Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-0776
April 2, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter is before the court on defendant State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Addictive Disorders' ("DHH") motion to dismiss (1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Record Document No. 47. Sartin concedes lack of subject matter jurisdiction of his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but opposes the motion as to his state law claims pursuant to LSA-R.S. Title 51:2256. The motion was submitted without oral argument on April 2, 2003. For the reasons that follow, DDH's motion to dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND
Defendants are Seven Acres Substance Abuse Center, Inc., (SASAC), individuals Dorothy Miller (an president/board member of SASAC), Frances Harry (secretary/board member of SASAC), Betty Hunt (treasurer/board member of SASAC), and Jean Bassett (program director of SASAC), and by Third Supplemental and Amended Complaint, movant DHH. Sartin's Third Supplemental and Amended complaint alleges that DHH is liable for damages because it maintained operational control over SASAC and provided at least 90% of SASAC's operating budget.
Sartin's complaint alleges that he had been employed as a day counselor at SASAC for 6 years prior to his termination. Sartin was one of two African-American employees among a staff of 10 paid employees. Bassett was hired as program director of the facility in December, 2000. Prior to that time, Sartin's work was satisfactory to his employer. Sartin alleges that shortly after Bassett became director, he asked Sartin for a copy of his high school diploma, and asked both Sartin and Robinson (the other African American) for authorization to disclose criminal history records information, but did not ask the white employees for such authorization.
In the course and scope of his employment, Sartin periodically recommended African-Americans as candidates for placement in the program at SASAC. According to Sartin, under Bassett, most were not even contacted. Sartin complained to Bassett about his inaction or rejection of nearly all African-American candidates he recommended for placement. He alleges that after he began to complain about the discrimination, Bassett and the other defendants encouraged program participants to initiate complaints about Sartin's work. Ultimately, without any notice or employment related counseling, Sartin was fired.
ANALYSIS
It is unnecessary for this court to address DHH's motion as to Sartin's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Sartin concedes lack of subject matter jurisdiction on that claim. Without. addressing the substance of Sartin's claim pursuant to LSA-R.S. Title 51:2256, DHH argues that it is also entitled to immunity from suit on that claim under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Without addressing DHH's immunity argument, Sartin argues that he has stated a state law claim pursuant to LSA-R.S. Title 51:2256 sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(B)(6)Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is proper only if the pleadings on their face reveal beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief, or if an affirmative defense or other bar to relief appears on the face of the complaint. Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. of America, 938 F.2d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the Court must assume that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are true, and must resolve any doubt regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff's claims in his favor. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens, regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 962, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed.2d 842 (1890); LeSage v. State of Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, 528 U.S. 18, 120 S.Ct. 467, 145 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive relief unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated it. LeSage, 158 F.3d at 216; Nihiser v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 269 F.3d 626, 627 (6th Cir. 2001)
"Eleventh Amendment immunity, if applicable, is shared by a state's agencies and officers to the extent that the state is the 'real, substantial party in interest.'" Lesage, 158 F.3d at 216 (citing Pennhurst State School Hospital, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. at 908 (other citations omitted)). The movant DHH is an executive department of the State of Louisiana and shares the State's sovereign immunity. LSA-R.S. 36:251 (West Supp. 2003); and see Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Voisin's Oyster House, Inc., v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986) and finding that the Department of Health and Human Resources is an arm of the state because it was created as part of the executive branch by state statute)
LSA-R.S. 51:2231 et seq. is the State of Louisiana's "Human Rights" law which, inter alia, makes it unlawful "for a person or two or more persons to conspire" to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because that person has opposed a practice made unlawful by applicable statutes. LSA-R.S. 51:2256. Sartin argues that because the statute's definition of "person" includes governments, governmental agencies and public authorities, see LSA-R.S. 51:2232(9), and because LSA-R.S. 51:2256 does not require a specific employee/employer relationship, his suit against DHH survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The argument may be correct, but it misses the mark. Sartin's state claim against DHH is barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Even when a State consents to suit in its own courts, however, it may retain its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. A State's consent to being sued in federal court must "be unequivocally expressed. Further, for a state statute to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity," it must specify the State's intent to subject itself to suit in federal court.Martinez v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original, internal citations omitted). By statute, Louisiana has refused to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. LSA-R.S. § 13:5106(A). The State's Human Rights law, at § 51:2264, provides as follows:
No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court. LSA-R.S. 13:5106(A).
Any person deeming himself injured by any alleged violation of the provisions of this Chapter shall have a civil cause of action in district court to enjoin further violations and to recover the actual damages sustained by him, together with the costs of court and a reasonable fee for his attorney of record, all of which shall be in addition to any other remedies contained in this Chapter.
Nothing in the language of the statute abrogates the State's statutory retention of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in general, nor does it waive that immunity in suits arising under LSA-R.S. 55:2231 et seq. Even taking Sartin's claims against DHH as true, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over his state law claims against DHH.
IT IS ORDERED that State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Addictive Disorders' motion to dismiss Zorronn Sartin's claims against it is GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Zorronn Sartin's claims against State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Addictive Disorders are DISMISSED without prejudice.