Opinion
No. 2022-C-01162
11-01-2022
SAULSBURY INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CABOT CORPORATION and Cleco Power, LLC
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Genovese, J., dissents.
PER CURIAM
The doctrine of lis pendens applies "[w]hen two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the same capacities." La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 531. In that event, "the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided in Article 925." La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 531 ; see also La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 925(3) (authorizing declinatory exception for objection of lis pendens under Article 531 ).
Two suits are pending in Louisiana courts on the same transaction or occurrence between Cleco Power, Inc., Cabot Corporation, and Saulsbury Industries. Cleco filed the first suit, and Saulsbury later filed the present suit. Although Cabot was not an original party to Cleco's suit, it intervened in that litigation pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1091. These undisputed facts satisfy the requirements for lis pendens . Cleco and Cabot properly raised the objection by filing declinatory exceptions. The first suit was filed by Cleco; therefore, this suit, the second suit, filed by Saulsbury must be dismissed without prejudice. See La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 531.
The court of appeal found Cabot was not entitled to a dismissal because "Saulsbury's suit was undisputedly the first filed suit against Cabot." Saulsbury Industries, Inc. v. Cabot Corp. , 21-0679 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/17/22), 342 So. 3d 882, 888. Article 531 requires the suits be "between the same parties"; however, it does not require a determination of when each objecting defendant became a party to each suit. Their mutual involvement in multiple suits arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is sufficient to trigger application of lis pendens . Once the doctrine is applicable, the "first suit" determination is simply a matter of confirming which suit was filed first, not which suit was the first to include the objecting party. The court of appeal's interpretation expands the phrase "first suit" to add "in which the objecting defendant was first named as a party." This interpretation is not warranted by Article 531 ’s language and, as demonstrated in this case, undermines its purpose.
Lis pendens guards against a multiplicity of suits and promotes judicial efficiency. See 727 Toulouse, L.L.C. v. Bistro at the Maison De Ville, L.L.C. , 12-1014 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/21/13), 122 So. 3d 1152, 1159, writ denied , 13-2414 (La. 1/10/14), 130 So. 3d 327. The court of appeal's interpretation of Article 531 leaves the parties litigating the same transaction in two suits, one involving all three parties and the other involving only two of the parties. This neither guards against a multiplicity of suits nor promotes judicial efficiency. A proper application of Article 531 confines this litigation to one proceeding.
This court has observed that because lis pendens and res judicata are related doctrines, an exception of lis pendens should be sustained if a final judgment in the first suit would be res judicata in the subsequently filed suit. See Aisola v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. , 14-1708 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 266, 269. In that regard, Article 531 recognizes that if an exception of lis pendens is warranted but not asserted, "the first final judgment rendered [in any of the suits] shall be conclusive of all." Here, a final judgment between Cabot and Saulsbury in Cleco's suit would be res judicata for their claims in Saulsbury's suit. This further supports a finding of lis pendens and a dismissal of Saulsbury's claims herein against Cabot. The court of appeal judgment is reversed in part to reinstate the trial court's judgment sustaining Cabot's exception of lis pendens and dismissing Saulsbury's claims against it without prejudice.
We recognize that multiple suits may involve some but not all the same parties. In those instances, a proper analysis of an exception of lis pendens may require consideration of the demands asserted in each suit against the particular defendant urging the exception. See Pumpkin Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Harrison , 13-1086 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/14), 2014 WL 647398, writ denied, 14-0828 (La. 6/13/14), 140 So. 3d 1193. However, in the present matter, all parties are involved in both suits.