Summary
stating that “[a]s a general rule, agreements against public policy are illegal and void.... No agreement can be sustained if it is inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the public good.”
Summary of this case from PHL Variable Insurance v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust ex rel. Christiana Bank & Trust Co.Opinion
C.A. No. 94A-10-001.
Submitted: April 21, 1995.
Decided: April 24, 1995.
Upon Appellant's Motion for Reargument.
DENIED.
Karen Sann of Landenburg, Pennsylvania, Pro Se.
Terri L. Thompson, Esquire, of Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Renal Care Centers Corporation.
OPINION AND ORDER
The matter before this Court is a Motion for Reargument by Karen Sann (hereinafter "Appellant") of the Court's March 28, 1995 opinion and order wherein the Court remanded the case to the Delaware Department of Labor (hereinafter "DOL") Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter "UIAB"). The case was before this Court on appeal from a decision in which the UIAB affirmed the DOL appeals referee's order disqualifying the Appellant from the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits.
Although styled "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment", the Appellant's Motion will be considered a Motion for Reargument. A Motion for Reargument is the proper medium by which reconsideration by the Court of its conclusions of law should be sought. See, Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, Del. Supr., 260 A.2d 701 (1969).
FACTS
The Appellant was employed by Renal Care Centers Corporation (hereinafter "RCC") from June 20, 1978 through May 20, 1994 as a technician earning twelve dollars per hour. Throughout her tenure with RCC, the Appellant had a significant attendance problem, and battled with alcoholism. She was ultimately terminated on May 20 after voluntarily readmitting herself into an alcohol rehabilitation center, thereby violating a conditional reinstatement agreement with RCC.
For a more comprehensive recapitulation of the facts see the Court's March 28, 1995 opinion and Order.
DISCUSSION
In its March 28, 1995 Opinion and Order, the court determined, inter alia, that the Appellant had raised colorable arguments regarding the invalidity of the conditional reinstatement agreement, but that the UIAB had not properly developed the record in this regard, nor had it properly addressed the Appellant's pattern of poor attendance which appears to have played a role in her discharge. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further findings.In her Motion for Reargument, the Appellant asserts that such a remand is unwarranted because RCC has simply failed to carry its burden of showing just cause for her termination, and that any possible alternative grounds for her termination could not amount to just cause. After considering the Appellant's Motion and RCC's response thereto, the Court continues to find remand necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. The reasoning is set forth below.
First, it is unclear from the record whether RCC met its burden of showing just cause for the Appellant's termination. RCC established on the record that the Appellant had indeed violated a term of the conditional reinstatement agreement. This Court has held that such a violation, in certain instances, may provide a basis for a finding of just cause. See, e.g., Trivits v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-09-11, Toliver, J. (June 30, 1994) (ORDER). The Appellant attempted to counter this showing with the contention that the agreement was void as against public policy and violative of the ADA. Unfortunately, as a pro se litigant, the Appellant failed to properly develop this allegation, and the UIAB failed to properly investigate or address it. Accordingly, the lack of information in the record in this regard precludes the Court from making a determination as to whether RCC's conditional reinstatement agreement offends public policy.
Secondly, the Appellant's argument regarding her attendance problem as a possible motivating factor for her discharge, notwithstanding its potential merit, only underscores the propriety of the Court's remand. As a central part of the Appellant's argument, she makes reference to RCC's policies and procedures with regard to absence and tardiness, and alleges that her pattern of attendance could not have properly resulted in her termination thereunder. Again, because the Appellant's attendance problem was not a focal point of the UIAB hearing, the record is sketchy with regard to RCC's attendance policy, and whether termination of the Appellant was, or could have been, pursuant to that policy. Hence, a remand to the UIAB for further findings is clearly required.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant's Motion for Reargument is without merit and hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.