Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2166-GTV.
June 21, 2000.
Thomas E. Scherer, plaintiff, pro se.
Brian J. Finucane and Nancy M. Leonard, Bioff, Singer Finucane, Kansas City, MO, for GE Capital and GE Capital Credit Card Services, defendants.
Jeffrey A. Burns and Douglas W. Robinson, Shook, Hardy Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, MO, for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc., defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Thomas E. Scherer brings this action against Defendants GE Capital d/b/a Monogram Retailers Credit Services ("GE Capital"), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc. ("Metropolitan Life"), alleging violations of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) because they failed to furnish him with a copy of the latest "summary plan description" of GE Capital's disability plan upon his written request. The case is now before the court on the following motions:
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60);
Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Defendant (Doc. 87);
Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Codefendant (Doc. 88);
Plaintiff Final Request for Summary Judgment (Doc. 133);
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (and Request for Oral Argument) (Doc. 134);
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal (Doc. 142);
Plaintiff Pleading in Support of Request for a Default Judgment Against the Defendant GE Capital for Failure to Produce Documents (Doc. 148);
Plaintiff Motion for Reconsideration to "Plaintiff Objection to an Order — Petition for Review Before a Judicial Council" (Doc. 161);
Plaintiff's Second Notice of Appeal (Doc. 162);
Defendant GE Capital's Motion for a Protective Order and to Quash "Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition" (Doc. 176);
Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay (Doc. 178); and
Plaintiff Motion Requesting Impeachment of Testimony (Doc. 183).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are either uncontroverted or based on evidence submitted in summary judgment papers and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. Immaterial facts and facts not properly supported by the record are omitted.
On May 2, 1996, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Mimi Rog at "GE Credit Card Services, 7905 Quivera, Lenexa, Ks. 66215," noting that he had "requested the necessary paperwork to file a claim for short term and long term disability/workman's comp [sic] from Metropolitan Life and the Human Resources Department of GE Capital. No documents have been sent. . . . I would therefore like to now file those claims prior to the expiration of any applicable deadlines." Ms. Rog replied in a letter dated June 21, 1996 that Plaintiff's eligibility for medical benefits had expired, that Plaintiff was "never enrolled in or eligible for coverage" under either "the GE Short-Term Disability Benefits or the GE Long-Term Disability Income Plan," that the statute of limitations had expired on filing a claim for worker's compensation benefits, and that Monogram Retailer Credit Services, Inc. was not notified "of an illness or condition that would have prompted a leave of absence under FMLA."
On March 24, 1999, Metropolitan Life sent Plaintiff a Monogram Retailer Credit Services, Inc. Benefits Handbook and several disability claim forms.
On April 13, 1999, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that GE Capital and Metropolitan Life "refused to send the Plan Policy and requested claim forms for 1065days, [sic] on the Plaintiff's short and long term disability claim . . . ."
II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id. The court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984).
B. Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has filed three motions for summary judgment (Docs. 87, 88, and 133), arguing that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) when they failed to send him a summary plan description in response to his May 2, 1996 letter to Mimi Rog. Defendants respond that Plaintiff's factual allegations are unsupported by citations to admissible evidence, and, even if true, do not establish that Defendants violated § 1024(b)(4). In addition, Metropolitan Life argues that it is not liable because it is not the plan administrator as defined by ERISA, and GE Capital argues that it is not liable because Plaintiff was not a participant in the plan as defined by ERISA.
In his three motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff incorporates by reference the arguments and factual assertions made in his Memorandum in Opposition to Metlife Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 73). Because "[a] pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," the court has considered the arguments and factual assertions contained in Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). For the same reason, the court has also considered Plaintiff's additional filings, includingPlaintiff Supplemental Citation[s] of Authority (Docs. 152 and 164) and Plaintiff Brief and Memorandum in Support of an Oral Argument (Doc. 153).
ERISA provides that "[the plan] administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description,, [sic] and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated." 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). The statute defines "administrator" as
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated; (ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or (iii) [if] an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.29 U.S.C. § 1002(16). "Participant" is defined as "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). ERISA also provides for certain penalties, at the court's discretion, if the administrator fails to furnish such instruments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
No matter how liberally the court construes Plaintiff's pleadings, the court cannot overlook Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1. That Rule requires that "[a]ll facts on which a motion or opposition is based shall be presented by affidavit, declaration under penalty of perjury, and/or relevant portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admissions." Because Plaintiff's factual allegations do not comply with this directive, the court cannot grant his motions for summary judgment.
In addition, summary judgment for Plaintiff is inappropriate because Plaintiff has not put forth evidence tending to refute either Metropolitan Life's assertion that it was not the plan administrator, or GE Capital's assertion that Plaintiff was not a participant at the time of his request.
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted because Defendants have failed to provide documents which, if obtained, may support his allegations. After reviewing the record, the court determines that many, if not all, of Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's requests have been valid. The court concludes that Defendants' alleged failure to provide documents does not establish that summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor is warranted, either as a matter of law or as a form of sanction.
The court denies Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Defendant (Doc. 87), Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Codefendant (Doc. 88), and Plaintiff Final Request For Summary Judgment (Doc. 133).
C. Metropolitan Life's Motions for Summary Judgment
Defendant Metropolitan Life, in its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60), argues that it cannot be held liable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) because it is not the plan administrator. Plaintiff responds that, because Metropolitan Life exercised discretion by denying Plaintiff's claim for benefits, it is a "fiduciary" as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), and that under the plan's terms, "discretionary authority . . . is specifically the duty of the plan Administrator. . . . Therefore, in regards to the claim for disability benefits, [Metropolitan Life] functioned as the plan administrator."
The chapter in the Monogram Retailer Credit Services, Inc. Benefits Handbook entitled "Income Protection Plan" qualifies as the summary plan description. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Its terms can be relied on to reflect the terms of the plan itself. See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1515 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A summary plan description, or SPD] is considered part of the plan documents required by ERISA. . . . Because the SPD best reflects the expectations of the parties to the plan, the terms of the SPD control the terms of the plan itself."). That document states that employees
can reach the Vice President of Human Resources, who is the plan administrator, at:
Monogram Retailer Credit Services, Inc. 9510 West 67th Streeet [sic] Merriam, Kansas 66203 913-676-4382
ERISA provides that the plan administrator is "the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(i). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this provision to preclude liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) for anyone except the person or entity specifically designated by the plan instrument, even if "company personnel other than the plan administrator routinely assume responsibility for answering requests from plan participants and beneficiaries." McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 405 (10th Cir. 1993). Metropolitan Life is clearly not the entity designated by the terms of the plan, and cannot be held liable under § 1132(c).
Similarly, Plaintiff's argument that Metropolitan Life should be held liable as a fiduciary fails under the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). See McKinsey, 986 F.2d at 405; Bass v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 764 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (D. Kan. 1991),overruled on other grounds by Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 826 (10th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have withheld documents which, if produced, would create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. As the court's numerous rulings in this case on discovery issues indicate, however, Defendants have complied fully with the rules of discovery. In short, Plaintiff has neither provided evidence, nor alleged any evidence to exist, that would tend to refute Metropolitan Life's assertion that it is not the plan administrator. The court concludes that the evidence on this issue is "so one-sided" that summary judgment is warranted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
The court grants Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60), and denies as moot Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (and Request for Oral Argument) (Doc. 134). Metropolitan Life is dismissed from the case.
III. DISCOVERY MOTIONS
In his Plaintiff Pleading in Support of Request for a Default Judgment Against the Defendant GE Capital for Failure to Produce Documents (Doc. 148), Plaintiff states that he "filed a final request for production of documents on February 1st, 2000 that the defendants have not responded to," and asks the court to grant summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion is denied because the record does not indicate that any such request was made, and Plaintiff has not established that Defendant GE Capital has improperly withheld discovery.
In Defendant GE Capital's Motion for a Protective Order and to Quash "Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition" (Doc. 176), GE Capital asks the court to quash Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition (Doc. 169) (in which Plaintiff seeks to depose Cynthia Brull, a former GE Capital employee), to issue a protective order, and to impose sanctions against Plaintiff for expenses incurred by GE Capital in bringing the motion. GE Capital argues that the notice was improperly served, and that the deposition of Ms. Brull would produce no information relevant to the subject matter of the pending suit. The court agrees with GE Capital, and grants GE Capital's motion. The court orders that Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition (Doc. 169) is quashed; Plaintiff shall not be permitted to depose Ms. Brull without showing cause to the court why her testimony is necessary to his case. The motion is denied, however, with respect to GE Capital's request for sanctions.
Plaintiff Motion Requesting Impeachment of Testimony (Doc. 183) is also denied. In this motion, Plaintiff "requests the impeachment" of testimony given by Ms. Brull in an earlier deposition. No such relief is contemplated by either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules. In addition, Ms. Brull's education, which is the subject of this motion, is irrelevant to this case. Plaintiff's motion is denied.
IV. ADDITIONAL MOTIONS
At the hearing conducted by the court on March 23, 2000, the court determined that it would construe Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal (Doc. 142) as a request to overrule the Magistrate Judge's December 20, 1999 Order denying two discovery-related motions made by Plaintiff. To the extent that this motion asks the court to modify or set aside that Order, the motion is denied as untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Furthermore, to the extent that this notice asks the court to "grant the plaintiff an appeal" to the Tenth Circuit, the motion is denied; the appeal is improper because no final judgment has been entered and Plaintiff has not been granted an interlocutory appeal, and it does not divest the court of jurisdiction.
In Plaintiff's Second Notice of Appeal (Doc. 162), Plaintiff renews his request that the court "grant the plaintiff an appeal" to the Tenth Circuit, and questions the court's authority to adjudicate this case due to his then-pending judicial complaint. Like Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal (Doc. 142), this motion is without merit because the appeal is improper, and it does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, Plaintiff's judicial complaint has been dismissed. See In re: Judicial Misconduct Complaint, No. 2000-10-372-03 (Jud. Council of the 10th Cir. June 12, 2000). The motion is denied. For the same reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay (Doc. 178) is denied.
Finally, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration to "Plaintiff Objection to an Order — Petition for Review Before a Judicial Council" (Doc. 161) is without merit. Plaintiff's judicial complaint, which is the basis for this motion, has been dismissed, rendering this motion moot. See id. The motion is denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that:
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) is granted;
Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Defendant (Doc. 87) is denied;
Plaintiff Motion for a Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law Against the Codefendant (Doc. 88) is denied;
Plaintiff Final Request For Summary Judgment (Doc. 133) is denied;
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (and Request for Oral Argument) (Doc. 134) is denied as moot;
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal (Doc. 142) is denied;
Plaintiff Pleading in Support of Request for a Default Judgment Against the Defendant GE Capital for Failure to Produce Documents (Doc. 148) is denied;
Plaintiff Motion for Reconsideration to "Plaintiff Objection to an Order — Petition for Review Before a Judicial Council" (Doc. 161) is denied as moot;
Plaintiff's Second Notice of Appeal (Doc. 162) is denied;
Defendant GE Capital's Motion for Protective Order and to Quash "Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition" (Doc. 176) is granted in part and denied in part;
Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay (Doc. 178) is denied; and
Plaintiff Motion Requesting Impeachment of Testimony (Doc. 183) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT ORDERED that Plaintiff's Notice of Defendant's Deposition (Doc. 169) is quashed; Plaintiff is prohibited from deposing Cynthia Brull unless Plaintiff can show cause to the court why her testimony is necessary to his case.
IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant Metropolitan Life is dismissed from the case.
Copies of this order shall be mailed to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.