Opinion
A21-1492
08-08-2022
Troy Kenneth Scheffler, Appellant, v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent.
Crow Wing County District Court File No. 18-CV-21-2295
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
DENISE REILLY JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. After several incidents of driving while intoxicated between 1994 and 2010, respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Troy Kenneth Scheffler's driver's license. In 2016, Scheffler completed a rehabilitation program, and the commissioner reinstated his license. Scheffler's reinstated license contained a no-alcohol restriction. In December 2020, Scheffler requested the removal of the no-alcohol restriction on his driver's license. The commissioner performed a background check on Scheffler and approved Scheffler's request to remove the no-alcohol restriction. The commissioner notified Scheffler that he could go to a driver's license renewal office and apply for a duplicate license without the restriction.
2. In July 2021, Scheffler sued the commissioner under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (2020) raising three arguments: (1) that upon removal of the restriction, the commissioner must issue Scheffler a duplicate license without Scheffler applying for it and paying fees; (2) that the commissioner cannot perform background checks before removing the restriction; and (3) that the no-alcohol restriction violates the Americans with Disabilitie s Act (ADA).
3. The district court denied Scheffler's petition finding that: (1) no authority supports striking down the commissioner's requirement that Scheffler apply for a duplicate license; (2) the commissioner has authority to adopt rules surrounding licensing laws and the State of Minnesota removed the no-alcohol restriction from Scheffler's record so his background check argument is moot; and (3) his petition did not allow for the litigation of a federal discrimination action, and, even if it did, his ADA claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Scheffler appeals.
4. We review de novo the district court's application of the law in proceedings held pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.19. Pallas v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Minn.App. 2010). We may "reverse the commissioner's licensure determination if it was fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, or not within its jurisdiction and powers." Id. We "defer to the district court's credibility determinations and ability to weigh the evidence, [and] [t]he district court's fact findings will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Constans v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.App. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).
5. In this case, the commissioner has not revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified Scheffler's license. Instead, Scheffler argues that upon a single application for removal of the no-alcohol restriction, the commissioner must remove the no-alcohol restriction and issue him a duplicate driver's license that does not show a no-alcohol restriction, all at no cost to him. Under Minnesota driving laws, "[u]pon proper application by a person having a valid driver's license containing the restriction that the person must not consume alcohol" the commissioner must remove the restriction "and issue to the person a duplicate driver's license that does not show that restriction." Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b) (2020). Scheffler argues that the language "upon proper application" means a person need only submit one application to both remove the restriction and obtain a new license. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the record contains no evidence of an application-whether for the removal of the no-alcohol restriction or for a new license, and this court is limited to reviewing only the evidence in the record. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). Second, although the statute does not specify what "proper application" means, the statute does specify that the commissioner may a d o pt rules and procedures related to impaired driving in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 169A.75 (2020). Thus, on this record, the district court correctly determined that Scheffler did not properly apply for a duplicate license because he did not comply with the commissioner's procedures.
6. Scheffler also argues that the commissioner was not authorized to perform a background check, and thus the district court erred in dismissing his challenge. He contends that a background check is unnecessary or illegal and delayed the removal of the no-alcohol restriction. We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing this issue as moot because relief on this issue is impossible. See Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015) (concluding that an issue becomes moot when "an award of effective relief is no longer possible"). The state already performed a background check and awarded Scheffler the relief he sought: the removal of the no-alcohol restriction. Because no other relief is possible on this issue, the district court did not err in dismissing it as moot.
7. Finally, Scheffler argues that the district court erred in concluding that his ADA claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As he did before the district court, he argues that chemical dependency is a federally recognized disability, and thus the no-alcohol restriction on his license violates the ADA. Res judicata applies to bar later claims when "(1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; [and] (4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter." Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004). We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata bars Scheffler's ADA claims. Scheffler litigated his ADA claim before both state and federal courts. And Scheffler did not succeed in either case. Scheffler v. Dohman, 785 F.3d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court's dismissal of Scheffler's complaint for failure to state a claim); Scheffler v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, No. A15-0282, 2016 WL 22355 (Minn.App. Jan. 4, 2016) (determining that Scheffler's ADA claim lacked merit and was barred by collateral estoppel), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). In both cases, Scheffler argued that he is an individual qualified under the ADA and that the Minnesota driving statutes and rules violate the ADA. Scheffler, 785 F.3d at 1260-61; Scheffler, 2016 WL 22355, at *4. The Eighth Circuit determined that Scheffler "failed to allege facts that would support that he has a disability as defined by the ADA." Scheffler, 785 F.3d at 1261. This court determined that Scheffler was not entitled to relief under the ADA and that collateral estoppel applied. Scheffler, 2016 WL 22355, at *4. Scheffler's current claim before this court is the same as his prior appeals and there has been an adjudication on the merits.
The commissioner also argues that the district court did not err in determining that Scheffler's ADA claim was beyond the scope of the hearing. Because we conclude that res judicata bars Scheffler's claims, we need not address the merits of this argument.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order denying the petition is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.