Opinion
NO. 01-16-00887-CR
05-31-2018
MARI NADINE SATURDAY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 5 Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14-CCR-178156A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A six person jury convicted Mari Nadine Saturday of operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a), (d). The trial court assessed her punishment at 365 days' confinement, probated for 18 months, plus additional conditions and a $400 fine.
Saturday appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) refusing to allow follow-up individual questioning of three veniremembers, (2) denying her motion to strike a fourth veniremember for cause, and (3) denying her motion for mistrial. We affirm.
Background
Saturday's appellate challenges center on rulings that the trial court made during jury selection. Because she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction, we provide a limited factual background.
On a Sunday in November 2014, La'Britni Wolridge, the complainant, was driving to an ice cream parlor in Missouri City. Wolridge was stopped at a red light on when Saturday hit Wolridge's car from behind. Wolridge and her sister, who was a passenger in Wolridge's car, noticed that Saturday was laughing. From her behavior at the scene, Wolridge suspected that Saturday had been drinking. Her speech was very slurred and her eyes were bloodshot red. Saturday admitted to Wolridge that she "was coming from a party and had been drinking."
Officer W. Reed, a certified DWI investigator with the Missouri City Police Department, testified that Saturday displayed signs of intoxication: she strongly smelled of alcohol, her eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and her speech was very slurred. Saturday admitted fault for the accident and to beginning drinking early in the day and during the Texans' football game. She reported that she had vodka mixed with Red Bull and "a few glasses of wine"—between five and six—while tailgating. She also later admitted that she had mixed alcohol into her coffee that morning. Saturday was transported to the Sugar Land Police Department for a sobriety test. Officer A. Sonnier administered the test while Officer Reed observed. Saturday exhibited all of the clues that indicate intoxication. After Saturday refused to provide a breath sample, she was transported to Oak Bend Hospital for an examination. At the hospital, Saturday agreed to provide a blood sample to determine her blood alcohol concentration because she believed that a blood test would demonstrate that she was not intoxicated. The lab results reported that her blood alcohol content was 0.172 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, approximately four hours after the accident.
At trial, Saturday denied that the accident was her fault. She also denied much of the officers' testimony describing the events that took place during the investigation and denied making the inculpatory statements reported by the officers. She admitted to drinking two vodkas mixed with Red Bull, but she denied that she had consumed wine and the amount of alcohol described by Officer Reed.
The trial court permitted each side 30 minutes to question the venire. During jury selection, the State questioned the venire about their trust in police officers:
[State:] . . . Is anyone here, just by the mere fact that someone may walk in through these doors, wearing a uniform, a badge, a belt, whatever, do you automatically, just by seeing them in a uniform give them more or even less credibility than any other person? Anyone on the first row that think just because someone walks in in a uniform, portraying themselves to be an officer, you automatically think: Yep, truth with him — trustworthy; or no, he's no good, I won't believe a single word he says? Anyone on the front row? Juror Number 5?
[Veniremember 5:] I — I would say that I would respect someone in a uniform. Yes, I probably do paint them a little — I might put them on a pedestal or I might believe that they're trustworthy.
[State:] Well, would you wait to hear their testimony before assessing any credibility is really the point of this question. Just because they walk in and present themselves to be an officer doesn't necessarily mean they are, right?
[Veniremember 5:] True.
[State:] Someone could walk in here with a priest outfit or a priest — you know, they [sic] doesn't necessarily mean they're a man of God, right?
[Veniremember 5:] I mean — true. But I think, automatically, I would give them the benefit of the doubt that they would be telling the truth. Or that —
[State:] Okay.
[Veniremember 5:] — you know, you hold them up to a different standard.
[State:] Does anyone — And I appreciate your honesty. Thank you ma'am.
[Veniremember 5:] Uh-huh.
[State:] Does anyone else feel the same as Juror Number 5? Juror Number — let's go — let's start here, Juror Number 10, you think so as well?
[Veniremember 10:] Yeah, I think so. I — I think people have all been kind of raised if you're ever in trouble, lost, you go find a police officer, they'll — they'll help you out.Defense counsel questioned the venire about trusting police too:
[State:] Okay. Do you — and I guess the same kind of posing the question to you: Would you wait to hear this person open their mouth, introduce themselves, tell you some qualifications about themselves before you start to even give them any credibility?
[Veniremember 10:] Absolutely.
[State:] Okay. So you would hold at an even playing field, just like everybody else, until they started to testify?
[Veniremember 10:] Yeah — well, I would — yes.
[State:] Thank you.
. . . .
[Veniremember 18:] I would have to really look and listen to what the officer would have to say before making a judgment call.
[State:] Okay.
[Veniremember 18:] And you also don't know whether or not that officer has been an officer for a day or for ten years.
[State:] Exactly. I'm glad you said that. Because that's really all I want — I'm looking for. I want everyone to assess anyone that takes the stand, not by what they present themself to be, but by what they say. And can I get a promise from everyone that they would do that?
(The majority of the prospective jurors are moving their heads up and down.)
[State:] Anyone on — anyone here that would not do that?
(No response.)
[Defense counsel:] [W]ould somebody being a police officer make it easier for you to trust them? Okay. And I guess we'll just start with Number 1 and go down the line. Would you more easily trust a police officer than a civilian given the same evidence? Okay?
. . . .
[Defense counsel:] No, Number 3?
[Veniremember 3:] No.
. . . .
[Veniremember 5:] Not regarding a case, no.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. What does that mean exactly?
[Veniremember 5:] If a stranger rang my doorbell and a police officer rang my doorbell, I'm going to trust to open the door for the police officer. So when I answer the question earlier as far as how, like I might hold them to [sic] up to a different standard or trust them a little bit, in that aspect, yes. But dealing with a —
[Defense counsel:] Got it.
[Veniremember 5:] — case, no.
[Defense counsel:] Well, why would you — I guess, so you're going to open your door to them, but you're saying that you don't necessarily think that they're more honest than Joe Blow?
[Veniremember 5:] I mean I would — my instinct would tell me that it would be okay to open the door or to trust in — in given moment.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. Anybody else feel that way? 16.
. . . .
[Defense counsel:] How far did we get? We got to Number 5. Okay. Is it easier to trust a police officer? We're — well, that's the question, starting for you — starting —
[Veniremember 6:] Huh-uh.
[Defense counsel:] — there with Number 6.Defense counsel asked additional questions about giving the benefit of the doubt to law enforcement:
. . . .
[Veniremember 8:] No.
[Defense counsel:] 8, no.
[Defense counsel:] [W]e just went ahead and talked about police a little bit. But who here thinks, you know, law enforcement has a tough job. They've got a job to do. You know, whether they may have made some mistakes or whatever, I want to also give them the benefit of the doubt. Not just Mari Saturday, but I want to give law enforcement the benefit of -- of the doubt. Does anybody have that?Defense counsel advised the venire that the law required them to give Saturday, and not law enforcement, the benefit of the doubt.
[Several veniremembers:] (Indicating.)
[Defense counsel:] Okay. And we have a whole lot here, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Let's put our cards down because there's so many. Okay.
Later, he asked whether any veniremember would be unable to presume Saturday innocent because they "prefer to give the benefit of the doubt to the police officer." No veniremember responded that they could not. Defense counsel then moved on to the topics of video evidence and Saturday's right not to testify. Veniremember 10 responded to Defense counsel about the right not to testify:
[Defense counsel:] How about the right not to testify? This is one that often comes up. And frankly, again, I don't know if it's going to have any bearing in our case or not. But the Defense has the right not to get on the stand and testify. And that — and you're not supposed to hold
it against them under the law if they don't testify. Again, in this case, she might testify, she might not. But I need to know right now, who is going to have a hard time not holding it against Ms. Saturday if, for whatever reason, she does not testify. Anyone?
[Veniremember 10:] (Indicating.)
[Defense counsel:] Number 10?
[Veniremember 10:] Yeah.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. Anyone else?
(No response.)
[Defense counsel:] Okay. And Number 10, if — if a defendant does not testify, does that mean that you would probably be biased against them, then, if they don't testify?
[Veniremember 10:] I think so. Because I was in that situation and —
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] — I was innocent, I would be the first one to volunteer my testimony —
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] — for that purpose.
[Defense counsel:] Fair enough.
Defense counsel asked the trial court to call Veniremembers 3, 5, and 8 for further questioning. Defense asked to question them about whether they "[w]ould give the benefit of the doubt to law enforcement" and whether they would be predisposed to believe law-enforcement witnesses. The trial court denied the request.
The trial court called Veniremember 10 for further questioning. Both counsel questioned him on the accused's right not to testify, and defense counsel also questioned him on law-enforcement witnesses:
(The bailiff returns with Prospective Juror Number 10.)
[The Court:] All right. We are outside the presence of the hearing of the other members of the jury panel. Attorney for the State, attorney for the defendant, and the defendant are present in the courtroom. Present is Juror Number 10, he has been sworn in. Mr. Torres, the attorneys had a few additional questions to ask you. And we'll start with [Defense counsel].
[Veniremember 10:] Fine.
[Defense counsel:] All right. I — I think — I mean, I think I've already asked you what I wanted to ask you, but we'll go over it a little bit further. On the issue of her not testifying, if she were not to testify, I believe you said that you would be biased against her and wonder why?
[Veniremember 10:] I think I just misheard the question. I — maybe bias —
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] — is a little too strong.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. So bias —
[Veniremember 10:] But —
[Defense counsel:] — is —
[Veniremember 10:] — there'd —
[Defense counsel:] — too —
[Veniremember 10:] — there'd —
[Defense counsel:] — strong?
[Veniremember 10:] — be some doubt.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. So the doubt, on that — on that one, would be why didn't — you know, doubt as to — as to what? I guess, I don't want to put any —
[Veniremember 10:] As to why wouldn't —
[Defense counsel:] You'd —
[Veniremember 10:] — you —
[Defense counsel:] — want her —
[Veniremember 10:] — take the —
[Defense counsel:] — to —
[Veniremember 10:] — stand.
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] If I was in a situation like this, and I was innocent, my lawyer wouldn't be able to keep me off the stand.
[Defense counsel:] So it would cause you to question the defendant and her —
[Veniremember 10:] I'd have —
[Defense counsel:] — and — and —
[Veniremember 10:] — some doubts —
[Defense counsel:] — and —
[Veniremember 10:] — yeah.
[Defense counsel:] — and her decision?
[Veniremember 10:] Right.
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] Right. That's a good way —
[Defense counsel:] So, you know, it would cause you to question — yes, that's a good way is — that's what — that's how you would put it?
[Veniremember 10:] I wouldn't say she's guilty.
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[Veniremember 10:] But I'd question it.
[Defense counsel:] It would cause you to question — so you would, in some manner, hold it against her?
[Veniremember 10:] I would have questions about it.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. All right. So question — you — you're saying you would question, but you're saying if —
[Veniremember 10:] Meaning —
[Defense counsel:] — questioned her —
[Veniremember 10:] — I'm meaning if —
[Defense counsel:] — if you questioned —
[Veniremember 10:] — I was —
[The Reporter:] Hold on.
. . . .
[Defense counsel:] You're saying that if you question her, you're not necessarily holding it against her when you question her? Is that what I'm trying to understand —
[Veniremember 10:] I'd —
[Defense counsel:] — what —
[Veniremember 10:] — have some doubt.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. So you would hold it against her, in a manner of speaking?
[Veniremember 10:] I'd have some doubt.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. I — I pass the witness, Judge.
. . . .
[State:] So, — and I know we talked a little bit about the presumption of innocence, right?
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[State:] And you understood that?
[Veniremember 10:] Yes.
[State:] And the presumption of innocence is that the defendant here is innocent until proven guilty. And that's my burden. All right.
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[State:] And so, the Fifth Amendment, affording everyone the protection of either not incriminating themself or not testifying, you — you feel strongly about that, right?
[Veniremember 10:] Yes.
[State:] But, you know the U.S. Constitution gives us the right, no matter what. And I know that you said that if you were on trial, you would — no one could hold you back to get up there. But looking at the bigger picture of everyone out there, anyone who's being put on trial —
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[State:] — and their Fifth Amendment right, could you follow the law and know that everybody has that Fifth Amendment right and not —
[Veniremember 10:] Absolutely.
[State:] — hold []it against anyone for not testifying against themselves?
[Veniremember 10:] Yes.
[State:] Knowing that there might be certain circumstances why they wouldn't want to — whether it may be they have a speech impediment — that might make them seem guilty, right?
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[State:] So — and I guess that's just the basic question: Could you follow the laws, as given to you, the U.S. Constitution, the Fifth Amendment, and not hold it against any individual for not testifying in their own case?
[Veniremember 10:] Yes, sir.
[State:] Okay. I — I don't think I have any other further questions, Your Honor.
[The Court:] All right.
[Defense counsel:] I guess, we also had — I — I guess, as I understood it, you would have the, I guess, the propensity to trust law enforcement, in general, over civilians. Is that accurate or no? Would you — would you generally lean —
[Veniremember 10:] Do I have —
[Defense counsel:] — towards —
[Veniremember 10:] — family. [D]o I very good friends —
[Defense counsel:] Uh-huh.
[Veniremember 10:] — in law enforcement? Yes. Would I tell my daughter and son that are lost or scared, go find a police officer? Yes.
[Defense counsel:] Uh-huh. I understand that. I — I would do the same. I guess, what I'm saying is, when you have two people telling a different story —
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[Defense counsel:] — one of them is law enforcement and one of them's a civilian —
[Veniremember 10:] Uh-huh.
[Defense counsel:] — do you tend — do you think that you would tend to believe the law enforcement officer over the civilian?Defense counsel moved to strike Veniremember 10 for cause, and the trial court denied the motion.
[Veniremember 10:] I think it would depend on some circumstances.
[Defense counsel:] Okay. So it would never — you're — you're saying you would never just trust them — you'd never tend to trust them over a civilian simply by virtue of the fact that they're law enforcement?
[Veniremember 10:] I mean, if all things are equal?
[Defense counsel:] Uh-huh.
[Veniremember 10:] I would go with law enforcement.
[Defense counsel:] Okay.
[State:] May I, Your Honor?
[The Court:] It's not necessary.
[State:] Okay.
[The Court:] Thank you.
(Prospective Juror Number 10 exited the courtroom.)
Both sides exercised their peremptory strikes. Defense counsel exhausted all of his peremptory strikes. He used one of his peremptory strikes on Veniremember 10, whom the trial court had refused to strike for cause. He then asked the court to grant him another peremptory strike so he could use it on Veniremember 5, who the trial court also had refused to strike for cause. The trial court denied the request for another peremptory strike.
After strikes for cause, agreed strikes, and peremptory strikes were resolved, the six veniremembers with the lowest numbers left were Veniremembers 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, and 14. When the trial court announced those six names, but before any veniremember was sworn or impaneled as a juror, Veniremember 3 told the court that he could not serve because he was to fly to Central America later that week. The trial court conducted questioning of Veniremember 3 at the bench.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The trial court announced that Veniremember 3 would be excused from service.
The trial court then resumed voir dire to seat an additional juror. Veniremember 16 was called back for further questioning and was ultimately struck for cause. Defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. The State agreed to defense counsel's additional strikes for cause to prospective jurors. The trial court allowed both parties to "redo" their peremptory strikes.
The parties agreed to strike Veniremembers 17, 18, 19, and 20 for cause. The State used a peremptory strike on Veniremember 15. Defense counsel's peremptory strikes did not change, and counsel renewed his request for an extra peremptory strike to use on Veniremember 5 on the basis that he had exhausted his peremptory strikes and used one of those on Veniremember 10, whom he had objected to for cause.
After applying the strikes for cause, agreed strikes, and peremptory strikes, Veniremembers 1, 5, 8, 13, 14, and 21 were seated and sworn as the jury. Veniremember 21 had replaced Veniremember 3.
Discussion
I. Additional Individual Questioning
Saturday first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow additional questioning for Veniremembers 3, 5, and 8 about whether they would give the benefit of the doubt to law enforcement.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's limits on voir dire questioning of individual veniremembers for an abuse of discretion. See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A trial court's discretion over the conduct of jury selection is broad. See Fuller, 363 S.W.3d at 585; Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38. A trial court may set reasonable limits on voir dire, including time limits. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38-39; Guerra v. State, 771 S.W.2d 453, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
But a trial court abuses its discretion when it prohibits a proper question about a proper area of inquiry. Fuller, 363 S.W.3d at 585; Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38. Proper areas of inquiry include those that allow counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and to discover a veniremember's views on an issue applicable to the case. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38-39; Guerra, 771 S.W.2d at 467-68. Proper areas of inquiry are nonetheless subject to the trial court's reasonable limits on voir dire. See Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 39.
For example, the trial court may reasonably limit duplicative questioning. Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ("To curb some prolixity [in voir dire], it is recognized that courts need have a discretionary area within which the examination might be reasonably limited. One basis for such a limitation is duplication of questioning."); see also Guerra, 771 S.W.2d at 467; Sullivan v. State, 678 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). This can include circumstances in which "investigation into possibly proper or fruitful matters is not entirely prevented" because the same topic was the subject of "previous interrogation." See Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Further, a trial court may refuse to permit further questioning of a veniremember about a topic on which the veniremember has already "state[d] his or her position clearly, unequivocally, and without reservation." Guerra, 771 S.W.2d at 468; accord Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 168, 170. After a veniremember has given his or her viewpoint about a particular topic, the trial court may restrict questioning into hypothetical situations related to that viewpoint. See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 163-64.
B. Analysis
Saturday contends that the trial court's refusal to call Veniremembers 3, 5, and 8 back for further questioning about whether they held a predisposition to believe law-enforcement witnesses was an abuse of discretion.
Both defense counsel and the State inquired about those topics during the general voir dire. Defense counsel asked whether a police-officer witness was more trustworthy. He also asked whether any prospective juror's willingness to give law enforcement the benefit of the doubt would override their ability to presume Saturday innocent. Veniremembers 3 and 8 answered unequivocally that they would not "more easily trust a police officer than a civilian given the same evidence." They, and Veniremember 5, also answered by silence that they would presume Saturday innocent notwithstanding any benefit of the doubt that they would give law enforcement. Finally, Veniremember 5 answered that any heightened trust he has in a police officer would not affect his view of a police officer's testimony in a case.
During the State's voir dire too, the entire panel responded by silence that they would assess every witness's credibility by what the witness said on the stand and not by whether the witness presented himself or herself to be a police officer.
Because these areas of inquiry were covered during the general voir dire, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the request to further question Veniremembers 3, 5, and 8. Further questioning would have duplicated questions already posed to them. See Guerra, 771 S.W.2d at 467; Smith, 513 S.W.2d at 827; Sullivan, 678 S.W.2d at 166. Veniremembers 3 and 8 had already answered unequivocally on those topics. See Guerra, 771 S.W.2d at 468; Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 168, 170. Veniremember 5 said that he would not give a police witness the benefit of the doubt when judging such a witness's testimony. See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 163-64.
In addition, Veniremember 3 was ultimately excused from service. This is an additional reason to overrule Saturday's issue about Veniremember 3. See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 168 (overruling similar point of error because Veniremember was otherwise struck and was not seated as a juror).
Saturday asks that we apply in this case the reasoning in Meador v. State, 253 S.W. 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923), and Mathis v. State, 322 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959). For the same reasons that the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to apply those cases in Smith, neither Meador nor Mathis require reversal here. See Smith, 513 S.W.2d at 827-28. In both Meador and Mathis, the trial court had refused to allow any questioning of the venire on relevant topics. See Mathis, 322 S.W.2d at 631-32; Meador, 253 S.W. at 299; see also Smith, 513 S.W.2d at 827 (distinguishing Meador and Mathis).
II. Challenge for Cause
Second, Saturday contends that the trial court erred in denying her challenge for cause against Veniremember 10.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's denial of a challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion. Robinson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). We defer to the trial court because it is in a better position to assess veniremember credibility. See Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Robinson, 989 S.W.2d at 458. If a veniremember unequivocally states an inability to follow the law, then the veniremember should be struck. See Robinson, 989 S.W.2d at 458. But if the veniremember equivocates, we defer to the trial court. See Holland, 761 S.W.2d at 318; Robinson, 989 S.W.2d at 458. A trial court may, in its discretion, deny a challenge for cause to a veniremember who indicates an inability to follow the law but ultimately affirms the ability to do so. See Holland, 761 S.W.2d at 318; Robinson, 989 S.W.2d at 461-62.
B. Analysis
Saturday contends that Veniremember 10 expressed doubt about being able to properly consider an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and further indicated a propensity to trust law enforcement. However, after being informed of the presumption of innocence, Veniremember 10 did not claim to be unable to presume the defendant innocent. When Veniremember 10 was called back for further questioning, he told the State and trial court that he would not hold against Saturday her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right not to testify.
Because Veniremember 10 equivocated about his ability to follow the law and to render a verdict based on the evidence, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in overruling the challenge for cause. See Holland, 761 S.W.2d at 318; Robinson, 989 S.W.2d at 458, 461-62.
III. Mistrial
Finally, Saturday contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial based on the trial court's decision to excuse a juror who had plans to travel out of the country.
A. Standard of Review
No statutory procedure governs the replacement of an excused juror. See Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 957-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Davis v. State, No. AP-77,031, 2016 WL 6520209, at *18-19 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2016) (not designated for publication).
Whether an error requires a mistrial is determined by the facts of the case. We will reverse a denial of a motion for mistrial only in extreme circumstances, such as when jury-selection errors are so prejudicial as to render continuing the trial a waste of time and expense. See Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We affirm if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884. Thus, Saturday must show both error and harm resulting from the juror-replacement procedure that the trial court used. See Carter v. State, No. 08-00-00441-CR, 2002 WL 505137, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 4, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("Finally, even if the trial court erred in its method of replacing Veniremember Turner, Appellant has not shown the process resulted in any harm."); Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 43-44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd) (holding that replacing unsworn member selected for jury with next unstruck Veniremember required demonstration of harm).
B. Analysis
Saturday fails to identify any harm resulting from the trial court's recommencement of voir dire proceedings once the juror was excused. The trial court permitted additional challenges for cause. The veniremembers that Saturday challenged either were excused or struck. Veniremember 21 was the next unstruck veniremember.
Saturday did not object to Veniremember 21, nor has she demonstrated any harm resulting from seating that veniremember on the jury. See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884-85; Carter, 2002 WL 505137, at *5; Gentry, 881 S.W.2d at 43-44. Saturday has not demonstrated how seating such a juror affected her substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
We therefore hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error in completing the jury selection. See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884; Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice Panel consists of Justices Bland, Lloyd, and Caughey. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).