Opinion
No. CV03-0521538S
February 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a wrongful death action by the plaintiff, administrator on behalf of the estate of Felix De Los Rios, brought in part against the defendant, Crowley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (Crowley). Crowley has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is that allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The undisputed facts show as follows: De Los Rios worked at the Crowley RV Center as a "detailer." The RV Center is a facility managed and operated by Crowley as an autonomous department. The Crowley automobile dealership is located on Farmington Avenue in Bristol while the RV Center is located on Barber Street in Bristol.
On October 26, 2002, De Los Rios was a front-seat passenger in an automobile being driven by an employee of Crowley between the dealership location and the RV Center location. The driver left the road and struck a tree, resulting in the death of De Los Rios. De Los Rios' estate has filed a claim under workers' compensation against Crowley. The estate has also brought this pending suit against Crowley for negligence and recklessness, essentially for entrusting the operation of the automobile to its employee driver. Crowley paid De Los Rios a wage for his services, as seen by the W-2 form issued to him. It also supplied workers' compensation coverage.
Crowley has now moved for summary judgment on the ground that the "pleadings, affidavits and . . . other proof submitted show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [Crowley] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn. App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, appeal denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).
The basis of Crowley's summary judgment motion is the "exclusivity" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that provides in § 31-284(a) as follows: "An employer . . . shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter . . ." This provision "manifests a legislative policy decision that a limitation on remedies under tort law is an appropriate trade-off for the benefits provided by workers' compensation. That trade-off is part and parcel of the remedial purpose of the act in its entirety. Accordingly, our case law on workers' compensation exclusivity reflects the proposition that these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation . . ." Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 26, 826 A.2d 1117 (2003), quoting Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 220-21, 752 A.2d 1069 (2000).
Here there is no genuine issue of material fact that Crowley paid De Los Rios' wages. In addition, Crowley arranged for De Los Rios to receive workers' compensation coverage and steps are being taken for the payment of certain benefits. These undisputed facts clearly support Crowley's contention that it was De Los Rios' employer and that the statutory exclusivity rule applies.
Exhibit A, supplementary to Crowley's Motion, indicates that De Los Rios has filed for workers' compensation against Crowley. An informal hearing was held with De Los Rios as claimant and Crowley Chrysler Plymouth as respondent on February 11, 2003.
The plaintiff claims in reply that Crowley has several auto dealerships and that De Los Rios performed work for each of these dealerships and the general public. From this, the plaintiff concludes that "the employees of the RV center were not employees of any other dealers and that each dealer was a separate business." The plaintiff objects to Crowley's exclusivity argument by contending that "there is an issue of fact as to whether Crowley Chrysler Plymouth as owner of the vehicle was the employer of deceased" and that the summary judgment should therefore be denied.
The plaintiff's argument is essentially that there is a factual issue of whether the RV center itself was De Los Rios' employer. This contention is not supported by the plaintiff's cases involving parent and subsidiary corporations. In Averitt v. Oakdale Development, LP, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0459460 (May 21, 2003, Arnold, J.), the plaintiff's W-2 indicated that he was employed by a subsidiary, while the defendant claimed that he was an employee of another corporation, possibly a parent corporation. Judge Arnold denied summary judgment on the exclusivity claim because the defendant had asserted "a matrix of business relationships revolving around the operation and maintenance of a theatre venue . . ." and had failed to isolate which one had employed the plaintiff. See also Steinberg v. The Stop Shop Companies, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV91 279136S, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 406 (July 20, 1993, Fuller, J.) (parent corporation cannot ordinarily claim exclusivity defense for an employee who works for a subsidiary corporation).
In the present case, there may well be a group of dealerships that have "Crowley" in their name. De Los Rios was paid by only one of these corporations, however — Crowley Chrysler Plymouth — and his work was directed only from this single corporation. Thus there is no issue of which corporation was his "true" employer. Cf. Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 655, 748 A.2d 834 (2000) (where the trial court was faced with the argument that the defendant was not the plaintiff's employer "because it did not pay [the plaintiff] for her services").
Similarly, the plaintiff's citations to the "economic reality" test are not on point. This approach attempts to place the injured plaintiff in the correct corporation when the issue of exclusivity arises. In Briden v. Road Systems, Inc., 705 F. Sup. 367, 368 (E.D.Mich. 1989), for example, the District Court quoted Michigan law that "if a parent corporation is, under the economic realities of the situation, the true employer of an injured worker, then the parent corporation should not be denied the protection of the exclusive remedy provision merely because the injured worker was employed in name by a subsidiary of the parent corporation." This test does not apply here because there is only one legal entity that was De Los Rios' employer. Romano v. Curry Auto Group, Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125, 301 App.Div.2d 509 (A.D. 2003) (one corporation is alter ego of other and exclusivity applies).
The plaintiff also argues that Crowley and the RV Center constitute "dual persona" and thus the exclusivity defense does not apply to Crowley. The "dual persona" doctrine is not accepted in Connecticut. See Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 759-62, 610 A.2d 1245 (1992) (rejecting "Pandora's box"); Melius v. Federal Express Corp., 76 F. Sup.2d 233, 235 (D.Conn. 1999) ("The Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to carve out a dual capacity exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act").
Even if the doctrine applied in Connecticut, it would not apply to these facts. As is stated in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 113.01: "An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if — and only if — it possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to its status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes that persona as a separate legal person." The plaintiff has not presented any proof that shows that the RV Center was sufficiently distinct from Crowley itself so that the doctrine might apply.
The RV Center on this record is simply a department of Crowley, with different functions from the sales department or the service department. Cf. Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Department, 902 P.2d 1077, 120 N.M. 474, aff'd, 946 P.2d 645, 124 N.M. 42 (N.M.App. 1995). In Singhas, the court dismissed a suit by a state employee against the state highway department for negligence. The highway department was not a legal entity distinct from the state itself and therefore the suit was barred by the exclusivity principle.
Based upon the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
Henry S. Cohn, J.