Opinion
No. 14-06-01130-CR
Opinion filed July 22, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 230th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1049456.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, ANDERSON, and BROWN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jason Dubois Sanders challenges the finding that he was competent to stand trial, asserting that the jury's finding of competency was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm. Sanders was charged with the felony offense of capital murder. He entered a plea of not guilty. Sanders moved for a pretrial competency hearing and the trial court convened a jury for that purpose. The defense presented the testimony of one expert witness in support of its contention that Sanders was incompetent to stand trial. The State responded with the testimony of its own expert witness, as well as a former detention officer, a deputy sheriff, a criminal-defense lawyer who previously represented Sanders, Sanders's former high-school principal, and Sanders's co-defendant. The jury found that the defense did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sanders was incompetent to stand trial. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found Sanders guilty as charged. The jury also answered three special issues: it answered the issue of mental retardation in the negative, the issue of future dangerousness in the affirmative, and the issue of mitigation in the affirmative. The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, without the possibility of parole. This appeal timely followed. In his first four of eight issues, Sanders challenges the qualifications of the State's expert witness, Dr. Denkowski. But Sanders refers to no place in the record where he timely objected to Dr. Denkowski's qualifications. On that point, therefore, Sanders has failed to preserve any error. See Croft v. State, 148 S.W.3d 533, 544 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)). Even if Sanders had preserved error, we find no support for his argument that an expert who testifies at a defendant's competency trial must be appointed under article 46B.021 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and must therefore satisfy the qualifications and requirements listed in articles 46B.022, 46B.024, and 46B.025. See Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.021, 46B.022, 46B.024 (Vernon 2004); see also Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.025 (Vernon 2005). In the final four issues, Sanders essentially challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have "(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person." Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2004). An accused is presumed to be competent to stand trial until he proves his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. Williams v. State, 964 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd). When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence offered to support the denial of Sanders's affirmative defense, or any fact issue where the law has shifted to the defendant the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the correct standard of review is whether after considering all of the evidence relevant to the issue, "the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (quoting Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990)). The jury heard evidence on both sides of the issue. The defense called Dr. Brown as its expert witness. Before reaching his opinion, Dr. Brown reviewed various documents including medical records, Mental Health Mental Retardation Authority (MHMRA) records, and school records the State had provided. Dr. Brown also met with Sanders, his mother, and his maternal grandmother, who had raised him. Dr. Brown testified that Sanders was "extremely slow intellectually" and that Sanders had trouble giving useful information. He performed a full intellectual evaluation of Sanders, using the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) to measure intellectual capacity, or IQ. Sanders scored a verbal IQ of 61, a performance IQ of 52, and a full-scale IQ of 52. Dr. Brown testified that the average IQ is between 90 and 110, the standard deviation is 15 points, and approximately 70 percent of the population falls within one standard deviation above or below the mean. Dr. Brown opined that Sanders was mildly to moderately retarded, which is considered high-functioning retardation, and that his impairment was permanent. He told the jury that Sanders' understanding of his case was "very, very simple and very, very primitive." In Dr. Brown's opinion, Sanders was incompetent to stand trial due to mental retardation. Sanders could not rationally understand the charge against him or the consequences of that charge, and he did not have the ability to consult with his lawyers with a rational degree of factual understanding. Although he thought Sanders could exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior, he did not think that Sanders could understand the adversarial nature of the proceedings. When asked if he thought Sanders could testify, Dr. Brown responded that Sanders easily misunderstands questions and would be "totally at the mercy of an intelligent manipulation of cross examination. He would not be able to fend for himself at all in this situation." On cross, Dr. Brown admitted that he did not review the previous IQ tests given to Sanders. Sanders had previously scored an 83 and an 89 on the WISC, which is the children's version of the WAIS-III administered by Dr. Brown. Sanders had also previously scored a 104 and 106 on the TONI test of nonverbal intelligence. Further, Dr. Brown did not review the statement of the co-defendant, any statement made by Sanders, the Houston Police Department offense report, the video recording of the offense, or Sanders's cell-phone records. Additionally, Dr. Brown did not speak to any officers or witness, any doctors that had previously evaluated Sanders, any of his teachers or friends, any lawyer who may have previously represented Sanders, jail personnel, or the co-defendant. The State presented six witnesses to counter the contention that Sanders was incompetent to stand trial, including its own expert, Dr. Denkowski. Prior to testifying, Dr. Denkowski reviewed Sanders' school records, the Harris County jail records, the Houston Police Department offense report, the available test protocols for Houston Independent School District, Dr. Brown's reports and findings, a statement from Sanders, a statement from his co-defendant, and MHMRA records. The jury heard from Dr. Denkowski that an IQ of 55 to 70 is in the range of mild retardation, and an IQ of 40 to 55 is in the range of moderate retardation. Regarding the score of 52 that Dr. Brown assessed, Dr. Denkowski testified that a
person with an IQ of 52 is pretty functionally impaired. They're — among other things, they're not going to be able to give you very good information about themselves. A lot of self-help skills aren't going to be there. This is not a person that's going to go out and buy their own clothes. That is not a person that is going to be able to drive a car. It would be too confusing. . . . They would never be able to achieve a sixth-grade level academically.Dr. Denkowski listed numerous tasks that he would not expect an individual with an IQ of 52 to be able to perform, including: drive a car without getting lost, drive a car alone, successfully play a video game, wear clean clothes, brush his teeth on a daily basis, use a cell phone, buy groceries on his own on a regular basis, and purchase and install a security system. Dr. Denkowski also testified that he had administered three tests on Sanders for malingering: the test of memory malingering (TOMM), the dot-counting test, and the rate-15-item memory test. Malingering is "an exaggeration of symptoms when one is in trouble because of our human nature to protect ourselves." Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293, 306 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). He noted that Sanders appeared to understand his questions, rarely asked for clarification, and was able to carry on a conversation. When asked his opinion as to whether or not Sanders was malingering, Dr. Denkowski responded: "definitely." He explained that the best of these three tests is the test of memory malingering. And my experience has been that even the defendant who is found to be mentally retarded will get like 45 or 47 out of 50. Those who have not been mentally retarded if they have been trying, will invariably get 50 on the first try. And you try this three times. You go through the sequence three times. With Mr. Sanders, he got 15 out of 50 the first time and then 19 out of 50 on the second two tries. That was virtually unheard of. Dr. Denkowski also administered the Stanford Binet Intelligence Scale, Fifth Edition, and stated that this test was "basically an equivalent to the [test] that Dr. Brown gave." Sanders scored a 40, which Dr. Denkowski stated was the "lowest possible score you can get on that test. . . . [Sanders] was functioning like a 47-month-old toddler in terms of mental ability." Dr. Denkowski also administered the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Beck Depression Inventory, and did a wide-range achievement test for spelling, reading, and math skills. He found that Sanders was functioning at a first-grade level. However, he noted that when Sanders was almost 17 years old, he was given an arithmetic-achievement test which indicated that he functioned at a sixth-grade level. He told the jury that at a sixth-grade level, "someone can multiply and divide double digits, numbers, have an understanding of fractions. But when I tested Mr. Sanders' math skills, he miscalculated problems like two plus seven, five minus one." Based on this, Dr. Denkowski formed the opinion that Sanders "was trying to conceal whatever level of academic skills he possessed." Next, Dr. Denkowski determined Sanders's adaptive behavior. Adaptive behavior refers to "the effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural group." Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(1) (Vernon 1994). To determine Sanders's adaptive behavior, Dr. Denkowski used information already available from the record, including the interviews performed by Dr. Brown. He also interviewed Sanders's girlfriend at the time, the co-defendant, and Sanders' former high-school principal. He told the jury that he did not interview Sanders's grandmother because she had already provided a rating, which gave Sanders credit for the ability to perform twice as many skills as he indicated he could perform. Sanders indicated that he could perform 43 of the 239 skills listed. Dr. Brown had assessed Sanders's adaptive behavior at a 41. Dr. Denkowski informed the jury that a 40 is the lowest score possible. Dr. Denkowski assessed Sanders's adaptive behavior at 75, though he noted that "75 is really an artificially low score." He opined that Sanders did not have significant deficits in adaptive behavior. On cross, he admitted that he did not go over the protocols from previous intelligence-assessment tests given to Sanders so he could not verify the previous results, and he had not addressed the considerations listed for determining competency under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second witness for the State was a former detention officer. He testified that Sanders was involved in a rule violation and was subsequently given an opportunity to write down a statement explaining what happened. The State admitted Sanders's written statement into evidence, though the statement was redacted to omit any mention of fighting. The detention officer testified that he did not write the statement for Sanders and that Sanders was alone in a separation cell when he wrote the statement. The State's third witness had spoken with Sanders about his options after the rule violation. He testified that it seemed like Sanders understood, Sanders did not indicate that he could not understand, and Sanders made a decision based on the options he was given. However, on cross, both witnesses admitted that they did not specifically remember Sanders and that they were testifying based on their reports. The fourth witness for the State was Sanders's former high-school principal. She testified that she heard Sanders was "an up-and-coming star" in track, and that he "could always find a way to make it appear that he was innocent even if I had witnessed what happened. And the way that he would respond to questioning about what had occurred made me realize that he was manipulative. He was very skilled in that area." She also testified that Sanders was in special education and speech therapy, and that he had a reading disability. The fifth witness for the State was an attorney who previously represented Sanders on a criminal case. She testified that she had no competency concerns during her representation of Sanders; however, she admitted that she had no independent recollection of Sanders and that she was testifying from practice of habit and a review of the record. She also admitted that she had not spoken to Sanders since September of 2004. The sixth and final witness for the State was the co-defendant. He testified that he lived with Sanders for two years and that he had seen Sanders cook something in a microwave, ride a bicycle, drive a car, use a phone, play video games, buy a ticket at a movie theater, go shopping for clothing, brush his teeth, buy groceries, give his phone number to others, order his own food, clean the house, and lie to his girlfriend. On cross, he admitted that he was testifying in return for leniency. After hearing evidence on both sides of the issue, the jury rejected Sanders's claim that he was not competent to stand trial. We must not intrude upon the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness's testimony. See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Appropriate deference should be afforded to the fact finder's conclusion on the issue of whether Sanders was competent to stand trial. See Williams v. State, 191 S.W.3d 242, 250-51 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.). A jury resolves conflicts in evidence by weighing testimony and then rejecting any or all of a witness's testimony. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Sanders claims that there was no conflict in the evidence because the State did not offer any evidence to refute Dr. Brown's testimony that Sanders was legally incompetent. We disagree. The State offered the testimony of Dr. Denkowski that Sanders was malingering, and this testimony alone clearly provides a conflict in the evidence. Although the jury heard from Dr. Brown that Sanders was incompetent because of his mental retardation, the jury also heard from Dr. Denkowski that Sanders "was trying to conceal whatever level of academic skills he possessed." Dr. Denkowski opined that Sanders was "definitely" malingering, and that he did not have significant deficits in adaptive behavior. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from two witnesses regarding a rule violation after which Sanders wrote his own statement, and made a decision about how to proceed based on the options he was given. The jury also heard from a criminal-defense attorney who had previously represented Sanders. She testified that she had no competency concerns during her representation. Sanders's former principal testified that "he was manipulative." Finally, his co-defendant testified that Sanders was able to perform various tasks which Dr. Denkowski had previously explained would not be possible for an individual with an IQ of 52, the IQ score Dr. Brown had assigned to Sanders. After an evaluation of the evidence presented, we conclude that the jury's finding of competency is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 155. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sanders asserts that Dr. Denkowski is not qualified because (1) he did not testify or otherwise prove that he was licensed in the State of Texas, (2) he had no experience or training related to insanity or incompetency evaluations, (3) he made no written report as to Sanders's competency, and (4) he did not address the factors to be considered in a competency evaluation.
Specifically, Sanders questions whether (1) the testimony of Dr. Denkowski is sufficient to counter the testimony of Dr. Brown, (2) the testimony of lay persons who have not had recent contact with Sanders is sufficient to rebut his claim of legal incompetency, (3) a person can be legally incompetent without being mentally retarded or mentally ill, and (4) the jury's verdict was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust and require reversal of his conviction.