Opinion
Case No. 02-4010-JAR
September 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT JOHN T. FLANNAGAN'S MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the court on defendant Judge John T. Flannagan's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12). Plaintiff has filed a pleading entitled "Reply to Several Pleadings by the Alleged Defendants" (Doc. 16). In his pleading, plaintiff makes reference to the motion that is currently before the Court. Thus, the Court construes plaintiff's pleading as a Response to Judge Flannagan's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. Additionally, plaintiff sought to stay the pending motion, but that request was denied on June 11, 2002. Since that decision, plaintiff has not filed additional pleadings contesting Judge Flannagan's motion. Judge Flannagan has filed a Reply to plaintiff's response (Doc. 19). The Court has reviewed the parties' filings and for the following reasons, Judge Flannagan's motion to dismiss shall be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In April of 2001, plaintiff filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy in Kansas City, Kansas. Judge Flannagan was the United States Bankruptcy Judge who presided over plaintiff's case; and defendant David Seitter was the appointed chapter 7 trustee.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, plaintiff's creditors First Card, Inc. and HSBC Bank filed civil actions against plaintiff in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas. Judgment was entered against plaintiff, and on April 4, 2001, $3806.04 was garnished from plaintiff's bank account at Mission Bank.
On June 28, 2001, plaintiff's bankruptcy attorney filed a motion for release of the garnished funds in bankruptcy court. Plaintiff claimed that his disability income was the source of the garnished funds and that such income is exempt from execution. On August 6, 2001, First Card and HSBC filed objections to plaintiff's motion for release. At a hearing on August 22, 2001, Judge Flannagan set the matter for pretrial conference on October 10, 2001. On October 10, 2001, the pretrial conference was continued until October 31, 2001, because the parties had not complied with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 31, 2001, the matter came before Judge Flannagan and it was again continued, this time until January 9, 2002, because the parties still had not complied with Rule 26. By December 26, 2001, all parties had complied with Rule 26.
On December 27, 2001, plaintiff filed an action in Johnson County, Kansas, naming both defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff's complaint sought an order directing defendants to release the garnished funds. The complaint also sought an award for compensatory and punitive damages. On January 15, 2002, the action was removed from state court to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3). Plaintiff objected to removal, but the court found, in a Memorandum and Order dated April 10, 2002 (Doc. 22), that removal was proper. After removal, Judge Flannagan filed the motion that is currently before the Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court finds it unnecessary to set forth the standard of review for summary judgment because plaintiff's claims against Judge Flannagan will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts supporting its claim which would entitle it to relief. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support its claim.
H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989).
Housing Auth. of the Kaw Tribe v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984).
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Because the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must also review the pleadings with additional considerations. A pro se litigant's pleadings are construed liberally. The court is to determine whether the plaintiff's complaint can be reasonably read to state a valid claim "despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." However, the court is not to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff originally brought this action in state court seeking "injunctive relief from the state courts of Kansas to order [defendants Flannagan and David Seitter to] . . . release funds under garnishment. . . ." Plaintiff's complaint also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to the relief requested because there have been many continuances on his motion to release the garnished funds, resulting in a violation of his due process rights and "a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the `color of law' [sic]." Plaintiff further alleges that his "right to equal protection under the law" has been violated. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply in the instant action because plaintiff brings this case against federal officials who were acting under the color of federal law. By its own terms, § 1983 only applies to state actors who commit constitutional violations while acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff's claims may proceed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which provides that a plaintiff may sue in federal court for damages arising from a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal law.A. Plaintiff's Claims for Monetary Damages
Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Judge Flannagan shall be dismissed because federal judges, including bankruptcy judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits for damages that arise from judicial acts taken in a judicial capacity. This is true even if the judge's actions are "erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority." The only necessary inquiry in determining whether a judge is entitled to judicial immunity is whether at the time the judge "took the challenged action, he [or she] had jurisdiction over the subject matter."
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986).
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
Judge Flannagan's actions which form the basis of plaintiff's complaint were undisputably judicial actions taken in his judicial capacity. Plaintiff complains that by delaying the ruling on plaintiff's motion to release the garnished funds, Judge Flannagan violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that Judge Flannagan was acting outside of his jurisdiction by delaying the ruling and any attempt to do so would be futile. Because Judge Flannagan was operating in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction, plaintiff's claims for monetary damages shall be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff's Claims for Equitable Relief
Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief against Judge Flannagan must also be dismissed. There are two bases upon which plaintiff's claims for equitable relief can be dismissed. First, the Court finds that Judge Flannagan is also entitled to absolute judicial immunity with respect to plaintiff's claims for equitable relief. While the Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all decided that federal judges are absolutely immune from equitable relief in a Bivens action such as the one currently before the court. The Court is in agreement with the rationale of these cases which extend judicial immunity to claims of equitable relief in Bivens actions. Consequently, plaintiff's claims for equitable relief against Judge Flannagan may be dismissed on that basis alone.
See Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 990 n. 9 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting authority from other circuits that extend judicial immunity to cases seeking equitable relief).
Newsome v. Merz, No. 00-4307, 2001 WL 1006189, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2001); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040, (1988). See also M ehdipour v. Purcell, 173 F. Supp.2d 1165 (W.D.Okla. 2001) (holding that without direction from the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit to the contrary, decisions from the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits would be relied upon to find federal judges are immune from equitable relief in a Bivens action).
In the alternative, plaintiff's claims for equitable relief can be dismissed because plaintiff has available legal remedies which bar his request for equitable relief. In Switzer v. Coan, the Tenth Circuit ruled that when there is an available remedy at law, a Bivens action for equitable relief is prohibited. As Judge Flannagan points out in his motion to dismiss, plaintiff had many legal remedies available that he chose not to pursue. Plaintiff could have sought mandamus relief, or more simply, plaintiff could have objected to the continuances on his motion to release the garnished funds or asked for an expedited ruling on his motion. Instead, plaintiff chose to sue the bankruptcy judge and the trustee before his motion was ever decided. Because plaintiff had legal remedies available, his Bivens action for equitable relief must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant John T. Flannagan's Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.