Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-01219-BHH-KFM
05-01-2023
Mario Alberto Sanchez-Partida, Petitioner, v. Warden Dunbar, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
ALLEGATIONS
Petitioner's Conviction and Sentence
On July 20, 2009, the petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana as well as conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. See United States v. Sanchez-Partida, C/A No. 2:09-cr-000378-001, at doc. 67 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2009). On March 18, 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to two hundred and ten months imprisonment for both crimes, with the sentences running concurrently. Id. at doc. 127. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On January 18, 2017, the petitioner filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Amendment 782. Id. at doc. 131. The petitioner's motion was denied on February 27, 2017. Id. at doc. 132. The petitioner filed another motion seeking to reduce his sentence on November 20, 2018, which was denied on November 30, 2018. Id. at docs. 133; 134. The petitioner then filed a motion for compassionate release on December 9, 2020. Id. at doc. 135. The petitioner's motion was denied on April 19, 2021. Id. at doc. 137. The petitioner filed another motion for compassionate release on June 6, 2022, which was denied on June 13, 2022. Id. at docs. 139; 141.
Petitioner's Present Action
The petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and located at Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg (“FCI Williamsburg”) seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that the BOP is violating his federal constitutional rights by refusing to provide the petitioner with good time credit under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) (doc. 1). The petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, but argues that exhaustion would be futile because he is due to be released immediately if his sentence were appropriately calculated (id. at 6, 8). For relief, the petitioner seeks to have his sentence recalculated to include good time credits under the FSA (id. at 9-10).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the petitioner filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, for the reasons that follow, his case is subject to summary dismissal. Because the petitioner is incarcerated in the District of South Carolina and he names the warden of FCI Williamsburg as the respondent, his § 2241 petition is properly filed in this court. As noted, here, the petitioner seeks an order instructing the BOP to recalculate his sentence to reflect good time credits he is entitled to under the FSA (doc. 1). However, the petition is subject to summary dismissal because the petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Unlike a § 2255 motion, which is filed in the trial and sentencing court, a § 2241 petition is filed in the district where the petitioner is incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); In re: Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000). “Generally, a § 2241 petition ‘attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity,' whereas a § 2255 motion ‘attacks the legality of detention.'” Rice v. Lamanna, 451 F.Supp.2d 755, 758 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996)); see United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between attacks to the “computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself”). As noted, the petitioner seeks an order instructing the BOP to recalculate his sentence based on the FSA (doc. 1). See Diaz v. Warden, FCI Edgefield, C/A No. 4:17-cv-00093-RBH, 2017 WL 2985974, at *2 (D.S.C. July 13, 2017) (noting that a § 2241 petition “is the proper means for a federal prisoner to challenge the BOP's sentencing calculations, including good conduct time credits”) (citing Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671,679 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts have required prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in a § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and provides “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). Any arguments not advanced at each step of the administrative appeal are procedurally defaulted. See McCullough v. Warden of FCI Williamsburg, C/A No. 8:19-cv-00630-BHH-JDA, 2019 WL 3308276, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2019), report and recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3306099 (D.S.C. July 23, 2019) (citing Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002)). Moreover, if a prisoner cannot obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to timely appeal at the administrative level, then the prisoner has procedurally defaulted his § 2241 claim, unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the failure. See, e.g., Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996), cited with approval in Watkins v. Compton, 126 Fed.Appx. 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2005). Although the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not waivable, United States v. Jeter, 161 F.3d 4 (4th Cir. 1998) (table), some courts have held that the judicial exhaustion requirement of § 2241 may be excused by courts for discretionary reasons, such as where requiring exhaustion would be futile. See, e.g., Dunkley v. Hamidullah, C/A No. 6:06-cv-2139-JFA-WMC, 2007 WL 2572256, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2007). Nevertheless, courts have emphasized a petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused only upon a showing of cause and prejudice. McClung, 90 Fed.Appx. at 445 (citing Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Here, the petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, arguing that exhaustion would be futile because he is entitled to immediate release (doc. 1 at 6, 8). However, vague and conclusory statements, such as those proffered by the petitioner, do not meet the cause and prejudice standard. Indeed, it is unclear what portion of the FSA the petitioner relies on in seeking additional good time credits. As such, this is precisely the type of case which requires a fully developed administrative record so that the court can evaluate the BOP's calculation of time to be credited to the petitioner's sentence based on the FSA. Mero v. Phelps, C/A No. 4:20-cv-03615-MGL-TER, 2020 WL 7774378, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 7769784 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2020) (noting that the “BOP should be afforded the opportunity to correct any alleged errors, to develop its factual record, and apply its expertise to the situation.”). Therefore, because the petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the instant matter should be dismissed. See Lane v. Warden, C/A No. 8:22-cv-01855-RMG, 2022 WL 2800908, at *2 (D.S.C. July 18, 2022) (dismissing § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust and noting that conclusory allegations of being eligible for immediate release did not meet the cause and prejudice standard to excuse exhaustion).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without requiring the respondent to file a return because the petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).