Opinion
FSTCV196040046S
06-28-2019
Aldona SATARA et al. v. Tracey HAMMER et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: June 27, 2019
OPINION
HON. EDWARD R. KARAZIN, JR., JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE
On February 14, 2019, the plaintiffs, Aldona Satara, in her representative capacity as trustee of the Trzebinska-Satara Family Statutory Trust (the trust); Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as guardian of the beneficiary minor child; and William Satara, the beneficiary minor child, filed a complaint against the defendants, Dariusz Pratnicki (Pratnicki), in his representative capacity as conservator of Marcin Satara; and Tracey Hammer (Hammer), in her representative capacity as conservator of the estate of Marcin Satara. On March 4, 2019, Marcin Satara, the conserved person, was added to the action. The complaint alleges the following facts: the plaintiffs are interested parties and are aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decree of December 21, 2018, ordering the return of money belonging to the plaintiffs to the estate of Marcin Satara. The plaintiffs also allege that the money in question belongs to them and not to the estate of Marcin Satara. The plaintiffs allege that they have suffered monetary damages as a result of the Probate Court’s decree. The plaintiffs request a trial de novo to resolve the issues and determination of who has rights to the funds, reversal of the Probate Court decree and such other relief the court deems just and equitable.
On March 19, 2019, the defendants Hammer and Pratnicki filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the Probate Court decree, and that this action is not ripe for appeal because the Probate Court’s decree was not a final determination of the parties’ legal rights. The motion is accompanied by memorandum of law. The plaintiffs filed an objection on April 1, 2019, accompanied by memorandum of law. The defendants filed a reply on May 6, 2019.
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide ... Our Supreme Court has determined that when ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
"The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 n.6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). "If ... the plaintiff’s standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011).
"[R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ... An issue regarding justiciability ... must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction ... If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [cause of action] must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009).
The defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decree. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs’ claimed interests are based on unfounded representations, and that this action is not ripe for appeal because the Probate Court’s decree was not a final determination of the parties’ rights. The plaintiffs in their opposition counter argue that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal because they were aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decree which was a final decision.
"[O]ur Supreme Court has stated that ‘the often thorny issue as to whether a judgment of the Superior Court is a final judgment for purposes of appeal ... is not involved in an appeal from a judgment of a Probate Court ... since the right of appeal at issue is available under [General Statutes] § 45-288 [now § 45a-186] to [a]ny person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, the section does not require a final judgment.’" Vredenburgh v. Norwalk Probate Court, 118 Conn.App. 436, 439 n.6, 984 A.2d 773 (2009). See also Erisoty’s Appeal from Probate, 216 Conn. 514, 518, 582 A.2d 760 (1990). "Thus, the fact that the orders appealed from were temporary does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction." Sherman v. Kowalyshyn et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6012430-S (January 28, 2011, Sheldon J.).
The defendants’ argument that this appeal should be dismissed for ripeness because the Probate Court decree was not a final determination of any party’s legal rights is without merit as a final determination of the Probate Court is not a necessary prerequisite in probate appeals. The motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
"[T]he absence of aggrievement, as required by [§ 45a-186], is a defect that deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adolphson v. Weinstein, 66 Conn.App. 591, 595, 785 A.2d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 921, 792 A.2d 853 (2002). "The jurisdictional requirement of aggrievement serves both practical and functional purposes to assure that only those parties with genuine and legitimate interests are afforded an opportunity to appeal ... If an appellant is a mere stranger or interloper to the proceedings with no direct interest in the outcome, the court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal." (Citation omitted.) Buchholz’s Appeal from Probate, 9 Conn.App. 413, 415, 519 A.2d 615 (1987).
"Aggrievement exists in two forms: statutory and classical aggrievement. Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fleet National Bank’s Appeal from Probate, 267 Conn. 229, 242 n.10, 837 A.2d 785 (2004).
"Classical aggrievement, in the case of probate appeals, is embodied in the right to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186a. Section 45a-186a states in relevant part: Any person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may ... appeal therefrom to the Superior Court." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Riether et al. v. Perrotti, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6010980-S (January 24, 2011, Alexander, J.) (51 Conn.L.Rptr. 279, 280).
"The factors involved in whether classical aggrievement exists are tempered by the subject matter of the litigation. Classical aggrievement usually requires that the party claiming aggrievement has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation ... the concept of aggrievement ... has evolved into a broader standard than that requiring a showing of a direct pecuniary interest." (Citation omitted.) Buchholz’s Appeal from Probate, supra, 9 Conn.App. 415. "Classical aggrievement ... requires an analysis of the particular facts of the case in order to ascertain whether a party has been aggrieved and, therefore, has standing to appeal ... [T]he following two-part test [determines] whether [classical] aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fleet National Bank’s Appeal from Probate, supra, 267 Conn. 242 n.10. "The test for determining whether a party has been aggrieved by a Probate Court decision is whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from certainty, that some legally protected interest that [the party] has ... has been adversely affected ... This interest may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 820-21, 889 A.2d 759 (2006). "The responsibility for alleging a factual basis for aggrievement for the purpose of taking a probate appeal falls squarely on the person taking the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shockley v. Okeke, 92 Conn.App. 76, 83, 822 A.2d 1244 (2005), cert. granted, 277 Conn. 923, 895 A.2d 797 (2006).
"One serving in a fiduciary capacity has a standing to appeal from any decree which adversely affects the interests of those for whom he is acting, if it is a part of his duty to protect those interests ... One who is a party to an action in a representative capacity may have a right to appeal even though he has no personal interest in the controversy, if it is his duty to do so in order to protect the interests of those whom he represents ... In any action where a judgment has been rendered which will result in the destruction of the trust or depletion of the trust fund, a trustee has in his representative capacity such an interest that he may properly claim to be aggrieved." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) O’Leary v. McGuinness et al., 140 Conn. 80, 85-86, 98 A.2d 660 (1953).
"It has generally been held that a beneficiary cannot sue ... at law for any harm done to his trust estate without first asking his trustee to bring a proper action and receiving a refusal ... This rule is rather strictly enforced as regards actions at law, but not so rigidly regarded in equitable actions. This is especially true where trustees are implicated in the alleged wrong." Naier v. Beckstein, 131 Conn.App. 638, 646 n.5, 27 A.3d 104, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 910, 32 A.3d 963 (2011). See also Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 123, 128 A.292 (1925) (beneficiary cannot sue for harm to trust estate in absence of trustee’s refusal); Verkaik v. Scheno, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-05-4004245-S (December 7, 2006, Tobin, J.) (claims against third parties can only be brought by the trustee on behalf of the trust); Breems v. Appeal from Probate, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-125013921-S (June 17, 2014, Tobin, J.T.R.) (trustee and not beneficiary has standing to maintain an appeal from probate).
The question in the present case is whether the plaintiffs have a legally protected interest that may be adversely affected by the decree of the Probate Court, ordering the transfer of funds in the Go Fund Me account to the conservator of the estate of Marcin Satara, to be held in escrow until further order of the court. The nature of the interest claimed by the plaintiffs is that of ownership of the funds referenced in the decree of the Probate Court; the plaintiffs allege that the funds belong to them and not to the estate of Marcin Satara. Aldona Satara, in her representative capacity as trustee of the trust, that holds the funds referenced in the decree of the Probate Court, has the requisite interest in light of her duty as trustee to protect the interests of the trust’s beneficiaries, where such interests are likely to be adversely affected. Aldona Satara’s duty as trustee to protect the interests of the trust’s beneficiaries, and the allegation of ownership by the plaintiffs over the funds that are the subject matter of the Probate Court’s decree demonstrates that she has an interest in the subject matter of the Probate Court decree. The subject matter of the Probate Court’s decree relates to funds held for the benefit of William Satara as the sole beneficiary of the trust, although he may be adversely affected by the decree to transfer the funds to the estate of Marcin Satara, no cause of action inures to him on that account. Naier v. Beckstein, supra, 131 Conn.App. 646. William Satara as the beneficiary cannot maintain an appeal from probate, as the trustee is the proper party to bring an action against anyone who wrongfully interferes with the interests of the trust. Aldona Satara in her capacity as trustee has already brought the present action to protect the interests of the trust, therefore, William Satara has no standing to maintain this appeal. It follows therefore that Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as the guardian of the beneficiary William Satara, has no standing to maintain this appeal.
In Re Marcin Satara, a conserved person, Probate Court Decree (21st December 2018, Fox, J.) (Paragraph 4).
The court now addresses whether Aldona Satara as trustee has been adversely affected by the decree of the Probate Court. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the Probate Court decree they have suffered money damages. The Probate Court decree ordering the transfer of the funds alleged to be held by the trust essentially deprives the trust of possession and control of the funds in issue and may possibly deplete the trust fund, thereby, adversely affecting the interests of the trust represented by Aldona Satara. Accordingly, Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as trustee has satisfied the two-prong aggrievement test and thus has standing to appeal the Probate Court decree. William Satara and Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as guardian of the beneficiary, have not satisfied the aggrievement test and thus have no standing to appeal the Probate Court decree.
The motion to dismiss on this ground is denied with regard to Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as trustee, and granted with regard to Aldona Satara in her representative capacity as guardian and William Satara.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss #102 is denied in part and granted in part. The plaintiffs’ objection to the motion to dismiss #105 is sustained in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED.