Opinion
CV146050490S
04-29-2016
Heather Sawczysyn v. Emer Coyne et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#114)
Jane S. Scholl, J.
Introduction
This is a negligence action by the plaintiff, Heather Sawczysyn, against Emer Coyne, the owner and operator of the defendant, Avon Valley Show Stables, LLC. The plaintiff claims that on or about October 2, 2013, she entered the defendants' premises for the purpose of receiving horseback riding instruction. She claims that the defendants provided her with a horse named " Mr. O'Riley" for her lesson. She alleges that as she was riding Mr. O'Riley in a walk he suddenly and without warning began to gallop and buck, throwing the plaintiff to the ground causing her to suffer injuries. She claims that her injuries and losses were caused by the carelessness and negligence of the defendants in that they: 1) failed to properly provide her a horse commensurate with her skill level and experience; 2) failed to prevent, warn or protect her from the risks associated with riding Mr. O'Riley; 3) failed to warn her of Mr. O'Riley's propensity to buck; 4) failed to properly hire and train riding instructors; 5) failed to properly supervise her, the horse, or both during the riding lesson; 6) failed to place an instructor in close proximity to her to minimize the risks of which they were, or reasonably should have been aware; and 7) provided her with a horse that had recently arrived to the stables, without properly assessing the horse's temperament.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims because: 1) the plaintiff is barred from recovery because General Statutes § 52-557p grants them immunity; 2) they did not breached any duty owned to the plaintiff because she is unable to prove that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of any propensity or the specific risks the plaintiff believes existed for riding Mr. O'Riley; and 3) the plaintiff cannot prove that either defendant caused her injuries. In support of their position, the defendants submitted plaintiff's response to interrogatories; portions of the plaintiff's deposition; the defendant Coyne's affidavit; and the affidavit of Chelsea Crisman, an employee of the defendant Avon Valley Show Stables, LLC. The plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as her affidavit and the affidavit of Sarah Adamson, a horse stable manager.
Discussion
" Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact [however] a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Association, 316 Conn. 558, 593-95, 113 A.3d 932 (2015).
The defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff is barred from recovery because General Statutes § 52-557p grants them immunity. General Statutes § 52-557p provides: " Each person engaged in recreational equestrian activities shall assume the risk and legal responsibility for any injury to his person or property arising out of the hazards inherent in equestrian sports, unless the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the person providing the horse or horses to the individual engaged in recreational equestrian activities or the failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity by the person providing the horse or horses or his agents or employees." The defendants claim that this statute applies to protect them from liability in this case. The plaintiff claims that her claims fall into the exception in the statute for negligence by the person providing the horse. In her affidavit, the plaintiff states that she was at the stable for horse riding lessons and that the defendants determined which horse she would ride. She claims that the staff told her that the horse chosen for her was new to the stable, having arrived within 24 hours of her lesson. She states that at no time did the defendants warn her that riding a horse that had recently arrived at the stable and which was unfamiliar with its new environment would pose any additional dangers to her. Sarah Adamson, in her affidavit, states that when a horse is placed in a new environment it experiences stress and that even a normally calm horse can be unpredictable or difficult to control. Under these circumstances she opines that a novice or inexperienced rider should not be allowed to ride such a horse. She claims that whenever possible, novice and inexperienced riders should be provided with a horse with which they are familiar.
In Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153, 166-67, 905 A.2d 1156 (2006), the plaintiff made claims similar to those by the plaintiff here against the defendants, providers of horseback riding lessons. There the Court noted that: " Furthermore, the fact that there are certain risks that are inherent to horseback riding as a recreational activity, as the legislature recognized in § 52-557p, one of which may be that horses move unexpectedly, does not change the fact that an operator's negligence may contribute greatly to that risk. For example, the defendants may have negligently paired the plaintiff with an inappropriate horse given the length of time since she last had ridden or negligently paired the plaintiff with an instructor who had not properly been trained on how to handle the horse in question. Both of these scenarios present factual questions that, at trial, may reveal that the defendants' negligence, and not an inherent risk of the activity, was to blame for the plaintiff's injuries . . . Indeed, the inherent unpredictability of a horse is something that the legislature already has considered in providing to an operator of a horseback riding facility a defense to a claim of negligence pursuant to the assumption of risk doctrine codified in § 52-557p. This protection granted by the legislature, however, does not permit the operator to avoid liability entirely for its negligence or that of its employees."
The defendant Coyne claims that the exception in the statute for negligence by the provider of a horse does not apply to her because there is no evidence that she provided the horse to the plaintiff within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-557p. Yet the statute refers to the person providing the horse or her agents or employees. It is admitted that Coyne is the owner and operator of Avon Valley. It is also admitted that Avon Valley provided Mr. O'Riley to the plaintiff. Therefore arguably, Coyne, as the owner of Avon Valley, could be construed as its agent within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, there is an issue of fact whether the claims against Coyne fall within the exception.
The defendants also claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because they did not breach any duty owned to the plaintiff because she is unable to prove that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of any propensity or the specific risks the plaintiff believes existed for riding Mr. O'Riley. Yet this is not a premises liable case and the plaintiff's claim does not come within the language of the statute regarding a failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Her claims are ones of negligence based on a breach of their duties as the provider of the horse.
The defendants also claim that the plaintiff cannot prove that either defendant caused her injuries. " To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries to the [defendants' conduct] . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection . . . This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise . . . An actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm is a proximate cause of that harm . . . The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proximate cause." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 56-57, 913 A.2d 407 (2007). Here there is a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff's fall would have occurred but for the defendants providing her with Mr. O'Riley to ride.
Conclusion
Therefore, there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants.
The motion for summary judgment is denied.