Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-6048-10T2
05-03-2013
ROCMON L. SANDERS, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Rocmon L. Sanders, appellant pro se. Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Daniela Ivancikova, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Kennedy and Mantineo.
On appeal from New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Rocmon L. Sanders, appellant pro se.
Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Daniela Ivancikova, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Rocmon L. Sanders, an inmate at Southern State Correctional Facility (SSC), appeals from a June 24, 2011 final agency decision of the Department of Corrections imposing disciplinary sanctions against him. The Department sustained a hearing officer's finding that appellant had committed prohibited act .301 (unexcused absence from work), in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
Here are the facts. On June 16, 2011, appellant failed to appear for his work assignment on an outside "ground maintenance" detail at SSC. The supervising officer, Senior Correction Officer (SCO) Elwell, then charged appellant with disciplinary infraction .301 for "unexcused absence from work or any assignment; being late for work." The charge was served upon appellant the next day and forwarded to a hearing officer for further action.
Appellant provided a written statement of defense in which he alleged he "cannot be assigned an outside detail during the warm seasons due to . . . being severely allergic to bee stings." He added that two weeks earlier, he had submitted a "job change request" seeking to avoid outside assignments for this reason, but the request was rejected. He claimed he re-submitted the request, and was "awaiting a response" on June 16. He concluded, "I was under the impression I was 'idle' until I receive[d]" a response and thus "did not knowingly fail to report to work."
Appellant was offered an opportunity to call witnesses at his hearing, and to confront and cross-examine any institutional representatives. He expressly declined this opportunity, however.
The hearing officer considered appellant's written statement, as well as the report of SCO Elwell and the "medical restriction list" for appellant, which listed no restrictions. Noting "no medical restriction on [appellant's] record," the hearing officer found appellant guilty of the infraction and referred him for a medical examination and for consideration for a job change by the classification committee.
Appellant administratively appealed the hearing officer's determination, and argued the determination was arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Associate Administrator Amadu Jalloh upheld the decision of the hearing officer, explaining "extenuating circumstances did not outweigh substantial evidence." This appeal followed.
In his brief submitted to this court, appellant variously contends that the hearing officer was biased, her findings of guilt were not supported by substantial evidence, and, on the whole, he was denied due process. We reject these arguments.
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or is unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
The record before us shows no SSC medical restrictions for appellant prior to June 27, 2011, when a Department physician specified "no outside detail" for appellant. This, presumably, was the result of the referral by the hearing officer after finding appellant guilty of the infraction on June 22. Also, appellant's work record at SSC reveals he had been assigned a number of outside details prior to June 16 without incident or apparent protest. Further, appellant was not entitled to not report for a work assignment, or to assume he could remain idle, simply because he had earlier requested a job change. This is particularly true where, as here, his first request was rejected.
Appellant's submission on appeal of an undated record from another prison facility showing he had an "active allergy" for "bee stings" as of November 28, 2001, and a chart summary from Talbot Hall dated August 10, 2010, listing "bee stings" under a heading for "allergies", does not warrant reversal of the Department's rulings. Appellant has provided no evidence that these records resulted in a "medical restriction" on his available job assignments as of June 16. Indeed, the record on appeal leads forcefully to the opposite conclusion.
The balance of appellant's arguments lack sufficient merit to be discussed in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION