Opinion
No. CV 07-5011306
September 9, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This suit arises out of personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on June 13, 2005 in New Haven. The court heard evidence on the matter on August 4, 2010. The plaintiffs, Joseph and Carmelo Savo, have sued the defendant, Valenti Motors, Inc., in four counts. Counts one and two allege vicarious liability and negligence by the tortfeasor, Herbert Nieves. Counts three and four allege negligence by the defendant in allowing Nieves to rent or lease the car. The defendant asserts two special defenses: (1) that the claims of vicarious liability are barred by the settlement and release of claims against Nieves; and (2) all claims are precluded by General Statutes § 14-60.
The court finds the following facts to have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. On June 13, 2005, Joseph Savo was operating his motor vehicle, a 1994 Cadillac Fleetwood, on Olive Street in New Haven, approaching the traffic light at the intersection with Grand Avenue. His wife Carmela was a passenger in the car. As they neared the light, the light changed from red to green. At that time, Carmela Savo noticed a car approaching them and told her husband "I think we are going to get hit." Indeed, the Savos' car was hit on the driver's side by a motor vehicle driven by Herbert Nieves. Mrs. Savo was transported to the emergency room at St. Raphael's hospital and was treated for bruising and burns to her face. She also suffered a scratch on her cornea and soft tissue injury to her neck, shoulder and arm. Joseph Savo experienced pain in his neck, back and right arm beginning the day after the collision. Mr. Savo eventually underwent a discectomy in his cervical spine as a result of the injuries suffered in the collision.
Herbert Nieves was operating a 2005 Audi A-5 that had been loaned to him on June 10, 2005 by the owner, Valenti Motors. On June 10th, Nieves brought his 1998 Audi A-8 to the defendant's service department, located in Watertown, Connecticut, for work on the transmission. Nieves signed a temporary loan of motor vehicle agreement on June 10, 2005. That agreement noted that Nieves' insurer was Geico. Louis Hardt, the parts and service director at Valenti Motors, testified that the procedure for loaning a car to a customer whose car is being serviced entailed ensuring that the customer had a driver's license, and that their car was in the possession of Valenti Motors. Maintenance checks on the "loaner" vehicles are performed the night before it is to be loaned. While Hardt had no documentation to corroborate his assertion, he testified that it was the defendant's standard procedure to perform the maintenance check the night before. No evidence was presented to dispute this fact.
The parties stipulated that on December 19, 2006, the plaintiffs entered into agreements settling their claims of negligence against Herbert Nieves, which were entered into evidence. These valid agreements served to release Herbert Nieves, Kim Nieves and Geico General Insurance Company from liability. Moreover, in their post-trial brief, the plaintiffs appear to concede that counts one and two against the defendant are barred as a matter of law because of these releases. "The plaintiffs' claim against Herbert O. Nieves has been resolved through settlement. This leaves Counts Three and Four, which allege negligence against Valenti Motors, Inc., as the operative counts of the complaint."
The court notes that the plaintiffs' concession as to this issue is warranted. The defendant is entitled to judgment as to counts one and two, which allege vicarious liability, because the plaintiffs signed a valid release of liability as to Nieves. See Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 722-23, 735 A.2d 306 (1999) (holding that General Statutes § 52-572e, governing the release of joint tortfeasors, did not abrogate common-law principles regarding vicarious liability of a master and servant and that the general release of agent operated as a matter of law to release defendant from liability); see also Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 20-21, 792 A.2d 832 (2002) (reaffirming Alvarez by holding that plaintiff's claim against lessor brought pursuant to § 14-154a, which provided for liability of an owner-lessor of a motor vehicle, was barred because of plaintiff's written release of all claims against the lessee).
Alternatively, the court agrees with the defendant that the plaintiff's recovery in counts one and two is barred by General Statutes § 14-60(a). See Cook v. Collins Chevrolet, Inc., 199 Conn. 245, 252, 506 A.2d 1035 (1986) (holding that dealer was not liable as a matter of law because of its full compliance with the conditions of § 14-60); see also Stein v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5009444 (April 1, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) ( 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 581, 582) ("[t]hough the [ Cook] court did not specifically address loans of motor vehicles, the statute explicitly applies to both loans of motor vehicles and loans of license plates . . . [A] number of Superior Court decisions have interpreted Cook to hold that, under § 14-60, an automobile dealer will be liable to an injured person only if he lends a car to someone who is uninsured").
Section 14-60(a) provides, in relevant part: "No dealer or repairer may loan a motor vehicle or number plate or both to any person except . . . when a motor vehicle owned by or lawfully in the custody of such person is undergoing repairs . . . and in any case for not more than thirty days in any year, provided such person shall furnish proof to the dealer or repairer that he has liability and property damage insurance which will cover any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the loaned motor vehicle, motor vehicle on which the loaned number plate is displayed or both. Such person's insurance shall be the prime coverage. If the person to whom such dealer or repairer loaned the motor vehicle or the number plate did not, at the time of such loan, have in force any such liability and property damage insurance, such person and such dealer or repairer shall be jointly liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the loaned motor vehicle or a motor vehicle on which the loaned number plate is displayed."
The defendant established that the vehicle was loaned to Nieves within the meaning of § 14-60. The vehicle was loaned to Nieves by the defendant while his car was undergoing repairs. The defendant entered into a temporary loan of motor vehicle agreement with Nieves, which specifically acknowledged that Nieves was insured by Geico. The terms of the agreement clearly characterize it as a loan, rather than a rental or lease. The terms "loan" and "Lender" are used throughout and additionally, it is absent any provision requiring Nieves to provide the defendant with compensation for use of the vehicle. Moreover, the agreement contains the following provision: "In consideration of Valenti Motors (hereinafter called the Lender) loaning me the above described motor vehicle, I hereby accept full responsibility for its operation and agree that I will not operate it contrary to the laws of any jurisdiction in which it is being operated; I also agree to indemnify and hold harmless said Lender for any claim or claims of personal injury or property damage to others or myself arising out of the use or operation of said vehicle." Finally, both the police accident report and the testimony of Lou Hardt are further proof that Nieves was insured at the time of the accident.
Therefore, the court must consider only counts three and four, which assert allegations of direct negligence against the defendant. Specifically, counts three and four allege that the defendant failed to determine whether the vehicle had defective steering or braking equipment; failed to determine whether Nieves was physically capable of driving the vehicle; failed to determine whether Nieves was properly insured; failed to determine whether Nieves had a valid driver's license; failed to determine whether Nieves knew how to operate the vehicle; and failed to properly instruct and train Nieves in the use of the vehicle.
Unlike counts one and two alleging vicarious liability of the defendant for Nieves' negligence, counts three and four allege that the defendant is jointly liable for their injuries. As a result, the release does not operate as a matter of law to bar the plaintiffs' recovery in these counts. Similarly, § 14-60 does not operate to bar these claims given the plaintiff's allegations of active negligence on the part of the defendant. See Carey v. D'Elia Pontiac, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 0319121 (December 4, 1996, Levin, J.) (denying defendant vehicle lender's motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to § 14-60 insofar as the complaint alleged that it was actively negligent).
The Supreme Court in Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., supra, 249 Conn. 720-21, explained the difference between vicarious liability and joint liability. "Vicarious liability is based on a relationship between the parties, irrespective of participation, either by act or omission, of the one vicariously liable, under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that one person should be liable for the act of the other. Its true basis is largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined that, irrespective of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts of another . . . Thus, a principal whose liability rests solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior and not upon any independent act of the principal is not a joint tortfeasor with the agent from whose conduct the principal's liability is derived . . . Essentially, aside from the relationship between the parties creating the doctrine of vicarious liability, the principal is not a tortfeasor in the true sense of the word because he is not independently liable based upon his own independent actionable fault . . . Consequently, there is no right of contribution, only indemnification." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 720-21.
On the other hand, "[t]he liability of the joint tortfeasor is direct because the tortfeasor actually contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and is divisible because the conduct of at least one other also contributed to the injury . . . Although both indemnification and contribution are based on equitable principles . . . indemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest, while contribution involves a claim for reimbursement of a share of a payment necessarily made by the claimant which equitably should have been paid in part by others." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 721.
Nevertheless, the court finds in favor of the defendant as to counts three and four given the plaintiffs' failure to present any evidence of the defendant's negligence. The plaintiffs failed to present any evidence showing that the vehicle's steering or braking equipment was defective. Instead, the court finds credible the testimony of Lou Hardt that the vehicle loaned to Nieves was new and did not have any problems. Similarly, the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence indicating that Nieves was physically incapable of driving the vehicle or that he required any training or instructions to operate the vehicle.
The plaintiffs also allege that the defendant failed to determine whether Nieves was properly insured before permitting him to use the vehicle. The temporary loan of motor vehicle agreement that Nieves entered into with the defendant specifically acknowledged that Nieves was insured by Geico. In addition, the court was presented with the police accident report, indicating that Nieves was insured, and with Hardt's testimony that a claim was made by the defendant against Geico for the damage to the vehicle. Finally, as to the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants permitted Nieves to drive the vehicle without a valid driver's license, the temporary loan of motor vehicle agreement and the police accident report also indicate that Nieves had a valid Connecticut driver's license.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant, Valenti Motors, on all counts.