at *1. The plaintiff alleged additional items were confiscated and he filed grievances as to each seizure. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the district court determined that prison officials provided plaintiff both notice of the rejection of his mail and an opportunity to protest the decision. Id., at *2. Thus, plaintiff was afforded the procedural protections due.
One of the items had been confiscated five years prior to the filing of the complaint and the plaintiff did not allege that a named defendant was involved in the confiscation of that item. Ingram, 2022 WL 3716502, at *2 n. 2.
In Coe, an inmate experienced “difficulty” receiving emails and photographs. He filed an informal complaint with prison staff. A defendant responded that “a number of pictures sent to [plaintiff] ... were in violation of [the prison's] policy and returned to customer.” Coe, 2020 WL 520578, at *1. The inmate filed a grievance to complain that he did not received notice of nondelivery. The responding official denied the grievance stating the prison was not responsible for providing notice of non-delivery as that task was assigned to the private vendor. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's due process claim because the prison's response to his informal complaint afforded the plaintiff notice that his mail was refused, and the plaintiff had an opportunity to protest non-delivery through the prison grievance process.
In Ingram and Coe, prison officials provided the notice required by Procunier. Thus, defendants satisfied the obligation required by Vogt that “prisons ... notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 184. Coupled with the availability of a grievance process, both inmates were afforded procedural due process.
Here, it is undisputed that prison officials failed to notify Schlager that his mail was rejected. Thus, for 44 days, Schlager was unaware that his mail had been returned, leaving him with only a belated opportunity to challenge the rejection. In Vogt, the plaintiff also was unaware that mail addressed to him had been rejected 6 months earlier, leaving him without recourse to timely locate his correspondence or challenge the disposition. Like Schlager, the ability to eventually file a grievance was available to Vogt. Yet, as conceded by Wetzel after remand and in response to Vogt's Motion for Summary Judgment, the rejection of Vogt's mail without notice by prison officials “was in violation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.” Vogt v. Wetzel, No. 17-1407 (Secretary Wetzel's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment) (ECF No. 98 at 5). In this case, Wetzel fails to establish that a different conclusion is warranted.
Given the loss of a timely opportunity to challenge the rejection of mail, it is appropriate to consider “the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 483. No party addresses this issue directly; however, Wetzel presents the memorandum issued by DOC's Security Captain on March 31, 2022, that directs all mailroom and security offices to “begin using the ... Unacceptable Correspondence Form any time mail is addressed to an inmate, the inmate[']s identi[t]y is known, and the mail is being returned to sender, confiscated, or otherwise will not be delivered to the inmate by the mailroom.” ECF No. 50-1 at 95. Completion and processing of the form would have alerted Schlager that ADA McCabe's mail was “[n]on-privileged - incorrectly sent to institution.” Id. The form advises the inmate of the procedure and time allowed to challenge the rejection of mail and informs the inmate that the item will be held by the mailroom officer until the appeal process is completed. In addition, if the inmate does not wish to appeal, he “has the option to forward a cash slip with an addressed envelope within 15 working days ... to have the confiscated items mailed out of the facility ....” Id. at 96.
Based on the DOC's recent adoption of this procedure, the administrative burden on prison officials of providing notice does not appear onerous. See also, Procunier, 416 U.S. at 418-19 (holding that a requirement that an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence ... [did] not appear to be unduly burdensome.”).
In summary, after weighing each of the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Schlager was denied the minimum procedural safeguards due in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because there is nothing left for a factfinder to determine, it is recommended that the Court grant Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Wetzel only.
d. Damages
Before judgment can be entered, it is necessary to determine what damages should be awarded. Through his Motion for Summary Judgment, Schlager seeks the imposition of compensatory and punitive damages in an amount not less than $24,000,000 (or $34,000,000 as requested in his brief) for “the years he must continue to suffer the consequences of the Defendant's actions.” ECF No. 4 at 5; ECF No. 38 at 7-8. In addition, he claims he suffered mental anguish. ECF No. 4 at 6.
“Actual injury must be shown before a section 1983 plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for the denial of procedural due process.” Morrison v. Stepanski, 839 F.Supp. 1130, 1142 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)). “There must also be a showing that if not for the deprivation of procedural due process rights suffered by the plaintiff, the outcome would have been different. Otherwise, ‘an award of damages ... would constitute a windfall, rather than compensation.'” Id.
As to Schlager's claim of mental anguish, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an award of compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury absent allegations of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Hom, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). It cannot be disputed that Schlager does not allege physical injury. Therefore, he cannot recover damages for any alleged emotional or mental distress.
Schlager contends that he remains entitled to compensatory damages because he was prevented from filing a timely reply to the Commonwealth's response to his motion for discovery in his federal habeas action. He contends that with his reply in hand, the district court would have granted the motion. ECF No. 38 at 7-8. In turn, the district court's order would have permitted to him to present “newly discovered evidence” in his state PCRA case or argue that the Commonwealth interfered with his ability to do so. Id. Either would have “help[ed] prove Schlager's innocence in his criminal case.” Id.
The dockets and publicly available opinions belie Schlager's speculative leaps. First, the district court denied the motion to compel because Schlager “has not demonstrated good cause for the discovery requests” and “fail[ed] to explain how each item would entitle him to habeas relief on any of his claims.” Schlager v. Coleman, 2020 WL 3980206, at *2. Second, the Superior Court determined that the proposed evidence would not set forth any “newly discovered factfs],” and therefore would not have changed the conclusion that his petition for postconviction relief was untimely. Commonwealth v. Schlager, 2023 WL 3736807, at *4. Under these circumstances, Schlager cannot establish any actual damages flowing from the violation of his procedural due process rights and it is recommended that the Court deny Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent he seeks an award of compensatory damages.
Schlager also fails to present any evidence that he is entitled to punitive damages. He contends that he has no way of knowing what other injuries he may have suffered due to adherence to Wetzel's mail policy. ECF No. 38 at 8. “What was potentially lost is not compensable, but is punishable, and should be. Punitive damages should be levied against the Defendant proportionally to what was potentially lost, to ensure such is not repeated.” Id.
However, punitive damages are available against individual defendants in a Section 1983 case when there is evidence that the defendant's conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent” or when the defendant acted with “reckless or callous indifference” to a person's federally protected rights. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Schlager presents no evidence of evil motive or intent to establish that Wetzel's conduct was reckless or malicious. Thus, Schlager has not established that he is entitled to an award of punitive damages. As such, it is recommended that the Court deny Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied to the extent he seeks an award of punitive damages.
Schlager is not necessarily left without a remedy. “In a section 1983 suit, ‘nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.'” Keller v. Crawford, 465 F.Supp.3d 472, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.l 1 (1986), and citing Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting the availability of nominal damages in the absence of compensatory damages)). See also Morrison v. Stepanski, 839 F.Supp. at 1143 (“Nominal damages are, however, recoverable for violation of the right [to procedural due process] in the absence of proof of actual harm.”).
As a matter of law, “nominal damages may not exceed one dollar.” U.S, ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 830 (3d Cir. 1976). Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in his favor and against Wetzel in the amount of $1.00 as nominal damages.
e. Injunctive Relief
Schlager also seeks injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283 and 2284 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 in the form of an order requiring the DOC to “[stop] the complained of practice of rejection of legal mail, especially without notice. This is an ongoing practice to reject legal mail without notice.” ECF No. 4 at 2, 6. The Court finds that because DOC has revised its mail procedures to require mailroom staff to provide inmates notice when mail is rejected, and has established an opportunity to appeal or to forward mail deemed undeliverable, prospective relief in the form of a permanent injunction is not warranted. See Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2022) (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1)-(2), “[i]f the prison had not fixed the situation, a court could have stepped in [to award injunctive relief]. But the prison did, so we cannot.”). Therefore, it is recommended that Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied to the extent he seeks an award of injunctive relief.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1) provides:
(1) Prospective relief.-(A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
2. Wetzel's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47)
a. Procedural Due Process
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Wetzel relies on the same arguments advanced in opposition to Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 48 at 3-7. Thus, Wetzel contends that Schlager cannot establish a violation of his procedural due process rights because: (1) he received notice that prison officials rejected his mail from ADA McCabe and received the rejected correspondence shortly thereafter; and (2) Schlager had an opportunity to challenge the rejection through DOC's inmate grievance process. Id. at 4-5.
The Court has addressed these arguments in relation to Wetzel's opposition to Schlager's Motion for Summary Judgment and found them wanting based on the clear and unambiguous holding by the Third Circuit in Vogt that “prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 184. Thus, despite Schlager's later participation in the grievance process, his procedural due process rights were violated when prison officials rejected his mail from ADA McCabe and returned it without notice to Schlager. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court deny Wetzel's Motion for Summary as to Schlager's procedural due process claim.
b. First Amendment Access-to-Courts claim
Wetzel also moves for summary judgment as to any First Amendment access-to-courts claim that may be read into Schlager's Complaint. ECF No. 48 at 7. Wetzel argues that Schlager cannot establish that the rejection of his mail from ADA McCabe interfered with his ability litigate any claim pending in his federal habeas action. Schlager does not address this issue. ECF No. 54.
Prisoners retain a right of meaningful access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). “To establish an access-to-courts claim, a prisoner must demonstrate: (1) an “actual injury” (i.e., a lost opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim); and (2) there is no other remedy, save the present civil rights suit, that can possibly compensate for the lost claim. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. “To demonstrate an actual injury, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct hindered his attempt to litigate a non-ffivolous claim.” Watson v. Wingard, 782 Fed.Appx. 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (in turn, citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353)).
Here, Schlager fails to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding his access-to-courts claim. The record of his federal habeas action establishes that the district court denied his motion for discovery because Schlager failed to support each discovery request with required facts. Delayed receipt of the Commonwealth's response to this motion did not thwart his ability to litigate the propriety of discovery in his federal habeas action. Moreover, Schlager has filed a Motion for Reconsideration that remains pending before the district court. Because Schlager did not lose the opportunity to pursue his underlying habeas claim, he has failed to show an “actual injury.” Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant Wetzel's Motion for Summary Judgment as to any First Amendment access-to-court claim that may be construed from the Complaint.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Damien M. Schlager, ECF No. 37, as to his procedural due process claim and award nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. It is further recommended that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Schlager's claims for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.
It is further recommended that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendant John Wetzel, ECF No. 47, as to Schlager's procedural due process claim but grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to any First Amendment access-to-court claim.
Finally, it is recommended that the Court dismiss all claims against John/Jane Doe Mailroom Employee at SCI Fayette pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and dismiss any claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days of the date of this Report and Recommendation, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).