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Sartin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana
Jul 27, 2023
Civil Action 22-603-JWD-RLB (M.D. La. Jul. 27, 2023)

Opinion

Civil Action 22-603-JWD-RLB

07-27-2023

JOSHUA SARTIN v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION


ORDER

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoenas or for Protective Order. (R. Doc. 17). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 31). Plaintiff filed a reply. (R. Doc. 42).

Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoenas to Plaintiff's Former and Current Employer or for Protective Order. (R. Doc. 24). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 30). Plaintiff filed a reply. (R. Doc. 41).

I. Background

On August 30, 2022, Joshua Sartin (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing a Complaint and Jury Demand (“Complaint”), naming Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Defendant”) as a defendant. (R. Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that on December 22, 2020, while working as a process operator for Defendant, he received a sexually explicit video and text messages from his coworker. On this same day, Plaintiff reported the incident to his supervisor. On January 11, 2021, Defendant began investigating. Thereafter, on January 27, 2021, Plaintiff was “terminated effective immediately.” (R. Doc. 1 at 5). According to Plaintiff, he “would not have been terminated by [Defendant] but for his reporting of sexual harassment in accordance with company policy.” (R. Doc. 1 at 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting that he “was terminated in retaliation for” reporting the sexual harassment. (R. Doc. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff seeks, among other things, “compensatory damages, including but not limited to damages for emotional distress, mental anguish, and suffering...” (R. Doc. 1 at 7).

On November 22, 2022, Defendant served its First Set of Requests for Production on Plaintiff. (R. Doc. 24-2). Among other things, Defendant requested that Plaintiff “make copies of and complete, sign, and return originals of the attached” medical and employment authorization forms for each health care provider and employer “identified in response to the interrogatories and request for production of documents.” (R. Doc. 24-2 at 16-17).

The medical authorization form reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

A CERTIFIED COPY of the entire medical records file, including but not limited to: office notes, correspondence, existing narrative reports, x-ray films and reports, CT Scan films and reports, diagnostic films and reports, etc., hospital records, lab results, HIV test result, genetic testing records, patient intake forms, initial application and information sheets, consultation reports, physical therapist reports, billing records, appointment records, progress notes, handwritten notes, nurses' notes, records of prescriptions, patient orders, pathology slides, insurance claim forms, or any and ALL records compiled by you or in your possession pertinent to the treatment of me.
(R. Doc. 17-3) (emphasis in original).

The employment records authorization form reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

A certified copy of all applications for employment, resumes, records of all positions held, job descriptions of positions held, payroll reports, W-2 forms and W-4 forms, performance evaluations and reports; states and reports of fellow employees, attendance records, workers' compensation files; all hospital, physician, clinic, infirmary, nurse, psychiatric and dental records, x-rays, test results, physical examination records and other medical records; any records pertaining to medical or disability claims, or work-related accidents including correspondence, accident reports, injury reports an incident reports; insurance claim forms, questionnaires and records of payments made; pension records, disability benefit records, and all records, and all records regarding participation in company-sponsored health, dental, life and disability insurance plans; material safety data sheets, chemical inventories, and environmental monitoring records and all other employee exposure records pertaining to all positions held; and any other records concerning employment with the above-named institution.
(R. Doc. 24-3 at 2) (emphasis in original).

On December 22, 2022, in response to Defendant's discovery request, Plaintiff objected to the medical authorization form on the grounds that it: (1) is substantially overbroad; (2) requests, among other things, HIV test results, physical therapist reports, genetic testing records, and records of prescriptions, personal and private medical documents, and information that are completely irrelevant to Plaintiff's employment litigation; and (3) is disproportionate the needs of the case, as it appears to have no temporal limitation and could be used to obtain medical records from any time in Plaintiff's life. (R. Doc. 17-5 at 25-26; R. Doc. 24-4 at 22).

Plaintiff further objected to the employment record authorization form on the grounds that: (1) it seeks records, such as Plaintiff's pre-employment physical and reports of personal injuries and medical reports, which are irrelevant and out of proportion to the needs of the case; and (2) is facially overbroad, as it does not have any temporal limit. (R. Doc. 17-5 at 26; R. Doc. 24-4 at 22).

On or about April 11, 2023, the parties participated in a Rule 37 discovery conference to discuss Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's discovery requests. (R. Doc. 17-1 at 3). During the conference, Plaintiff reiterated its objections to the broad, unlimited medical and employment record authorization forms.

On May 16, 2023, Defendant served notices of its intent to serve Olin Corporation (“Olin”) (Plaintiff's employer from November 29, 2021, until March 26, 2023) and Shell Chemical LP (“Shell”) (Plaintiff's current employer since April 2023) with Rule 30(b)(6) depositions for records only and subpoena duces tecum (the “Employer Subpoenas”). (R. Doc. 24-1 at 5).

On May 18, 2023, Defendant served Notices of 30(b)(6) Depositions for Records Only and Subpoena Duces Tecum on Plaintiff, which compels various primary care providers, cardiologists, hospitals, and pharmacies used by Plaintiff over the past ten years to produce “entire health and medical records” by June 9, 2023, at 9:00 am (“Medical Subpoenas”). (R. Doc. 17-1 at 4).

On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to quash the Medical and Employer Subpoenas pursuant to Rules 26 and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards

“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C).

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). Rule 2(c)'s “good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)).

Rule 30(b)(6) governs deposition notices directed to organizations. In the deposition notice, then party “must described with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). In response, the organization must designate an agent or other person to testify on its behalf “about information known or reasonably available to the organization.” Id. “The duty to present and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) designee goes beyond matters personally known to that designee or to matters in which that designee was personally involved. The deponent must prepare the designee to the extent matters are reasonably available, whether from documents, past employees, or other sources.” Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 433 (5th Cir. 2006). The court may limit a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice to the extent it requests the organization to designate an agent to testify on topics of information that are overly broad, vague, or ambiguous. See e.g., Scioneaux v. Elevating Boats, LLC, No. 10-0133, 2010 WL 44366417, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2010) (quashing deposition notice where the plaintiff failed to particularize the topics of discussion in Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidates Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4833023 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008) (granting motion for protective order to the extent topics listed in a 30(b)(6) notice were overly broad, vague, and ambiguous); Panda Assicurazioni-Societa Azioni v. M/V Caribbean Exp., No. 97-3855, WL 30966 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 1999) (denying motion to compel Rule 30(b)(6) deposition where the notice was insufficiently particularized).

Rule 45 governs discovery from non-parties through the issuance of subpoenas. As “the court for the district where compliance is required,” this Court has the authority to quash or modify the subpoenas at issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3). The party issuing the subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1). Additionally, the party moving to quash or modify the subpoena has the burden of demonstrating that compliance with the subpoena would be unduly burdensome. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). A court's considering of a motion to quash a third-party subpoena as unduly burdensome should be governed by the following factors: (1) relevance of the information sought; (2) the requesting party's need for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity of the description of the documents; and (6) the burden imposed. Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.

B. Analysis

1. Meet and Confer

Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for protective order “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.”

In addition, the Court has issued specific requirements to ensure that the parties in this action actually attempt to resolve, in good faith, the issues raised in a discovery motion prior to the filing of such a motion. The Court's Scheduling Order provides that “[a]ny motions filed regarding discovery must be accompanied by a certificate of counsel for the moving party, stating that counsel have conferred in person or by telephone for purposes of amicably resolving the issues and stating why they are unable to agree or stating that opposing counsel has refused to so confer after reasonable notice.” (R. Doc. 13 at 1).

No such certification is provided. Accordingly, the Court has the right to refuse to consider the motions as submitted. Nevertheless, as discussed more thoroughly below, the record indicates that the parties have engaged in numerous discussions regarding the subpoenas at issue.

With respect to the Medical Subpoenas, Plaintiff argues that, by telephone on May 18, 2023, he expressed that he “had objections to the records sought but wanted to first address the procedural issues.” (R. Doc. 17-1 at 5). Particularly, Plaintiff requested clarification that the subpoenas were for records only, as opposed to oral testimony.

By email on May 22, 2023, Plaintiff again requested that Defendant confirm that it will not hold oral depositions of Plaintiff medical providers. (R. Doc. 31-7 at 3). Additionally, Plaintiff requested that Defendant “withdraw its notices of deposition and subpoenas to his medical providers/pharmacies” because the documents sought “are not relevant to the claims and issues in this case.” (R. Doc. 31-7 at 3). On the same day, Defendant confirmed that Defendant “will not hold depositions for testimony of Plaintiff's medical providers on June 9 or others in connection with the notices of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition for records only and subpoenas duces tecum.” (R. Doc. 31-7 at 2). Defendant, however, refused to withdraw or modify its notices of deposition. Accordingly, on May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion “in light of the short time frame before Defendant intended to serve the” Medical Subpoenas. (R. Doc. 42 at 2).

As to the Employer Subpoenas, on May 17, 2023, the parties participated in a telephone call during which they agreed that Defendant would not serve the Employer Subpoenas before May 24, 2023, while the parties attempted to reach an agreement on modified subpoenas. (R. Doc. 30-1 at 9). Plaintiff reserved his right to file a motion to quash. (R. Doc. 30-1 at 8-9).

On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a proposed redline of the Employer Subpoenas, which limited them to “payroll, benefits, and retirement records.” (R. Doc. 30-1 at 6). On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff followed up with Defendant with respect to his proposed modifications. Upon receiving no response from Defendant, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to quash on May 23, 2023.

On May 24, 2023, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's email with its proposed redlines. (R. Doc. 30-1 at 4-5). Defendant also expressed that Plaintiff prematurely filed his motion to quash in contravention of their agreement to amicably modify the subpoenas. (R. Doc. 30-1 at 5). On this same day, Plaintiff responded with additional redlines and argued that its motion was not premature as he did not hear from Defendant until May 24, 2023, and Defendant had the right to serve subpoenas on May 25, 2023. (R. Doc. 30-1 at 3-4).


Summaries of

Sartin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana
Jul 27, 2023
Civil Action 22-603-JWD-RLB (M.D. La. Jul. 27, 2023)
Case details for

Sartin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

Case Details

Full title:JOSHUA SARTIN v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION

Court:United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana

Date published: Jul 27, 2023

Citations

Civil Action 22-603-JWD-RLB (M.D. La. Jul. 27, 2023)