Opinion
CV176009924S
12-07-2018
Lois SCHAFRICK v. HARTFORD HEALTHCARE CORP.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Nada K. Sizemore, Judge
By Original Complaint dated November 20, 2016 and by Amended Complaint dated October 1, 2018, the Plaintiff Lois Schafrick brings suit in three counts against Hartford Healthcare Corporation for an incident that occurred on April 1, 2015 at the Women’s Primary Care location at 1781 Highland Avenue-Suite 106 in Cheshire, Connecticut.
[NOTE: At the Motion for Summary Judgment oral argument on October 1, 2018, the court noted that the electronically filed original Complaint dated November 20, 2016 was missing page 2. Although the parties had all the full copies and had closed pleading prior to the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court asked Plaintiff’s counsel to file an amended pleading including page 2. Therefore, even though the court file shows an Amended Complaint dated Oct. 1, 2018 and filed on Oct. 1, 2018, the pleadings are still closed and the Motion for Summary Judgment proper. The amended filing was to get the court’s electronic files complete.]
She claims that she was a patient at the Cheshire office on April 1, 2015 and that the Defendant Hartford Healthcare operated, maintained, possessed and controlled said premises. While she was there for a medical appointment, she alleges that she fell from a stool that she had attempted to sit on in the examination room, when it slid from underneath her and gave way.
In the complaint, she asserts that the stool had wheels, making it dangerous for an elderly person such as Plaintiff to sit upon. And she alleges the Defendant knew of such danger and hazard and upon reasonable inspection it should have known of the hazard and dangerous condition.
She brings suit in three counts against Hartford Healthcare based on premises liability and negligence theories.
More specifically, in Count I, she asserts a claim in Premises Liability claiming that the Defendant was negligent as follows in that:
(1) It allowed a stool to remain in a patient examination room where it created a hazardous and dangerous condition and risk of harm to patients who might choose to sit on it; (2) The hazardous and dangerous condition, created by the presence and placement of the stool had existed for an unreasonable period of time and no measures had been taken to remedy same; (3) It failed to remove the stool in order to prevent it from creating a hazard whereby patients such as plaintiff might sit upon it and have it give way.
As a result of the negligence and carelessness, she claims serious physical injuries including a comminuted displaced fracture of the left distal radius, head concussion, aggravation of pre-existing right knee pathology, scarring and severe shock to her nervous system. She seeks money damages for past and future medical expense, lost wages and lost earning capacity along with damages for severe pain and mental anguish and distress of mind.
In Count II, she brings suit in negligence alleging that the Defendant breached its duty of care to her by failing to provide safe seating. She restates the same allegations of negligence as in Count I without any specificity as to how the Defendant failed to provide safe seating. Paragraph 19 of Count II.
And finally in Count III, she brings suit in negligence claiming breach of duty for failure to properly instruct. She restates the same allegations from Count I and adds the claim that Defendant failed "to properly instruct the Plaintiff where to sit, when instructing her to sit down and fill out a form." Para 30, Count III.
By Answer and Special Defense dated March 10, 2017, the Defendant generally denies all allegations of premises liability or negligence, and raises two special defenses.
In the First Special Defense it claims that the alleged injuries and damages were proximately caused by Plaintiff’s own negligence and carelessness in that: (1) she failed to keep and maintain a proper and reasonable lookout as to where she was sitting; (2) she failed to make a reasonable and proper use of her senses and faculties to observe conditions then and there existing; (3) if the condition complained of did in fact constitute danger, she failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid any such condition which was known or should have been known to her while on the premises; (4) she failed to take appropriate safety precautions under the circumstances; and (5) she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety and well-being.
The Defendant in the Second Special defense asserts that Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by Plaintiff’s own negligence and carelessness in that she failed to follow instructions of her healthcare providers as to where to sit when she entered the examination room.
The Plaintiff replied to these special defenses by Reply dated March 11, 2017 so pleadings are closed.
By Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 17, 2018, the Defendant moves for summary judgment under Practice Book Section, 17-44 et seq., on all counts arguing that no reasonable jury could ever conclude that the rolling stool was defective and dangerous and conclude that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of any defective or dangerous condition or conclude that the Defendant breached any duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. The Defendant asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that HHC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Defendant submitted the following documentary evidence in support of its Motion: Plaintiff’s Responses dated May 19, 2018 to the Defendant’s Request-for Admission, Affidavit dated August 9, 2018 of Cherie Kerzner and Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Deposition (date not provided).
By Objection dated August 25, 2018, the Plaintiff objects to the Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that all three issues raised in each count present questions of fact for the jury. The Plaintiff submits no documentary evidence in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment other than the written Objection.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall-be-rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016).
"[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way ... [A] summary disposition ... should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party ... [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
"Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). "Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ... the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ... [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).
"[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 407, 54 A.3d 553 (2012).
"Although the issue of causation generally is a question reserved for the trier of fact, the issue becomes one of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, and summary judgment may be granted based on a failure to establish causation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997).
"[T]he party moving for summary judgment ... is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks-omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence ... If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. CR Summer Hill, Ltd. Partnership, 170 Conn.App. 70, 74, 154 A.3d 55 (2017).
PREMISES LIABILITY COUNT ONE
In Count I, the Plaintiff asserts a claim alleging negligence and Premises Liability theories.
In asserting any negligence claim, a Plaintiff must meet all essential elements of the tort to prevail. Those elements include: (1) duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) actual injury or damages. LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251 (2002).
Because the negligence claim in Count I is grounded in Premises Liability, the Plaintiff must also prove the existence of a specific defect and also prove that the Defendant had prior notice of such defect. See Martin v. Stop & Shop, 70 Conn.App. 250, 251 (2002); Di Pietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 116-17, 49 A.2d 951 (2012). Since she was a business invitee at the Defendant’s premises, she was owed a duty that the Defendant would keep its offices in a reasonably safe condition and warn of danger that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover. DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. at 116. The courts have said often that "business owners do not breach their duty to invitees by failing to remedy a danger unless they had actual or constructive notice of that danger." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted. Di Pietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, supra at 116.
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff Schafrick cannot prove the premises liability claim as a matter of law, as she cannot identify any specific defective or dangerous condition existed on the Defendant’s premises that resulted in her fall and resulting injuries. And the Defendants further argue that there were no prior reports of any incidents involving this rolling stool and therefore, there is no notice of any potential defect to support a premises claim.
The court agrees with the Defendant’s analysis on this Count, and finds that the Plaintiff cannot as a matter of law support a claim using a premises liability theory. Further, the Plaintiff has not presented any facts that would show that the stool created a hazardous and dangerous condition in any way. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Count I.
COUNT II-FAILURE TO PROVIDE "SAFE SEATING"
In Count II, Plaintiff brings suit in negligence alleging that the Defendant breached its duty of care to her by failing to provide "safe seating."
She restates the same allegations of negligence as in Count I without any specificity as to how the Defendant failed to provide safe seating. Paragraph 19 of Count II. Other than the general allegation that the seating was not "safe," the Plaintiff does not allege any specificity or provide any factual support as to how the seating was deemed to be unsafe, other than the stool had wheels on it.
In her deposition testimony, she acknowledges that the presence of the stool did not cause her fall but that it was her decision to attempt to sit on the stool knowing it was not for patient use that resulted in her fall. Exhibit A, pp. 66-69.
Notably the Plaintiff has provided no reported case law or counter-affidavits or other documentation to support the claim of the seating not being safe. "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence ... If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. CR Summer Hill, Ltd. Partnership, 170 Conn.App. 70, 74, 154 A.3d 55 (2017).
Therefore, this court finds a matter of law that there are no genuine issues of material fact on the negligence claims in Count II and that the Defendant is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law with respect to the claims in Count II.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant did not breach any duty of care to the Plaintiff to sustain a negligence claim as a matter of law for failure to provide safe setting.
COUNT THREE-FAILURE TO INSTRUCT
In Count III, Plaintiff brings suit in negligence claiming breach of duty for failure to properly instruct. She restates the same allegations from Count I and adds the claim that Defendant failed "to properly instruct the Plaintiff where to sit, when instructing her to sit down and fill out a form." Para 30, Count III.
The claims made by the Plaintiff in this last Count are different than the claims made in Count One and Two in that she is alleging that the Defendant had duty to instruct her where to sit when she was asked to fill out a form in a patient examination room. This theory does not hinge on whether there was any hazardous or dangerous condition. But rather, the theory seems to encompass whether a medical provider should instruct patients to not sit on stools with wheels in the patient examination rooms. And if a medical provider fails to do so-does that become negligence?
Since Plaintiff was a patient at the medical practice that day, this issue of whether the Defendant had a duty to instruct this Plaintiff on where to sit in the patient examination room-when filling out forms becomes a more mixed question of law and fact that dictate a different result on summary judgment. Whether the stool was defective or not does not seem relevant to the claim of general negligence based on a failure to instruct theory.
Generally, in any claim of negligence, the Defendant does owe her a duty of reasonable care when she is on the premises as a patient. Whether the Defendant breached that duty of care by not instructing her on where to sit, and whether the Defendant acted reasonably on the date of her patient examination becomes a question of fact for the jury.
The Defendant’s brief and supporting documentation are all focused on the premises liability theory and has not addressed how this count is appropriate for summary judgment as a matter of law. The Plaintiff argues that whether there was proper instruction provided by the Defendant is a question of act for the jury. The court agrees with the Plaintiff’s arguments as to the claims in Count III.
"Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). "Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ... the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ... [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).
The ultimate issue presented in Count III is whether the Defendant was negligent by not instructing the plaintiff, an elderly patient, about where to sit in a medical examination room when filling out paperwork for that appointment. Even though this may present as difficult issue of proof for the Plaintiff at trial, the Defendant has not met its burden on summary judgment establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The Court therefore, denies summary judgment for the Defendant as to Count III.
OVERALL COURT RULINGS
The Court therefore enters Judgment for the Defendant on Counts I and II; and denies Summary Judgment on Count III. The Plaintiff’s Objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment is overruled as to Counts I and II; and the Plaintiff’s Objection is sustained as to Summary Judgment on Count III.