Opinion
AC 38853
10-17-2017
SANLE ZHANG, et al. v. 56 LOCUST ROAD, LLC
Michael J. Cacace, with whom was Ronald E. Kowalski II, for the appellant-appellee (defendant). Richard E. Castiglioni, with whom were Bridgitte E. Mott and, on the brief, Jonathan J. Kelson, for the appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).
Michael J. Cacace, with whom was Ronald E. Kowalski II, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).Richard E. Castiglioni, with whom were Bridgitte E. Mott and, on the brief, Jonathan J. Kelson, for the appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).
Lavine, Mullins and West, Js.
PER CURIAM.The defendant, 56 Locust Road, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court quieting title to a disputed area of land in favor of the plaintiffs, Sanle Zhang and Yanpin Li, and granting the defendant a ten foot easement by necessity over the easterly portion of the disputed area. The plaintiffs cross appeal from the portion of the judgment in which the court granted the defendant the easement by necessity. On appeal, the defendant claims: (1) because the plaintiffs' predecessors in title did not convey, either orally or by deed, their interest in the disputed area, the trial court erred in finding in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim of adverse possession; (2) the trial court failed to balance the equities in this case by rejecting the defendant's equitable defenses; (3) General Statutes §§ 47–37 and 52–575 are unconstitutional because they permit a taking of property without just compensation; and (4) the easement granted by the court may not provide meaningful access to the defendant because the court specifically subjected the easement to the town's land use regulations. The plaintiffs claim on cross appeal that the court erred in granting the defendant an easement by necessity.
In its fourth claim, the defendant argues: "If the defendant is unable to secure the necessary municipal approvals... it [will] have no way to access the larger, nearly three acre, portion of the now severed 56 Locust Road property. Such a result would completely frustrate the trial court's order and would be contrary to Connecticut precedent requiring that the defendant be permitted to access its now landlocked property." (Emphasis added.) We conclude that this claim is premature and, therefore, unreviewable. "It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston, 140 Conn.App. 136, 155, 57 A.3d 905, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915, 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke, 111 Conn.App. 462, 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... [and we therefore] must be satisfied that the case before [us] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 909, 964 A.2d 544 (2009).
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Having examined the appellate record and having considered the briefs and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The trial court fully and accurately addressed the issues relevant to the parties' appeals and, in its memorandum of decision, set forth a proper statement of both the facts and the applicable law. Any further discussion by this court would serve no useful purpose.
The judgment is affirmed.