Opinion
3367.
Decided April 15, 2004.
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Louis B. York, J.), entered July 9, 2002, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted the petition to the extent of enjoining respondent from appointing temporary employees in disregard of Civil Service Law § 64(1) and directing respondent to amend its policy regarding Civil Service Law § 75(1)(c) to also include part-time employees, but denied the application on behalf of petitioner Patino for lost wages and benefits, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Mordecai Newman of counsel), for appellant-respondent.
Tuckner, Sipser, Weinstock Sipser, New York (William J. Sipser of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
Before: Buckley, P.J., Tom, Sullivan, Williams, JJ.
The injunctive relief was properly granted. Respondent concedes that its own regulations require an "important" need to justify the open-ended employment of temporary workers. Respondent is bound by that regulation ( see Matter of Conlon v. McCoy, 27 A.D.2d 280, 281, modified on other grounds 22 N.Y.2d 356), and the regulation must be "consistent" with the Civil Service Law ( see New York Unconsolidated Laws § 7390[1]), which requires that temporary appointments be for no more than three months and that there be an "important and urgent" need for them (Civil Service Law § 64). Respondent has failed to articulate an "important" need for the open-ended employment of temporary workers, nor has it shown that the contested practice is in any way consistent with the Civil Service Law. We reject respondents' argument that the reference to "continuous" in Civil Service Law § 75(1)(c) limits the protections of that statute to full-time employees.
While respondents could not, simply by hiring petitioner Patino on a per diem basis, limit any right to which he otherwise became entitled by reason of his length of continuous service, it does not follow that Patino was entitled to a hearing prior to his termination. No such hearing was required under the applicable collective bargaining agreements, which Supreme Court properly upheld ( see Matter of Robinson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 226 A.D.2d 467, 468). Petitioners have not shown that the disputed provisions of the agreements violate statutory "imperatives" ( see City of Newburgh v. Potter, 168 A.D.2d 779, 780, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 857), or are inconsistent with public policy or contrary to legislative intent ( see Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes v. Cuevas, 276 A.D.2d 184, 193, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 711).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.