From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Sandifer v. Foster

Superior Court of North Carolina EDENTON —
Oct 1, 1795
2 N.C. 237 (N.C. Super. 1795)

Summary

In Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N.C. 247, the call of the last line was, "thence along the river to the beginning"; the river was held to be the boundary, although the line coming towards the river called for a white oak at its termination, which was half a mile distant from the river.

Summary of this case from McPhaul v. Gilchrist

Opinion

October Term, 1795

The last line of a boundary was from a white oak (which stood half a mile from the river), thence along the river to the beginning: Held, that the river is the boundary.

EJECTMENT. The land in controversy was patented in 1706, by one Gee, and a transfer of 200 acres of the tract was made to Bridgers by endorsement on the deed. In 1752, Bridgers conveyed to Robert Sandifer, who in 1765 devised to his son Robert Sandifer, after the death of the devisor's widow; but in the meantime he gave the lands to her for her life. She is yet alive, and hath conveyed the lands to the plaintiffs. In 1780, John Sandifer obtained a grant from the State, and conveyed to his son Robert, who conveyed to the defendant a part of this land. Gee's patent began at the mouth of Dividing Run, thence north, thence east, thence south to a white-oak, thence along the river to the beginning. This white-oak stood half a mile from the river; and if the line be run a direct course from thence to the beginning, a large part of the land described in the plaintiff's grant will be left out of Gee's patent; but if the river is deemed to be the boundary, the land described in the defendant's grant will then be included in Gee's patent, and, of course, be also included in Bridgers' deed.

Baker for plaintiff.

Keys for defendant.


The river in this case must be considered as the boundary of Gee's patent. It has always been thus uniformly decided in our courts.

The jury so found, and there was judgment accordingly.

Cited: Hartsfield v. Westbrook, post, 258; Cherry v. Slade, 7 N.C. 85; Hurley v. Morgan, 18 N.C. 430; Slade v. Neal, 19 N.C. 62; Shultz v. Young, 25 N.C. 387; McPhaul v. Gilchrist, 29 N.C. 173; Literary Board v. Clark, 31 N.C. 61; Baxter v. Wilson, 95 N.C. 143; Brown v. House, 118 N.C. 878; Bowen v. Gaylord, 122 N.C. 820; Rowe v. Lumber Co., 133 N.C. 437; Whitaker v. Cover, 140 N.C. 284; Boyden v. Hagaman, 169 N.C. 202; Power Co. v. Savage, 170 N.C. 629.

(238)


Summaries of

Sandifer v. Foster

Superior Court of North Carolina EDENTON —
Oct 1, 1795
2 N.C. 237 (N.C. Super. 1795)

In Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N.C. 247, the call of the last line was, "thence along the river to the beginning"; the river was held to be the boundary, although the line coming towards the river called for a white oak at its termination, which was half a mile distant from the river.

Summary of this case from McPhaul v. Gilchrist

In Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N.C. 237, Gee's patent began on the mouth of a dividing run, thence north, thence east, thence south to a white oak, thence along the river to the beginning.

Summary of this case from Cherry v. Slade
Case details for

Sandifer v. Foster

Case Details

Full title:DEN, ON THE DEMISE OF SANDIFER v. FOSTER

Court:Superior Court of North Carolina EDENTON —

Date published: Oct 1, 1795

Citations

2 N.C. 237 (N.C. Super. 1795)

Citing Cases

Slade v. Neal

Where a grant called for a "beginning at a pine at the sound side, and running thence along the sound and…

Whitaker v. Cover

Judge Gaston, who argued the case for the defendant, seems not to have contested the point. The deed in…