Opinion
No. CV04-0834015
December 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
Factual Background
Anthony Santaniello has been convicted of a variety of crimes, including sexual assault in the first degree and attempted murder. The attempted murder charge alleged that he took steps to kill the victim of the sexual assault. These convictions are being appealed.
Subsequent to his conviction and sentencing, he filed a Petition for New Trial, relying on a claim of newly discovered evidence. In substance, the claimed new evidence was a letter dated February 2, 2004, which may have been written by Thomas Marra, stating that he had "manipulated and convinced" Anthony Santaniello to have the victim murdered. (The state has informed the court it has reason to believe Marra may not have authored the letter.) At the direction of the presiding judge, Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant, this civil matter was assigned to the undersigned judge, who had presided over the criminal trial.
During the sentencing, the Court discussed the impact of Mr. Santaniello's crimes on the victim, who testified at trial and addressed the Court at sentencing. Among other things, the undersigned judge stated as follows:
But given the nature of a sexual assault, it is — going through the process is a very difficult emotional and often degrading process and then having to appear in an open court and testify is very, very difficult. And it goes without saying that there's an enormous breach of trust and an assault not only on a person, but on the system when someone is convicted of crimes like these.
Sentencing transcript, pp. 53, 54.
But let me just go back to saying how serious these offenses are. Obviously, a sexual assault is an assault on the person of a woman. It's an assault on the personhood of a woman, on the dignity, on the sense of trust. It's a very serious crime, in and of itself.
Sentencing transcript, p. 52.
I don't have to go on at length about how significant it is when somebody who's accused of a crime takes steps, any steps relating to the possibility of killing a witness, who happens in this case to be the victim — because not only is that conduct a horrifying experience for a person who is dragged into the system through no fault of his or her own . . . Not only is it a personal assault on that person, but it is also an assault on the system, because the system cannot function if victims are afraid to complain, if victims are afraid to go to the police, if victims are afraid to pursue cases.
Sentencing transcript, p. 53.
In fact it's your perfect right to sit here and to pursue your legal remedies. But there's not a single thing that I've seen that indicates that you have an ounce of remorse or concern.
Sentencing transcript, p. 54.
I have, of course, considered the harm to the victim, who is here. I saw her testify with great dignity during the trial. I want to commend you for the courage you've [Ms. M.] displayed, which is quite extraordinary, and I know this is extremely difficult.
I've listened carefully as she spoke her [sic] today. Her life has been altered irrevocably. I won't run through all of the concerns that she has, but among them are selling her home, relocating, purchasing a different car.
Sentencing transcript, p. 57.
You [Santaniello] don't seem to have displayed any concern.
Sentencing transcript, p. 57.
Santaniello was sentenced to an effective sentence of 42 years.
Legal Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the undersigned judge should be disqualified from the case, relying on applicable provisions of the Practice Book and of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The argument, as stated on page 5 of plaintiff's November 18, 2005 memorandum, is essentially that because, as the sentencing judge, I expressed concern about the victim's journey through the legal system, and because I opined that Mr. Santaniello lacked remorse, I have indicated a preference to spare the victim from another trial at which she would have to testify. Consequently, plaintiff asserts, I am less likely to fairly and dispassionately evaluate his claims in the pending Petition for New Trial than would another judge.
Specifically, plaintiff relies on practice Book Section 1-22, which states that: "A judicial authority shall, upon motion of either party or upon its own motion, be disqualified from acting in a matter if such judicial authority is disqualified from acting therein pursuant to Canon 3c of the Code of Judicial Conduct or because the judicial authority previously tried the same matter and a new trial was granted therein." Plaintiff also relies on Canon 3(c)1, which states that: "A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . ."
Plaintiff is not asserting that the sentencing remarks indicate any personal bias, prejudice, animus or personal vendetta against him. Nor has plaintiff requested that his disqualification motion be referred to another judge for decision.
For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
As our Supreme Court stated in State v. Eric M., 271 Conn. 641, 651 (2004):
Also relevant to our analysis is canon 3(c)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides in relevant part: "A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (A) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding . . ." We have explained that "[t]he reasonableness standard is an objective one. [Therefore], the question is . . . whether a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 460, 680 A.2d 147 (1996), aff'd after remand, 252 Conn. 128, 750 A.2d 448, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 835, 121 S.Ct. 93, 148 L.Ed.2d 53 (2000).
See also Judge Bishop's decision in State v. Molnar, 79 Conn.App. 91, 102, 829 A.2d 439 (2003), in which he noted:
A judge is not an umpire in a forensic encounter . . . He is a minister of justice . . . He may, of course, take all reasonable steps necessary for the orderly progress of the trial . . . In whatever he does, however, the trial judge should be cautious and circumspect in his language and conduct . . . A judge should be scrupulous to refrain from hearing matters which he feels he cannot approach in the utmost spirit of fairness and to avoid the appearance of prejudice as regards either the parties or the issues before him . . . It is his responsibility to have the trial conducted in a manner which approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pickel v. Automated Waste Disposal, Inc., 65 Conn.App. 176, 181, 782 A.2d 231 (2001).
At the same time,
Vague and unverified assertions of opinion, speculation and conjecture cannot support a motion to recuse . . . (Citations omitted.) State v. Montini, 52 Conn.App. 682, 695, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 909 (1999).
Plaintiff is of course correct that he is entitled to a judge who can impartially and dispassionately evaluate the merits of his claims. To maintain the respect of the public, the system must not only be fair, but must appear to be fair. It would be fundamentally unfair if the plaintiff's claims in this action were not evaluated by a neutral and detached decisionmaker. But I am unpersuaded that the remarks that were made at sentencing indicate that disqualification is required, or even appropriate. I am not convinced that a reasonable person would question my impartiality, based on all the circumstances, for the following reasons.
There is nothing intrinsically extreme or excessive about the sentencing remarks. It is common for a sentencing judge to comment on the impact a serious crime of violence has had on a victim's life. This is particularly so when the victim has testified at trial and is present at the sentencing. It is also standard practice for a sentencing judge to take into account a defendant's apparent remorse, or lack of remorse, along with the seriousness of a crime; an offender's criminal history; the need for specific and general deterrence; and other factors.
See Article XXIX of Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Connecticut, which reads, in part, as follows: "b. In all criminal prosecutions, a victim . . . shall have the following rights (1) the right to be treated with fairness and respect throughout the criminal process . . ."
A judge, at sentencing, has multiple duties. First and foremost is to sentence a defendant according to law, with a clear explanation for the sentence being imposed. The defendant is entitled to a detailed explanation of why he is being sentenced, particularly in a case as serious as this one. Society demands it. Our law requires it. See Practice Book Section 43-10(6), which states that "In cases where sentencing review is available, the judicial authority shall state on the record, in the presence of the defendant, the reasons for the sentence imposed." In a broader sense, the sentencing judge also speaks for the community when rendering a sentence. "The sentencing court has a twofold responsibility: to the individual found guilty and to the society which criminal laws are intended to protect." Neely v. State, 47 Wis.2d 330, 177 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1970).
Moreover, just as a judge has a duty under certain circumstances to disqualify himself or recuse himself to protect the integrity of the system, so the judge has a duty not to do so unless it is required. If judges too readily grant such motions, this would encourage the filing of such motions for improper tactical reasons, as well as judge-shopping. See, e.g., State v. Montini, 52 Conn.App. 682 (1999), in which the Court held that a judge who was a "nationally known advocate for child rights" did not have to recuse himself from a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse.
In the present case, Judge Bryant referred the case to me because I had presided over the trial. The defendant has not challenged Judge Bryant's decision to do so. In certain cases, it may make good sense for a case to be assigned randomly, or for a presiding judge to send a matter to a judge with no knowledge of the matter under consideration. But in other cases, it is logical and appropriate for the judge who presided over the criminal trial to preside over the Petition for New Trial. See, e.g., Reid v. State, 2003 Ct.Super 6750 (May 14, 2003), in which Judge Mulcahy heard a petition for new trial after presiding over the trial; Adams v. State, 259 Conn. 831, 792 A.2d 809 (2002); State v. Schiavo, 2003 WL 1994141 (Conn. Super). See also State v. Spells, 76 Conn.App. 67, 818 A.2d 808 (2003), in which the Court held that the judge who presided over the trial did not have to excuse himself from ruling on a post-sentence motion for new trial. The Court held that the Court's comments about the defendants' behavior were neither improper nor based on an extra-judicial source.
In the pending case, the trial judge is particularly well positioned to evaluate the petitioner's claim given its somewhat unusual nature, as well as the fact that the trial judge has had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses during trial, and assess the overall strength, or weakness, of the evidence.
For all of the above reasons, the motion is denied. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the undersigned judge cannot fairly evaluate his claim. In early January 2006, the Court will take steps to schedule a hearing on the claim made in the Petition for New Trial.