Opinion
No. CV 02-0394269 S
February 15, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Procedural Background
This case arises out of an alleged breach of a purchase agreement and related covenants in connection with a Connecticut Limited Partnership called Meriden Associates ("the Partnership"). The parties formed the Partnership to operate a restaurant located in Meriden, CT. The plaintiff and limited partner, Marcelo Sarfaty, alleges that the general partner, defendant PFY Management, breached a contract to purchase Sarfaty's Partnership interest. Sarfaty also alleges that the president of PFY, defendant Paul Yeh, and a related entity, defendant P N Enterprises, breached related contracts guaranteeing the purchase of Sarfaty's interest in the Partnership, which guarantees were triggered when PFY failed to act.
The parties have elected to try this case to the court. As a preliminary matter, the court heard oral argument on three separate motions in limine filed by Sarfaty seeking to preclude the introduction of certain evidence by the defendants, which will be addressed individually.
Discussion
"The purpose of a motion in limine is to exclude irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial evidence from trial . . . A trial court should exclude evidence if it would create undue prejudice and threaten an injustice if admitted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LoSacco, 26 Conn.App. 439, 444, 602 A.2d 589 (1992). "The decision whether, in the first instance, the court should entertain a motion in limine is a discretionary one. As a general proposition, the purpose of the motion is to insulate the jury from exposure to harmful inadmissible evidence . . . A ruling excluding (or admitting) evidence claimed to be cumulative is also a discretionary one." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tech Air of Naugatuck v. CTR of Charlotte, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 040184947 (July 17, 2007, Gallagher, J.).
"Questions of relevance must be determined in each case by reliance on reason and judicial experience as no exact test of relevancy is found in the law . . . Evidence is admissible when it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case . . . A fact is relevant whenever its existence, either alone or in connection with other facts, makes more certain or probable the existence of another fact . . . [A]ny fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue . . . Relevant evidence is admissible if the trial court, in the exercise of its broad discretion, determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 32 Conn.App. 574, 581, 630 A.2d 609 (1993). "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value . . . We have identified at least four circumstances where the prejudicial effect of otherwise admissible evidence may outweigh its probative value: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counter proof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the party against whom the evidence has been offered, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Potter v. Chicago Tool Company, 241 Conn. 199, 265-66, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997).
I. Capacity to Contract
Plaintiff's first motion in limine seeks to exclude references by the defendants to his capacity to enter into a contract, as outlined in their first special defense. Specifically, Sarfaty seeks to preclude any claim that the agreement to purchase his Partnership interest or the related guarantees signed by the defendants, are void or unenforceable due to the plaintiff's alleged incapacity to enter into those agreements. Plaintiff argues that even if he lacked the capacity to enter into these contracts, such a lack of capacity could only inure to his benefit, as the resulting agreements would be voidable only at the option of the plaintiff. In this case, Sarfaty is the party seeking specific performance of the contracts. Therefore, plaintiff argues that his capacity to contract, or lack thereof has no relevance to this proceeding, and attempts by the defendant to prove otherwise should be precluded.
The court finds that the concept of capacity is a sword that may be wielded to attack the contract only by the incapable party. With respect to the obligations imposed by the contracts in dispute, capacity can be neither a sword nor a shield from responsibility in the hands of the other party. See Coburn v. Raymond, 76 Conn. 484 (1904). In light of the position of the parties in this case, even if the defendants could somehow establish Sarfaty's lack of capacity, it would have no effect on the enforceability of the contracts. While the court is not precluding defendants from attempting to prove that Sarfaty has failed to meet his obligation of performance, or otherwise has not satisfied conditions for payment as specified in the contracts, the motion in limine excluding reference to the plaintiff's lack of capacity to enter into a contract is granted.
II. The Limited Partnership Agreement
The plaintiff's second motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence relating to the defendants' third special defense, which claims that under the terms of the Partnership agreement, the conditions for the withdrawal of funds have not been reached. Sarfaty argues that the Partnership agreement is not relevant, as it is not the agreement that is being enforced. The plaintiff further argues that the complaint does not seek monetary damages or the withdrawal of funds from the Partnership. The defendants counter by arguing that the Partnership agreement is directly related to this matter, because Paul Yeh has filed a counterclaim for an equitable set-off based on that agreement, characterizing the Partnership agreement, purchase agreement, and related guarantees as "one transaction with multiple writings."
Given the state of the pleadings, the court finds that the terms of the Partnership agreement may be relevant to this litigation. A final determination of the issue will have to await the evidence. Plaintiff's motion in limine states that the introduction of such evidence would "confuse the issues [and] mislead the jury." However, in this case it will be the court, not the jury, which is the finder of fact, a circumstance that presumably will lessen the potential for any confusion, and allow for finer distinctions between the relevant and the irrelevant. (For this same point in the context of competent versus incompetent evidence, see Doe v. Carreiro, 94 Conn.App. 626, 640 894 A.2d 993 (2006), "We note that in court trials, judges are expected, more so than jurors, to be capable of disregarding incompetent evidence.") Finally, plaintiff has not established how the introduction of this evidence would unfairly prejudice him. The motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence regarding the defendants' third special defense is denied.
III. Immigration Status
The plaintiff's third motion in limine seeks to exclude references to his immigration status, more specifically, allegedly inaccurate information supplied by Sarfaty to immigration authorities, or his alleged "unclean hands" in connection with his immigration proceedings. The plaintiff argues that whether he provided false information in connection with his immigration proceedings is a matter of federal law. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the doctrine of preemption. The plaintiff further maintains that federal immigration authorities have not come to any conclusions regarding false statements made in connection with his immigration proceedings.
The "application of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 308, 777 A.2d 670 (2001). "The doctrine of unclean hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular controversy in issue . . . The doctrine generally applies only to the particular transaction under consideration, for the court will not go outside the case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complainant in other matters or questioning his general character for fair dealing. The wrong must . . . be in regard to the matter in litigation . . . Though an obligation be indirectly connected with an illegal transaction, it will not thereby be barred from enforcement, if the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case . . . In addition, the conduct alleged to be unclean must have been done directly against the interests of the party seeking to invoke the doctrine, rather than the interests of a third party." (Emphasis added; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 310-11. Whatever alleged wrong may have been done by plaintiff, it was certainly not directly against the interests of the defendants. The court agrees with plaintiff that the unclean hands doctrine has no applicability to this case.
The court, however, reserves judgment until time of trial to determine whether to completely exclude all evidence in this area. If the plaintiff elects to testify, and defense counsel has a good faith belief that the plaintiff lied to immigration officials in connection with his immigration proceedings, then it could be relevant impeachment material. "A witness may be impeached by specific acts of misconduct that demonstrate a lack of truthfulness." Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 675, 174 A.2d 122 (1961); see, State v. Sharpre, 195 Conn. 651, 491 A.2d 345 (1985) (counsel could inquire about whether witness cheated on his tax returns in order to impeach). The court need not address the plaintiff's preemption argument, because it is not deciding any matters of federal law. The court grants the motion in limine with regards to referencing the unclean hands doctrine, but reserves judgment with regards to possible uncharged misconduct evidence should plaintiff elect to testify.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff's motion in limine with regards to referencing the unclean hands doctrine and the plaintiff's capacity to enter into contracts. The court denies the plaintiff's motion in limine with regards to referencing the defendants' third special defense. The court reserves judgment on whether the defendants can utilize alleged misstatements by plaintiff to immigration authorities for impeachment purposes.