Opinion
No. 97 Civ. 9190 (LBS) (GWG)
March 6, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION To the Honorable Leonard B. Sand United States District Judge
Plaintiff Sammy Santiago, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional rights were violated at Rikers Island when his legal materials were destroyed and he was assaulted by corrections officers in early 1997. Santiago's claims against the New York City Department of Corrections were previously dismissed. See Memorandum Endorsement, dated September 24, 1998 (annexed to Notice of Motion, filed August 10, 1998 (Docket #9)). The remaining defendants — all sued in their individual capacities — have now moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND 1. Factual History
Santiago was a member of a violent street gang called the Almighty Latin Kings and Queens Nation ("Latin Kings"). Deposition of Sammy Santiago, dated August 29, 2001 ("Santiago Dep.") (reproduced in Declaration of Mary O'Flynn, dated February 11, 2002 ("O'Flynn Decl."), Ex. Pl. Tr.), at 38. He pled guilty to a number of criminal charges arising from his actions with the Latin Kings. In New York State court, he pled guilty to Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree and Bail Jumping in the Second Degree. Id. at 23. In federal court, Santiago pled guilty to charges of money laundering and a violation of the Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Id. at 23-24. Santiago was incarcerated for several years in the New York State prison system and is currently in the custody of the United States Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons pursuant to his federal conviction. Santiago's claims in this case arise from two incidents that occurred at Rikers Island in 1997. First, Santiago alleges that he had a number of boxes of legal materials at Rikers Island that were taken and never returned to him. Second, he alleges that he was assaulted by several correction officers.
The evidence submitted as part of the defendants' summary judgment motion reflects that on or about January 31, 1997, Santiago was preparing to be transferred from Rikers Island, a prison facility operated by the New York City Department of Corrections, to the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC"), a facility operated by the Bureau of Prisons, for sentencing on his federal charges. See Defendants' Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, dated February 2 11, 2002 ("Def. 56.1 Statement"), ¶ 14. Among his possessions were approximately eleven boxes of legal documents. Id. ¶ 15. After his sentencing in federal court on January 31, 1997, Santiago was returned to Rikers Island from the MCC. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The eleven boxes of legal materials arrived at Rikers Island, but Santiago was not allowed to take the boxes to his cell because prison officials said they would be a fire hazard. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Santiago later attempted to retrieve his boxes of legal materials but was told they had been destroyed. Id. ¶ 18. Santiago's legal materials consisted of discovery material that had been produced to him as part of his RICO case. See Santiago Dep. at 120.
With respect to the alleged assault, the record shows that Santiago was at the medical facilities at Rikers Island from February 3 through February 5, 1997. On February 3, 1997, Santiago requested psychiatric medicine. See Progress and Observation Record, notes dated February 3, 1997 (reproduced in O'Flynn Decl. Ex. J). On February 4, 1997, Santiago returned for a psychiatric evaluation complaining of depression and anxiety disorder. See Progress and Observation Record, notes dated February 4, 1997 (reproduced in O'Flynn Decl. Ex. J). Santiago returned to the medical facilities on February 5, 1997, complaining of injuries to his back and was observed with bruising around his rib cage. See Progress and Observation Record, notes dated February 5, 1997 ("February 5 notes") (reproduced in O'Flynn Decl. Ex. J). At the time, Santiago stated he suffered his injury due to a slip in the shower. Id.; Injury to Inmate Report, dated February 5, 1997 ("Injury Report") (reproduced in O'Flynn Decl. Ex. K); Imate [sic] Statement, dated February 5, 1997 ("Inmate Statement") (reproduced in O'Flynn Decl. Ex. L). In his amended complaint, Santiago asserts that because of threats by corrections officers, he had to say this in order to obtain medical treatment. Amended Complaint, filed January 5, 1998 ("Am. Compl. I") (Docket #4), ¶ IV-A.
2. Procedural History
Santiago filed his original complaint in this matter on December 15, 1997. See Complaint, filed December 15, 1997 (Docket #2). His complaint raised the claims stated above but stated that the alleged assault occurred on February 27, 1997. See id. (unnumbered pages annexed to the complaint). Judge Thomas P. Griesa sua sponte dismissed Santiago's complaint in its entirety. See Order, dated December 15, 1997 (Docket #3). Judge Griesa found that Santiago had failed to allege any actual injury arising from the loss of his papers and had failed to sufficiently explain the alleged assault. See id. at 1-2. The dismissal gave Santiago sixty days in which to correct the complaint. Id. at 3.
On January 5, 1998, Santiago filed an amended complaint. See Am. Compl. I. The complaint described the assault in greater detail, but did not change any of the allegations regarding the loss of his legal papers. See id. ¶ IV-A; id. at attached unnumbered pages. The Amended Complaint did not specify when the alleged assault took place. On March 20, 1998, the case was reassigned to Judge Leonard B. Sand. See Notice of Reassignment, filed March 20, 1998 (Docket #6).
On August 10, 1998, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim because the Department of Corrections was not a suable entity. See Memorandum of Law in Support of New York City Department of Corrections Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, dated August 10, 1998 (Docket #10). Santiago then moved to amend his complaint for a second time. See Amended Complaint F R C P Rule 15(A), filed August 28, 1998 ("Am. Compl. II") (Docket 4 #11). The new complaint alleged the same causes of action and, for the most part, the same facts. The proposed amended complaint stated that the alleged assault occurred on February 4, 1997. See id. ¶ 13. By memorandum endorsement, Judge Sand granted the motion to dismiss the claims against the Department of Corrections. See Memorandum Endorsement, filed September 24, 1998 (annexed to Notice of Motion (Docket #9)). Judge Sand reserved decision on the individual defendants because they had not yet been served. Id.
On October 5, 1998, Judge Sand issued an order directing the Office of Corporation Counsel for the City of New York to assist in Santiago's service of the individually named corrections officers. See Order, dated October 5, 1998 (Docket #13) at 1-2. In addition, Judge Sand extended Santiago's time for service on the individual defendants until December 31, 1998. See id. at 2. Service was not made as of that date.
On April 21, 1999, Judge Sand issued another order regarding the lack of service on the individual defendants. See Order, dated April 21, 1999 (Docket #16). Docket entries on July 13, 1999, indicates that service failed as to "C-73 C.O. Johnson," "C-73 Braeford," "C-74 C.O. R. Albual," and "C-74 Cpt. Pilp, 696." However, "C-73 Cpt. Martinez" and "C-73 C.O. Vargas" were served on January 7, 2000 and February 10, 2000 respectively. Martinez, Vargas and Donald Drakes answered Santiago's complaint on February 14, 2000. See Answer to the Amended Complaint, filed February 14, 2000 (Docket #20). Thereafter, a discovery cutoff was set for December 18, 2000. This deadline was later extended to August 31, 2001. Some limited discovery was permitted thereafter. See Order, dated November 29, 2001 (Docket #39), at 2-3.
On February 11, 2002, the defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. The motion included a notice to Santiago informing him of the potential consequences of failing 5 to respond to this motion. See Defendants' Local Civil Rule 56.2 Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 11, 2002 ("Def. 56.2 Statement") (Docket #42). Thereafter, the Court granted several requests by the defendants to stay briefing on the motion to allow the parties to conduct settlement discussions. See Memorandum Endorsement, filed April 10, 2002 (Docket #44); Memorandum Endorsement, filed May 13, 2002 (Docket #45); Memorandum Endorsement, filed June 12, 2002 (Docket #46). Ultimately, however, these discussions proved unfruitful.
On September 12, 2002, the Court directed Santiago to respond to the motion for summary judgment on or before October 21, 2002. See Order, dated September 12, 2002 (Docket #47). The order specifically informed Santiago of the consequences of the failure to respond to the motion. Id. at 1-2. Santiago wrote a letter to the Court dated September 17, 2002, seeking discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). That request was denied because "discovery in this matter long ago concluded and because plaintiff has not demonstrated what facts will result from discovery that are necessary to respond to the pending motion." See Memorandum Endorsement, filed September 25, 2002 (Docket #49). Santiago did not respond to the defendants' motion by the October 21, 2002 deadline.
Noting that Santiago had been transferred to another facility, the Court on December 16, 2002, issued another order informing Santiago of the consequences of failing to respond to the pending motion and granting him until January 3, 2003 to respond. See Order, dated December 16, 2002 (Docket #50). No response was filed by that date.
Instead, on January 18, 2003, Santiago sent a letter claiming that he had been promised $25,000 as part of a settlement. See Letter to the Court from Sammy Santiago, dated January 18, 2003, at 1-2. On February 3, 2003, the Court received and docketed an undated document from Santiago that lists various complaints about his current confinement in federal prison. See Untitled Document (Docket #52). Santiago attached to this document a January 15, 2003, letter from the Corporation Counsel observing that Santiago still had not responded to the motion for summary judgment.
This letter was written in Spanish, although the numerous prior letters from Santiago in this case were all in English.
To date, Santiago has not submitted any materials in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
II. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "An issue of fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2003) ("To overcome such a motion, the non-moving party must offer sufficient proof to allow a reasonable factfinder to decide in its favor."). "Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Thus, "[s]tatements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted), cert denied, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000). In addition, "[t]he 'mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' supporting the non-movant's case is also insufficient to defeat summary judgment." Niagara Mohawk, 315 F.3d at 175 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
"In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant may satisfy [their] burden by pointing to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Thus, "[a] defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case." Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 93 F.3d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to establish an essential element of its case.") (citation omitted).
B. The Loss of Santiago's Legal Materials
Prisoners retain a constitutional right of access to the courts while incarcerated. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1987). Those rights are violated if "prison officials . . . actively interfer[e] with inmates' attempts to prepare legal documents, . . . or file them." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The intentional destruction of a prisoner's legal materials may state a claim for denial of the right of access. See Morello, 810 F.2d at 347; Smith v. O'Connor, 901 F. Supp. 644, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In order to assert a claim for a denial of the right of access, however, a prisoner must show an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.
In this case, the "actual injury" requirement means Santiago must demonstrate that the loss of his materials prejudiced his ability to pursue a legal claim. See, e.g., Davis v. Goord, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 360053, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2003) ("To state a claim for denial of access to the courts . . . a plaintiff must allege that the defendant 'took or was responsible for actions that 'hindered [a plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a legal claim.''") (quoting Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1997)) (citation omitted); Smith, 901 F. Supp. at 649 ("To state a claim that his constitutional right to access the court was violated, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that defendants['] . . . conduct materially prejudiced a legal action he sought to pursue.") (citations omitted); accord Livingston v. Goord, 225 F. Supp.2d 321, 331 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Hudson v. Greiner, 2000 WL 1838324, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2000); Higgins v. Coombe, 1999 WL 760658, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1999). Therefore, in responding to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Santiago was obligated to produce admissible evidence on this point: in other words, evidence showing that the loss of the materials harmed his 9 ability to pursue an actual legal claim. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Schneider, 1999 WL 459813, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (granting summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff failed to submit evidence of actual injury), aff'd, 2003 WL 430516 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2003); Thomas v. Thomas, 2000 WL 307391, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000) ("Because plaintiff does not proffer evidence from which a reasonable jury could find actual injury, her claim of denial of access to the courts cannot withstand defendants' motion for summary judgment.").
Santiago has provided no evidence at all on this point. Indeed, he submitted no affidavits or other evidence to support the claims in his complaint. The defendants notified Santiago that in order to withstand the motion for summary judgment, he needed to adduce evidence in support of his allegations. See Def. 56.2 Statement at 1-2. The Court gave Santiago the same admonishments. See Order, filed September 12, 2002 (Docket #47), at 1-2; Order, filed December 16, 2002 (Docket #50), at 1-2.
Notably, Santiago is an experienced federal court litigant who thus surely understood the ramifications of his failure to comply with such notices and court directives. See Santiago v. Campisi, 91 F. Supp.2d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Santiago v. James, 1998 WL 474089 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1998); Santiago v. Semenza, 965 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Santiago v. State of New York, 00 Civ. 3819 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 22, 2000); Santiago v. Modesto, 00 Civ. 3826 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 22, 2000); Santiago v. United States, 99 Civ. 11614 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1999); Santiago v. New York State Corr. Facility, 99 Civ. 353 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 19, 1999); Santiago v. Hernandez, 98 Civ. 7370 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 20, 1998); Santiago v. New York State Dep't. of Corr., 98 Civ. 1608 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 5, 1998); Santiago v. New York State Dep't. of Corr., 97 Civ. 8306 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 10, 1997). Because Santiago did not meet his burden of providing admissible evidence in support of his claim regarding access to the courts, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Not only has Santiago not submitted admissible evidence on an actual injury, none of the papers in the court record explain how the loss of documents caused Santiago to suffer injury. Santiago did state at his deposition that he "needed" the lost papers for an appeal of his guilty plea, see Santiago Dep. at 173-74, but he offered no specifics beyond this conclusory statement to suggest that the papers would have had any relevance to that appeal. As noted, "conjecture" cannot create a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).
In addition, even had Santiago raised an allegation of actual injury, his claim would fail because he apparently was represented by counsel at the time his materials were destroyed. See Santiago v. James, 1998 WL 474089, at *5 (an attorney "has represented [Santiago] from the beginning of his criminal proceeding, which commenced in or about June 1994, and has continued to represent him through the present [that is, 1998]."). As was noted in James, "if an inmate is represented by counsel, there can be no violation of his constitutional right to access to the courts as a matter of law." Id. (citing cases); see also Shepherd v. Fraisher, 1999 WL 713839, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1999) ("plaintiff cannot state a viable § 1983 claim based on the alleged denial of his access to courts when he was represented by counsel.") (citations omitted); Perez v. Metro. Corr. Ctr. Warden, 5 F. Supp.2d 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("If an inmate is provided with legal counsel, the inmate is given a 'reasonably adequate opportunity' to present his claim and there is no violation of constitutional magnitude.") (citing cases), aff'd, 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, the lost materials that allegedly impacted Santiago's access to the courts were various discovery materials relating to his criminal trial. See Santiago Dep. at 120. Because Santiago's counsel either had these materials himself or would have had the right to obtain all of the materials lost, Santiago suffered no injury that harmed his ability to access the courts. See Perez, 5 F. Supp.2d at 212 n. 5 (noting that the lost documents at issue were materials from the criminal trial and "there is no reason to believe that plaintiff's counsel did not have these materials or would have been unable to secure copies.").
C. The Assault Claim
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment proscribes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citations omitted). In the prison context, "'[w]hen the state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well being.'" Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (in turn quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989))).In order to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate both an objective and subjective element. See Griffen v. Crippen, 193 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1999). The objective element is "context specific, turning on 'contemporary standards of decency,'" Blyden, 186 F.3d at 263 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (in turn quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))), and requires a violation alleged to be "'sufficiently serious' by objective standards." Griffin, 193 F.3d at 91 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (in turn quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991))). The subjective element requires the inmate to show that the prison officials involved "had a 'wanton' state of mind when they were engaging in the alleged conduct." Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Under the Eighth Amendment "'[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.'" Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). As such, "a de minimis use of force will rarely suffice to state a constitutional claim." Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). "However, the malicious use of force to cause harm constitutes an 'Eighth Amendment violation per se . . . whether or not significant injury is evident.'" Griffin, 193 F.3d at 91 (quoting Blyden, 186 F.3d at 263). This is true because "'[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.'" Blyden, 186 F.3d at 263 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (citation omitted).
The defendants have not attempted to demonstrate that Santiago's claims fail either the subjective or objective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. Instead, their argument goes to whether this incident occurred at all. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 11, 2002 (Docket #43), at 11. Santiago bears the burden of proving that a violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred. See generally Griffin, 193 F.3d at 91. The defendants have pointed to the absence of evidence that the alleged assault ever took place. Therefore, the defendants must prevail unless Santiago adduced evidence demonstrating that an assault occurred. See Allen, 100 F.3d at 258; Vann, 72 F.3d at 1048.
As noted, Santiago has offered no affidavits or other evidence in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Instead, Santiago submitted a document that complains about issues at his current federal prison facility. See Untitled Document (Docket #52). For this reason alone, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim.
The record includes a deposition of Santiago (annexed to the defendants' motion) that contains some testimony regarding the alleged assault. But Santiago has failed to rely on it as part of his response to the defendants' motion. Moreover, evidence suggesting that there was no assault also exists inasmuch as the medical records indicate that Santiago reported his injuries were caused not by an assault but because of a fall in the shower. See February 5 notes; Injury Report; Inmate Statement.
While the Court is cognizant of the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, see, e.g., Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994), the fact that Santiago is "proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve [him] from the usual requirements of summary judgment." Fitzpatrick v. New York Cornell Hospital, 2003 WL 102853, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2003) (citing cases); accord Johnson v. New York Hospital, 1998 WL 851609, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1998) (citing cases), aff'd, 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999). Without a reference or citation to evidence to support his claims, Santiago has not satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted and the case dismissed.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (e). Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with copies sent to the Honorable Leonard B. Sand, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007, and to the undersigned at 40 Centre Street, New York, New York 10007. Any request for an extension of time to file objections must be directed to Judge Sand. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).