Opinion
No. 2:15-cv-2067 AC PS
12-08-2015
MANFRED SCHIELD, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO SHERIFF'S DEPT. OFFICER HATFIELD # 692, Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding in this action pro se. The action was originally filed in the Fresno Division of this court, and was then transferred to the Sacramento Division. See ECF No. 3. This matter was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(21) (referral of pro se cases).
Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and has submitted an affidavit making the showing required by that statute. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The determination that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required inquiry. The court is directed to dismiss the case at any time if it determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (screening of IFP complaints), 1915A(a) (screening of complaints by prisoners against employees of governmental entities).
I. SCREENING STANDARD
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. In addition, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56), construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly), and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976)). The court need not accept as true, legal conclusions "cast in the form of factual allegations." Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
"Pro se complaints are construed 'liberally' and may only be dismissed 'if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
"Iqbal did not alter the rule that, 'where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.'" Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Deputy Hatfield allowed his police dog to attack and bite plaintiff while plaintiff was surrendering and complying with defendant's orders, and while other officers were yelling at defendant to stop the dog from attacking. Complaint ¶ IV. The complaint also alleges that Deputy Hatfield is employed by the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department. Complaint ¶ II(A). The court notes that although plaintiff appears to be incarcerated at Avenal State Prison, this action does not challenge any conditions of his confinement.
B. Deputy Hatfield
For screening purposes, the complaint appears to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), for excessive use of force during an arrest, against Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Hatfield, Badge # 692. If the allegations of //// the complaint are proven, plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits of this action.
C. The Sheriff's Department
It appears that plaintiff is also trying to sue the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department. The caption is ambiguous on this point, and there are no factual allegations against the Department itself, other than its status as the employer of Deputy Hatfield. However, in explaining why "exhaustion of administrative remedies" does not apply here, plaintiff asserts that "[t]his is a complaint against an outside agency (Sacramento County Sheriffs Dept.) . . .." Complaint ¶ II(B).
Plaintiff's complaint is written on a form apparently provided to prisoners. One of the entries on the form is "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," which would be applicable if plaintiff were a prisoner challenging the conditions of his confinement. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a).
The Sheriff's Department cannot be held liable under Section 1983 based solely upon the conduct of Deputy Hatfield, as that would be "vicarious liability." See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)) (municipal defendants "are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions"). Instead, the Sheriff's Department can be held liable only for the harm caused by its own actions and policies. Id. (municipal defendants "are responsible only for their own illegal acts") (internal quotation marks omitted); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Therefore, "to prevail on a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant or sheriff's department," plaintiff must allege facts showing:
(1) that he was "deprived of [his] constitutional rights by defendants and their employees acting under color of state law; (2) that the defendants have customs or policies which amount to deliberate indifference to ... constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies [were] the moving force behind the constitutional violations."Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 617 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001)).
One way the "customs or policies" requirement can be satisfied is if plaintiff can truthfully allege facts showing that he was harmed by the Sheriff's Department's custom or policy of conducting inadequate "training or supervision," where that training or supervision "is sufficiently inadequate as to constitute 'deliberate indifference' to the righ[t]s of persons" with whom its deputies come into contact. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). The requirement can also be satisfied if plaintiff can truthfully allege facts showing that the Department ratified Deputy Hatfield's allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (Section 1983 claim may be made out by acquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the "standard operating procedure" of the local governmental entity).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges no such facts against the Department, other than its status as Deputy Hatfield's employer, and therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim against the Department.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
3. Plaintiff may proceed now to serve Deputy Hatfield, as set forth below (instructions numbered 5-9), and pursue his claims against only that defendant. Alternatively, he may delay serving Deputy Hatfield, and attempt to state a cognizable claim against the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department.
4. If plaintiff elects to attempt to amend his complaint to state a cognizable claim against the Department, he has thirty days so to do (and he may skip instructions numbered 5-9, below). He is not obligated to amend his complaint. If he does so, the amended complaint will also be subject to screening. ////
5. If plaintiff elects to proceed now against Deputy Hatfield alone, then within thirty days he must return the materials for service of process that are enclosed with this order, as described below. In this event the court will construe plaintiff's election as consent to the dismissal of all claims against the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, without prejudice.
6. Service is appropriate for the following defendant: Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Hatfield, Badge # 692.
7. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff one USM-285 form for each defendant, one summons, a copy of the complaint filed September 30, 2015 (ECF No. 1), an instruction sheet, and an appropriate form for consent to trial by a magistrate judge.
8. Within 30 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached Notice of Submission of Documents, and submit the following documents to the court:
a. The completed Notice of Submission of Documents;
b. One completed USM-285 form for each defendant listed in number 3, above;
c. One completed summons;
d. One copy of the endorsed complaint for each defendant; and
e. A completed form to consent or decline to consent to trial by the magistrate judge.
9. Plaintiff need not attempt service on defendants and need not request waiver of service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to serve the above-named defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 without payment of costs.
10. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with a court order. DATED: December 8, 2015
/s/_________
ALLISON CLAIRE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER
Plaintiff submits the following documents in compliance with the court's order filed __________:
___ completed summons form
___ completed USM-285 forms
___ copies of the complaint
___ completed form to consent or decline to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction __________
Date
__________
Plaintiff