Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1988-14T4
03-31-2016
BRADLEY SCHEURER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VINCENTOWN LANDSCAPE AND NURSERY CORPORATION, MERIT SERVICE SOLUTIONS, LLC, VINCENT WELLS and BILL MOORE, Defendants-Appellants.
McDowell, Posternock, Apell & Detrick, P.C., attorneys for appellants (Ellen M. McDowell, on the brief). Mark S. Guralnick, attorney for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. DC-5291-14. McDowell, Posternock, Apell & Detrick, P.C., attorneys for appellants (Ellen M. McDowell, on the brief). Mark S. Guralnick, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM
Defendants Vincentown Landscape and Nursery, Inc., and Vincent Wells appeal from a November 12, 2014 Special Civil Part judgment in the amount of $3000, plus court costs. We affirm.
On July 10, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part, concerning his claim that defendants damaged his van while removing snow from a parking lot on December 9, 2013. The judge conducted a trial in the matter on November 12, 2014. Plaintiff testified that he drove his white Chevrolet van to work at Pro Computer Service in Moorestown and parked the vehicle in the company parking lot. After parking his van, plaintiff then used a company car to complete his work assignments throughout the day. Plaintiff did not return to the parking lot until his workday ended at approximately 10:30 p.m. that evening. Because it had snowed all day, when plaintiff returned to the parking lot, he could not access his van to drive home. Plaintiff therefore drove his company car home.
When plaintiff returned to the parking lot the following morning, he discovered damage to the back passenger's side quarter panel of his van. The van was undamaged when plaintiff parked the vehicle the previous morning. Upon making inquiries, plaintiff learned that defendants had plowed the parking lot. Plaintiff filed suit when defendant refused to pay for the repairs to his vehicle.
Plaintiff testified that the amount to make him whole would slightly exceed $3,000 and presented a repair estimate of $2,844.70, before sales tax. At the outset of the trial, defense counsel conceded "we don't contest the amount of damages," but later tried to retreat from this position. Defendants presented testimony of two employees who attempted to raise doubts as to whether one of defendants' employees or subcontractors actually caused the damage to plaintiff's van.
The judge then placed his decision on the record. The judge noted that plaintiff testified that when he parked his car on December 9, his van was undamaged and there was no vehicle parked next to him, just snow in a vacant parking spot. Further, when he left to go home on the evening of December 9, he indicated that no one had driven over the snow pile next to his van. When plaintiff returned the next morning, the snow next to his van was removed and he observed the damage to his vehicle. The judge concluded that "there's not only a preponderance of the evidence" but also "a [foot-full-of-snow] worth of evidence here in this particular case, overwhelming evidence that . . . the damage was caused through the negligent [snow removal] operation" of defendants or their agents. The judge awarded plaintiff $3000, plus court costs, and entered a confirming judgment in favor of plaintiff. This appeal followed.
Defendants argue that the judge's "finding that defendants were responsible for the damage to plaintiff's van resulted in a miscarriage of justice." Defendants further argue that the judge erred by relying upon plaintiff's repair estimate to establish damages. Defendants claim the repair estimate was hearsay, and the judge erred by considering it.
We note initially that the scope of our review of findings made by a trial court in a non-jury case is limited. We will not set aside the court's findings of fact "unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)). Our deference to the trial court's factual findings "is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).
Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the judge's finding that plaintiff's van was damaged when defendants plowed the parking lot. Plaintiff testified that, before the lot was plowed, the van was not damaged. The judge credited plaintiff's testimony, and based on that testimony, reasonably concluded plaintiff's van was damaged by defendants during their snow removal efforts. The record indicates the judge received and carefully considered testimonial evidence, documentary evidence, recorded evidence, circumstantial evidence and the arguments of counsel. Defendants' claim of a miscarriage of justice clearly lacks merit.
Defendants further argue that it was improper for the judge to rely upon the repair estimate as a basis for the award of damages. We disagree. At the outset of the trial, defense counsel conceded "we don't contest the amount of damages," but later attempted to retreat from this position. Regardless, the judge properly found that it was appropriate to relax the Rules of Evidence under N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2) since the amount in issue did not exceed $3000, and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. The rules of evidence may be relaxed in matters tried in the Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part so that the court may admit "relevant and trustworthy evidence in the interest of justice[.]" N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2); see also Triffin v. Quality Urban Hous. Partners, 352 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (App. Div. 2002) (noting the rules of evidence may be relaxed in small claims matters).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION