Opinion
6:19-cv-00710-YY
06-09-2021
BRANDY MARIE SANDOVAL, Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY JAIL and STAFF; DEPUTY POE, DEPUTY CHILDERS, DEPUTY DWIGHT, DEPUTY EGGLESTON, OSBORNE, DEPUTY PIERCE, MCIRVIN, DEPUTY KELLY, SARGEANT TURNER, CCS-CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, and TRACY from CCS, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
YOULEE YIM YOU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FINDINGS
Pro se plaintiff Brandy Sandoval brings claims arising from her incarceration at Douglas County Jail. See Am. Compl., ECF 11. Defendants Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”) and Tracy Simpson (aka “Tracy from CCS”) (hereafter defendants) have filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 41) and a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 51). The Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED, the Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED AS MOOT, and the claim against CCS and Simpson should be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant Douglas County Jail has been dismissed from this case. See Order, ECF 7. Plaintiff asserts claims against other jail employees who have also filed a motion for summary judgment, which will be resolved in a separate decision.
I. Plaintiff's Claim
In her Amended Complaint, plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from the denial of medical treatment. Am. Compl. 3, ECF 11. Plaintiff alleges defendants ignored medical needs related to her neck, spine, and back, and committed “medical negligence.” Id., ECF 11, at 3, 8. She claims she sustained “permanent spinal damage from the failure of DC Jail Staff to act and get me the medical treatment I needed, ” and “will eventually have to have spinal surgery.” Id.
Where plaintiff has not paginated her filings, the court uses the ECF docket number and page number for identification.
Plaintiff also claims that she “got merca [sic] and head lice, ” that “they blew my veins 3 times trying to take blood twice, ” and the jail “did no medical intake upon [her] admittance” even though she is diabetic. Id. at 8, 11.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 51)
Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether they acted with deliberate indifference or breached the standard of care required for medical negligence.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of material factual issue are resolved against the moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
B. Motion 1: Deliberate Indifference
Generally, “[t]he status of the detainee determines the appropriate constitutional standard for evaluating conditions of confinement.” Vazquez v. Cty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted). Fourteenth Amendment “[d]ue process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be ‘cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment.” Id.(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (quotation marks omitted); see also Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Inmates who sue prison officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”).
At her deposition, plaintiff claimed that her back injury was caused during an arrest in April 2018. Pl. Dep. 43, ECF 69-1. Additionally, in her Amended Complaint, she claims she was assaulted by corrections officers who reinjured her back and spine and caused her to sustain whiplash. Thus, it appears that plaintiff claims her rights were violated after she arrived at the jail and before she was convicted and sent to Coffee Creek Correctional Facility to serve her sentence. Accordingly, the less stringent Fourteenth Amendment standard for pre-trial detainees applies. See Martinez v. Geo Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 18-1125-R, 2019 WL 3758026, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019) (observing the Fourteenth Amendment contains a less-stringent objective test for deliberate indifference as opposed to the Eighth Amendment test, which requires a subjective and objective component).
“[C]laims for violations of the right to adequate medical care ‘brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment' must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018).
[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee's medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.Id. at 1125. “With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily ‘turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.'” Id. (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071). The “‘mere lack of due care by a state official' does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent-something akin to reckless disregard.'” Gordon, 888 F.3d 1125.
There is no disputed issue of fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's complaints of a back or spinal injury. Plaintiff admits that she received an x-ray two weeks after she arrived at the jail. Resp. 2, ECF 61. These x-ray results, which are in the record, show that the “vertebral bodies have normal shape and ossification pattern, ” “posterior elements are intact, ” and a “[n]ormal lumbar spine series.” Valentine Decl., Ex. 2, ECF 73-1.
Plaintiff also has provided records from an outside hospital that similarly acknowledge plaintiff's “x-rays did not show a fracture.” ECF 29, at 76.
Plaintiff has attached what appear to be medical records to her Amended Complaint. ECF 29. Some portions are illegible or redacted. In any event, they do not support a finding of deliberate indifference. For instance, in one chart note, plaintiff was evaluated after being forcibly returned to her cell, and claimed, “I don't have any new injuries.” ECF 29, at 15. Medical staff examined plaintiff, and she had no apparent injuries. Id. When medical staff “tried to educate” plaintiff “how to get medical care and our plan of care, ” she disagreed with the plan and said, “I just want to go home.” Id. On another date, a nurse practitioner reminded plaintiff that a plain film image of her back had been ordered to “start the process of correcting her discomfort, ” and offered plaintiff a hot/wet pack, which she declined. Id. at 16. Plaintiff then started screaming, “I swear to God, . . . if you don't fix my fucking back I am going to sue you.” Id. The nurse practitioner “again attempted to calm [plaintiff] and reviewed the plan that was in place however [plaintiff] was screaming” and staff “was unable to therapeutically communicate with her.” Id.
Other records show plaintiff intentionally flooded her cell and then accused staff of not rendering adequate care and said she needed to “go home to take care of her kids.” ECF 29, at 18.
Plaintiff frames defendants' conduct as “medical malpractice, ” ECF 61-2, at 6, and “medical negligence.” Am. Compl., ECF 11, at 7; see also Sandoval Aff. 2, ECF 62. But medical malpractice and mere negligence do not amount to a constitutional violation. Moreover, here, the evidence at most shows a difference of opinion between plaintiff and medical professionals regarding the type of medical treatment she should have received. “As a matter of law, the difference of opinion does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Hodges v. Corizon Health, Inc., 837 Fed.Appx. 466, 469 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)).
There also is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent regarding head lice, MRSA, and blood draws. The record shows that defendants checked plaintiff for head lice on May 21, 2018, but there was “no evidence of head lice noted.” Valentine Decl., Ex. 3, ECF 73-2. Plaintiff was diagnosed with MRSA during treatment for an abscess on her left buttock. ECF 29, at 3 3. As for blood draws, defendants have produced a progress note showing that on September 20, 2018, a blood draw was “attempted with three unsuccessful sticks.” Valentine Decl., Ex. 3, ECF 73-2. It further states that plaintiff was told “we would try again tomorrow and to drink plenty of water.” Id. Additionally, regarding diabetes, plaintiff admitted at her deposition that she was in fact treated for her diabetes “[a]t some point in time.” Valentine Decl., Ex. 1, at 5, ECF 52-1. None of this constitutes evidence that defendants' intentional decisions put plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125.
In sum, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding deliberate indifference, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
C. Motion 2: Breach of Standard of Care
CCS also moves for summary judgment “on all claims of medical negligence on the basis that there are no issues of material fact” as to whether it breached the duty of care. As explained above, there is no cognizable medical negligence claim in a § 1983 action. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Thus, it is unnecessary to examine the issue further.
II. Motion to Dismiss (ECF 41)
CCS has also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief and defendant Tracy Simpson was not properly served. Because defendants are entitled to prevail on its motion for summary judgment, which will result in dismissal of this case, the motion to dismiss is moot.
Alternatively, defendants moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 51) should be GRANTED, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF 41) should be DENIED AS MOOT, and the claims against CCS and Simpson should be dismissed with prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Wednesday, June 30, 2021. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.