Opinion
2210267 2210268
02-03-2023
S.C. v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
Leigh Anne Landis of Landis Legal Services, L.L.C., Florence, for appellant. Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Felicia M. Brooks, chief legal counsel, and Elizabeth L. Hendrix, asst. att’y gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
Leigh Anne Landis of Landis Legal Services, L.L.C., Florence, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Felicia M. Brooks, chief legal counsel, and Elizabeth L. Hendrix, asst. att’y gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
EDWARDS, Judge.
On August 23, 2021, the Lauderdale Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") entered two separate judgments, one in case no. JU-15-432.03 and one in case no. JU-15-433.03, terminating the parental rights of S.C. ("the mother") and V.L.C., Jr. ("the father"), to V.C.C. and V.L.C. III ("the children"), respectively. The mother filed a postjudgment motion in each action on September 1, 2021. On September 8, 2021, the juvenile court set the mother’s post-judgment motions for a hearing to be held on September 23, 2021; on September 9, 2021, the juvenile court entered an amended order specifying the time for the hearing.
At the hearing on the mother’s post-judgment motions held on September 23, 2021, counsel for the Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") argued to the juvenile court that, pursuant to Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P., the mother’s postjudgment motions had been denied by operation of law on September 15, 2021, 14 days after they had been filed. The juvenile court stated that counsel for DHR was "legally and technically … correct" but stated further that it would "enter a written order extending the date for today’s hearing to today and order that it relate back to the 14-day period." On September 24, 2021, the juvenile court entered an order in each action, purporting to deny the mother’s postjudgment motions. On that same date, the juvenile court also entered an identical order in each action, purporting to deny DHR’s "objection" to the postjudgment hearing; those orders read, in their entirety, as follows:
"Objection(s) by [DHR] that this hearing was held beyond fourteen (14) days from the date the motion to set aside, vacate, and motion for new trial was filed (September 24 [sic], 2021, for [the mother] and/or in real time during oral argument on Thursday, September 22 [sic], 2021, by [the father]) is overruled and the time for the hearing is extended to Thursday, [September] 22 [sic], 2021, and this order shall relate back to the date the motion (Doc 169) was filed."
As noted earlier, the mother’s postjudgment motions were filed on September 1, 2021. Moreover, we presume that the juvenile court meant to refer to Thursday, September 23, 2021, the date of the postjudgment hearing, because September 22, 2021, was a Wednesday.
(Capitalization omitted.)
The mother filed notices of appeal from the juvenile court’s judgments on October 7, 2021. DHR filed in this court a motion to dismiss the mother’s appeals on the ground that her postjudgment motions had been denied by operation of law on September 15, 2021, and therefore her notices of appeal had been untimely filed. See Rule 4(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that a notice of appeal from a judgment entered by a juvenile court be filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment); Rule 28(D), Ala. R. Juv. P. (same). We agree with DHR and grant DHR’s motion to dismiss the mother’s appeals.
The father is not a party to these appeals.
Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides, in pertinent part:
"All postjudgment motions, whether provided for by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure or the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, must be filed within 14 days after entry of order or judgment and shall not remain pending for more than 14 days, unless, within that time, the period during which a posjudgment motion may remain pending is extended: "(1) By written order of the juvenile court on its own motion, or upon motion of a party for good cause shown, for not more than 14 additional days; or
"(2) By the appellate court to which an appeal of the judgment would lie. "The period during which a postjudgment motion may remain pending may not be extended by consent of the parties.
"A failure by the juvenile court to render an order disposing of any pending postjudgment motion within the time permitted hereunder, or any extension thereof, shall constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of the expiration of the period."
[1–3] As DHR correctly observes, the mother’s postjudgment motions were denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 1(B) on September 15, 2021, 14 days after those motions were filed. At that time, the record in each action did not contain a written order extending the time for the juvenile court to rule on the mother’s postjudgment motions. Instead, after DHR called the issue to the attention of the juvenile court at the September 23, 2021, hearing, the juvenile court, on September 24, 2021, entered in each action an order purportedly extending the time for ruling on the mother’s postjudgment motions. However, the juvenile court did not render those orders before the expiration of the 14-day period established by Rule 1(B), and, therefore, it lacked jurisdiction to extend the period to rule on the mother’s postjudgment motions at the time it entered the September 24, 2021, orders. See K.P. v. Madison Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 243 So. 3d 835, 838 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (quoting Ex parte Limerick, 66 So. 3d 755, 757 (Ala. 2011), quoting in turn Ex parte Davidson, 782 So. 2d 237, 241 (Ala. 2000)) ("Our supreme court has explained that, ‘[i]f a [postjudgment] motion is … denied by operation of law, "the trial judge then loses jurisdiction to rule on the motion" and is "without jurisdiction to enter any further order in [the] case after that date."… Any order entered after the trial court loses jurisdiction is void.’ "). Furthermore, the juvenile court’s attempt to have those orders "relate back" to September 1, 2021, the date the mother filed her postjudgment motions, was ineffective. See K.P., 243 So. 3d at 838 (explaining that a juvenile court cannot change the date of rendition of an order by use of an order entered pursuant to Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.).
Accordingly, because the mother’s notices of appeal were filed more than 14 days after the denial of her postjudgment motions by operation of law pursuant to Rule 1(B), her notices of appeal were untimely filed, and the appeals must be dismissed. See K.P., 243 So. 3d at 839.
2210267 — APPEAL DISMISSED.
2210268 — APPEAL DISMISSED.
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.