Opinion
No. TTD FA03 0081377-S
March 23, 2006
This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for contempt (#123), plaintiff's objection to defendant's motion for contempt and plaintiff's motion for modification. For the following reasons, the objection is overruled and both motions are denied.
Plaintiff's objection and motion are both dated March 14, 2006.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By complaint dated May 20, 2003, plaintiff commenced this action for dissolution of marriage and other relief. A judgment of dissolution was entered by the court (Alvord, J.) on August 28, 2003. Incorporated into the judgment was a written agreement of the parties which, inter alia, provided for alimony and child support.
On February 9, 2006, defendant filed this motion for contempt alleging non compliance with certain provisions of the judgment. On March 14, 2006, plaintiff filed an objection to defendant's motion for contempt and a motion to modify certain provisions of the judgment. The court heard argument at short calendar on March 20, 2006, and, after reviewing the relevant pleadings, now issues this opinion.
II. DISCUSSION
The separation agreement of the parties incorporated by reference into the judgment of dissolution provides that "[plaintiff] will pay the cost of health insurance for [defendant], currently $280.53 per month. [Defendant] will obtain insurance through COBRA or another insurance provider of her choice. [Plaintiff] will reimburse [defendant] for such, or any other insurance cost until the earlier of [defendant] is employed full-time or the seven year alimony period ends."
Entitled "Mediation Summary, May 28, 2003."
A.
In her motion for contempt, defendant alleges that plaintiff has failed to pay a portion of her monthly health insurance premium for 2005 and 2006. Defendant claims that plaintiff owes $1,250.00. Plaintiff admits that he has failed to pay defendant's entire health insurance premium as alleged, but claims that he is not responsible for premium increases over and above $280.53. Alternatively he claims that defendant's refusal to work full-time excuses his obligation to pay the insurance premium.
Including the premium due April 1, 2006.
"In a marriage dissolution action, an agreement of the parties executed at the time of the dissolution and incorporated into the judgment is a contract of the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Sullivan, 66 Conn.App. 501, 504 (2001). "Separation agreements incorporated by reference into dissolution judgments are to be interpreted consistently with accepted principles governing contracts." Kremenitzer v. Kremenitzer, 81 Conn.App. 135, 139 (2004).
"Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . . where there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law . . . When only one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside the four corners of the contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bentz v. Halsey, 54 Conn.App. 609, 616 (1999). On the other hand, "when an ambiguous term is at issue, the trial court can examine the extrinsic evidence to resolve the question of the parties' intent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larson v. Jacobson, 38 Conn.App. 186, 190 (1995).
"Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning about which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Pastena, 52 Conn.App. 318, 322, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 917 (1999), citing Levine v. Advest, Inc., 244 Conn. 732 (1998). "A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." John M. Glover Agency v. RDB Building, LLC, 60 Conn.App. 640, 645 (2000).
In the present case, the separation agreement of the parties explicitly states that as alimony, plaintiff will pay the health insurance costs for defendant for a period of seven years or until defendant is employed full-time. Although the agreement references the fact that defendant's August 2003 premium is $280.53, nowhere in the agreement is there any language expressly limiting plaintiff's obligation to the August 2003 amount. Nor is such a limitation implicit in the agreement. To the contrary, the agreement gives defendant an unrestricted option to obtain health insurance of her choice through any provider. Thus no reasonable person could believe that defendant's premiums would remain at $280.53 over the seven-year period of alimony.
The terms of the separation agreement are clear, plain and unambiguous that plaintiff agreed to assume the entire cost of defendant's health care for a period of seven years or until her full employment. Any other interpretation of this provision is unreasonable and would not effectuate the parties' intent.
Alternatively, plaintiff claims at the time the separation agreement was negotiated, the parties contemplated that defendant would seek full-time employment within a reasonable time of the judgment and the fact that two years postjudgment, defendant is working part-time alleviates plaintiff's obligation to pay her insurance premiums. Significantly no provision of the separation agreement explicitly requires defendant to maintain employment during the life of the agreement.
The entire agreement expires no later than five years after the youngest child graduates from high school (approximately 2021).
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that defendant is currently employed part-time, three days per week, as a paraprofessional. Aside from this stipulation, neither side produced any evidence. Thus, no evidence was adduced (1) that the parties had previously agreed defendant would seek full-time employment within a reasonable time; (2) that defendant refuses to work full-time; or (3) that defendant refuses to seek full-time employment. Even if plaintiff had produced this evidence, however, plaintiff's claim would still fail.
Plaintiff points to the provisions in the agreement relative to child support and day care expenses which require defendant to contribute to those expenses "[w]hen [defendant] is employed . . ." Plaintiff claims this language shows that the parties intended that defendant seek full employment within a reasonable time after the judgment. Plaintiff's interpretation of this phrase is overly broad and not supported by any reasonable interpretation of the separation agreement.
The phrase "when defendant is employed" does not mandate employment — whether full- or part-time — at any point in time. When read in context, it does nothing more than confer on plaintiff the benefit of a reduction in his child support and day care expenses contingent upon defendant's employment. Even under a broad reading of these provisions, defendant at all times retains the option of when or if to become employed. Thus application of the child support and day care contingent employment language to the alimony employment language lends no support to plaintiff's claim.
Moreover, the court does not need to look to either the child support or day care provisions of the agreement or to extraneous evidence to interpret this term. The full employment language of the alimony provision is clear and unambiguous and it does not contain any requirement — explicit or implicit — that defendant seek full-time employment at any time. Put simply, the provision unambiguously provides that so long as defendant is not employed full-time, plaintiff must pay her monthly health insurance premium until August 20, 2010.
Having determined that plaintiff is responsible to reimburse defendant for her entire monthly health insurance premium, the court must go on to decide whether plaintiff's failure to pay said amounts in 2005 and 2006 constitute a contempt of the judgment of dissolution.
For a person to be adjudged in contempt of court, the court must find that the contemnor's actions constituted a wilful and deliberate disobedience of a court order. Mere failure to comply with a court order is not sufficient. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 Conn. 630, 637 (1994). Based upon all of the evidence, the court finds that in the present case, plaintiff's actions did not constitute a wilful disobedience of the judgment. Thus the court denies defendant's motion for contempt.
Despite having denied defendant's motion for contempt, this court, as part of its equitable authority, orders plaintiff to forthwith pay $1,250.00 to defendant in reimbursement of sums due and owing to her through April 1, 2006. Additionally the court orders plaintiff to pay, by May 1, 2006, to Attorney Cynthia Houck, attorneys fees in the amount of $250.00. Kronholm v. Kronholm, 23 Conn.App. 577, 579 (1990) (in a contempt proceeding, even in the absence of a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad discretion to make whole a party who has suffered as a result of another party's failure to comply with the court order.)
B.
In his motion for modification, plaintiff alleges that since the date of judgment there have been dramatic increases in the parties' health insurance premiums and that defendant refuses to take any steps to pay for her own health insurance premiums. Plaintiff asks that the court modify his alimony obligation to terminate the requirement that plaintiff pay defendant's insurance premiums.
No evidence was presented that plaintiff's own insurance premiums have increased since the date of judgment. Defendant's monthly premium, however, increased, in 2005, by approximately $85.00 per month — a 30% increase over August 2003.
"It is well settled in this state that a `modification [of alimony] is not warranted unless there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of either party, occurring subsequent to the entry of the original decree, and not contemplated by the parties at that time.' Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 407 (1977); see General Statutes 46b-86(a); Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285, 290 (1980); Grinold v. Grinold, 172 Conn. 192, 195 (1976)." Noce v. Noce, 181 Conn. 145, 147-48 (1980).
In the present case, plaintiff's claim of a substantial change in circumstance as a result of the increase in defendant's monthly insurance premium is foreclosed by this court's conclusion in Part A of this opinion that an increase in defendant's premium from 2003-05 was contemplated by the parties at the time of the separation agreement. Based on the open-ended health insurance benefit accorded to defendant in the separation agreement, no reasonable person could conclude that the cost of defendant's insurance would not change over the seven-year period of coverage. For these reasons, as a matter of law, an increase in defendant's monthly premium cannot be a change in circumstance justifying a modification of the judgment. Next plaintiff claims that defendant refuses to take steps to pay her own premium. Aside from voluntarily relieving plaintiff of the cost of her monthly premium, under the terms of the separation agreement, the only "step" which defendant can take to relieve plaintiff is to obtain full-time employment. Thus in order to grant plaintiff's motion to modify, the court must find that defendant's alleged refusal to obtain full-time employment is a change in circumstance from the date of the dissolution. In other words, as a predicate matter, the court must find first, that at the time of dissolution, defendant was not refusing to obtain full-time employment and second, that at present she refuses to obtain full-time employment.
As stated in Part A of this opinion, no evidence was adduced that at the time of dissolution, defendant was working full-time or seeking full-time employment. To the contrary, the "employment" provision of the separation agreement states that "[defendant] is a homemaker and has not been employed since before the birth of her children." Thus, as a matter of law, defendant's present refusal to obtain employment cannot be considered a substantial change in the defendant's circumstances since the date of the dissolution. Plaintiff's motion to modify, therefore, is denied.
For purposes of the motion to modify, the court assumes, without deciding, that defendant refuses to seek full-time employment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for contempt is denied, plaintiff's objection is overruled, and plaintiff's motion to modify is denied.