Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2670-G.
February 28, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant, the City of Cleburne, Texas (the "City"), to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against it. The plaintiff did not respond to the motion. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 9, 2000, the plaintiff Daniel Lee Schinzing ("Schinzing" or the "plaintiff") filed this action in state court against the City, alleging violations of rights he claims are guaranteed him by the United States and Texas Constitutions, and also alleging fraud and "criminal conspiracy." See Plaintiff's Original Complaint ("Complaint") ¶¶ 5, 8, 20. The City removed the case to this court on December 8, 2000. See City's Notice of Removal.
This case arises from a series of events which began on August 8 or 15, 1995, when two Cleburne police officers allegedly initiated a traffic stop of Schinzing's vehicle. Complaint ¶ 4; Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc on Jury Verdict of Guilty — Punishment Fixed by Jury (Sept. 18, 1996) ("Judgment"), attached as Exhibit "C" to City's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims in Their Entirety Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and Brief in Support Thereof ("City's Brief"). This traffic stop resulted in Schinzing's arrest for driving while his license was suspended, and his subsequent jury trial for the same charge. See Judgment. The plaintiff was found guilty, and was sentenced to 150 days of incarceration in the Johnson County Law Enforcement Center ("JCLEC"). See id. His conviction was later affirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals. See Schinzing v. State, No. 10-96-225-CR (Tex.App.-Waco June 18, 1997), attached as Exhibit "D" to City's Brief.
As a result of the above sequence of events, Schinzing alleges violations of rights he claims are guaranteed him by the common law of Texas or by the United States or Texas Constitutions. Schinzing alleges, e.g., that:
1. the traffic stop was conducted without a warrant, Complaint ¶ 5;
2. after the traffic stop, the officers arrested Schinzing for "`driving with a revoked Texas driver's license,'" although a warrant had not been issued for his arrest, id. ¶ 7;
3. he "suffered the indignity of being forced to submit to arrest with handcuffs being applied in total view of the public," id. ¶ 9;
4. because of the allegedly unlawful actions of the City and its agents, he "was forced to spend hundreds, if not more than a thousand hours, studying the history of traffic laws within this and other states," id. ¶ 18;
5. the City committed fraud by having its agents conduct a traffic stop on his automobile "without lawful authority either by Constitutional mandate, the common law, nor [sic] even by statute . . .," id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added);
6. the City and the judge of the court in which he was convicted engaged in an "obvious criminal conspiracy," in that they denied Schinzing his purported right "to state his case at any trial in which he may be a party," id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added);
7. "he was subjected to the indignities of 110 days of the 150 day original sentence in the JCLEC, indignities to which innocent citizens . . . should not be subjected," id. ¶ 26.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Before dismissal is granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-movant. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).B. Statute of Limitations
Liberally construed, Schinzing's complaint makes factual allegations to support three civil causes of action: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging the deprivation of rights guaranteed him under the United States Constitution; (2) a cause of action alleging the deprivation of rights guaranteed him under the Texas Constitution; and (3) fraud. Even when all the facts alleged are viewed in the light most favorable to Schinzing, however, Schinzing's § 1983 cause of action is barred by limitations. The record reflects that the events that gave rise to this claim occurred between August 8 or 15, 1995 (the date of Schinzing's arrest) and December 31, 1996 (the approximate date of Schinzing's release from the JCLEC), see Judgment; Complaint ¶¶ 4, 26. Schinzing's § 1983 claims are governed by Texas' two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury actions); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985) ("§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions . . ."); Eugene v. Alief Independent School District, 65 F.3d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) ("§ 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations."), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996). Schinzing was therefore required to file this case at least by early 1999. Because he failed to do so, the § 1983 claim must be dismissed.
Schinzing alleges that the date of his arrest was August 8, 1995. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 7. The judgment of conviction, however, reflects that the offense was committed on August 15, 1995. Judgment.
It is of no moment that limitations is an affirmative defense, which usually must be raised in the defendant's answer, for "[t]here is general agreement . . . that even the defenses of limitations or laches may be asserted by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim — provided that the complaint shows affirmatively that the claim is barred." Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1958). See also LaPorte Construction Company, Inc. v. Bayshore National Bank of LaPorte, Texas, 805 F.2d 1254, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. Criminal Conspiracy
In addition, Schinzing complains that the City and its agents engaged in an "obvious criminal conspiracy." Complaint ¶ 20 (emphasis added). In the American system of jurisprudence, it is beyond peradventure that private plaintiffs may not bring actions which sound in criminal law. Moreover, the City — which can act only through natural persons as its agents — cannot conspire with itself. Cf. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corporation, 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981) ("For purposes of federal antitrust law, a corporation cannot conspire with its officers or employees."). Accordingly, Schinzing's purported "criminal conspiracy" cause of action is also dismissed.D. Pendent State Law Claims
Federal court jurisdiction exists over an entire action, including state law claims, when the federal and state law claims "`derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' and are `such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.'" Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Yet supplemental jurisdiction is a "doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Consequently, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350.When the federal claims are dismissed before trial and only state law claims remain, the balance of factors to be considered under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine weigh heavily in favor declining jurisdiction; therefore, the federal court should usually decline the exercise of jurisdiction over the remaining claims and remand the case to state court. Id. at n. 7. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[o]ur general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pending are dismissed." Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)).
In the present case, the only federal claim has been eliminated and only state law claims remain. Because the federal claim was dismissed before trial, the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity suggest hat this court ought to decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remand the case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City's motion to dismiss Schinzing's § 1983 cause of action is GRANTED. Schinzing's purported "criminal conspiracy" cause of action is likewise DISMISSED. Schinzing's remaining claims — all of which are governed exclusively by state law — are hereby REMANDED to the County Court of Johnson County, Texas. The clerk shall mail a certified copy of this order to the County Clerk of Johnson County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).