Opinion
D032781
Filed July 20, 1999 Certified for Publication
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Petition denied.
Castle Krause and Richard H. Castle for Petitioner.
Morrison Foerster, Raymond L. Wheeler and Robert J. Keenan for Respondents.
OPINION
This case arises from the December 1998 unification of the municipal and superior courts of San Diego County, in accordance with a majority vote of the judges taken after the electorate's approval of Proposition 220. The San Diego County Court Clerks Association (the Association), which represents the employees automatically transferred from municipal to superior court, seeks a writ of mandate ordering the superior court to immediately restore their civil service status. We deny the petition.
We use municipal court and superior court to refer to the courts of San Diego County.
The parties agree that our exercise of original jurisdiction over this matter is proper since the superior court has an interest in the outcome. (See American Federation of State etc. Employees (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 506, 513; Service Employees Internat. Union v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 320, 322.)
FACTS
On June 2, 1998, the statewide electorate approved Proposition 220, an amendment to the California Constitution. It provides, "the municipal and superior courts shall be unified upon a majority vote of superior court judges and a majority vote of municipal court judges within the county. In those counties, there shall be only a superior court." (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 5, subd. (e).) Where unification occurs, municipal court employees automatically become superior court employees. (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 23, subd. (c)( 1).)On August 27, 1998, a majority of the judges of the municipal and superior courts voted in favor of unification, to occur on December 1, 1998. In October 1998 the superior court notified municipal court employees that upon unification, pay rates, job classifications, health and insurance benefits, leave balances, seniority points and participation in the county retirement system would be unaffected. It also advised them that as superior court employees, they would be "at-will" and no longer subject to the civil service rules of San Diego County. Under the rules, an employee could be terminated or otherwise disciplined only for cause, and any disciplinary action was subject to the specified procedures.
The Association, on behalf of the 550 employees facing automatic transfer from municipal to superior court, wrote several letters to the latter's presiding judge, Wayne Peterson, seeking to retain their civil service status. Having obtained no relief, the Association now seeks a writ of mandate ordering the superior court to restore the transferred employees' civil service status.
In addition to the superior court, respondents include Judge Peterson, Kenneth Martone, executive officer of the superior court, and the executive committee of the unified court (collectively superior court).
DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review
This case involves the interpretation of a constitutional amendment and statutes, questions of law subject to independent review on appeal. ( Board of Retirement v. Lewis (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 956, 964; McMillan v. Siemon (1940) 36 Cal.App.2d 721, 726.)II. Statutory Scheme
The organization of the state's municipal and superior courts is governed by numerous county-specific statutes. (See Gov. Code, § 69502 et seq. [superior courts]; § 72000 et seq. [municipal courts].) Under provisions enacted in 1986, municipal court personnel not serving "at the pleasure of their appointing authorities" were civil servants subject to discipline only for cause. (§§ 74348, subd. (b); 74749, subd. (b).) On the other hand, subdivision (b) of section 69904, enacted in 1974 and applicable to the superior court, provides, "[a]ll personnel appointed by the judges pursuant to this or any other section shall be exempt from civil service and shall be attachés of the court. They shall serve at the pleasure of a majority of the judges of the court and may at any time be removed by the majority of the judges in their discretion." This statute has been interpreted to mean that superior court personnel "are court employees, not county employees, and a majority of the judges of the Superior Court has exclusive control over noneconomic benefits of such employees[.]" ( American Federation of State etc. Employees v. County of San Diego, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 516-517.)
All statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise specified.
Section 69904 applies to "a county of the third class, as determined by the 1970 federal census[.]" (§ 69904, subd. (a).) San Diego County is reportedly the only county to which section 69904 applies. The county-specific statutes provide that the employees of certain other superior courts are also "at-will" (see, e.g., § 69894 [Los Angeles County], § 69899.5 [Orange County], § 69903 [Alameda County], § 69906 [San Bernardino County] and § 69911 [Kern County]). Not all of the statutes regarding superior court employees, however, address the issue of employment status (see, e.g., § 69900 [City and County of San Francisco]).
The purpose of Proposition 220 was "to permit the Legislature to provide for the abolition of the municipal courts and unify their operations within the superior courts." (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 5, subd. (e); 23, subd. (a).) Upon unification, municipal court employees would automatically become superior court employees. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 23, subd. (c)( 1).) The measure also allowed "urgency statutes that create or abolish offices or change the salaries, terms, or duties of offices, or grant franchises or special privileges, or create vested rights or interests, where otherwise permitted under this Constitution." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 23, subd. (a).)
Accordingly, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 2139, effective September 28, 1998, an urgency measure designed to implement court unifications. (§ 70200 et seq.) Section 70212, subdivision (a) repeats that upon unification, "[p]reviously selected officers . . ., employees, and other personnel who serve the court become the officers and employees of the superior court." Section 70217 provides in part:
"On unification of the municipal and superior courts in a county, until adoption of a written personnel plan by the judges of the unified superior court and approval of the plan by the Legislature:
"(a) Upon unification, previously selected officers, employees, and other personnel who serve the courts shall become the officers, employees, and other personnel of the unified superior court at their existing or equivalent classifications, and at their existing salaries and benefits that include, but are not limited to, accrued and unused vacation, sick leave, personal leave, health and pension plans."
"(b) Permanent employees of the municipal and superior courts on the effective date of unification shall be deemed qualified, and no other qualifications shall be required for employment or retention. . . .
"(c) Employment seniority of an employee of the municipal or superior courts on the effective date of unification shall be counted toward seniority in the unified superior court, and all time spent in the same, equivalent, or higher classification shall be counted toward classification seniority." (Italics added.)
III. Applicability of Section 69904, Subdivision (b) A
"Our primary aim in construing any law is to determine the legislative intent. [Citation.] In doing so we look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]" ( Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501.) The Association contends that under the plain meaning rule, subdivision (b) of section 69904 is inapplicable to the employees transferred from municipal court because they were not "appointed" — a term meaning designated, chosen, selected or assigned (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 99) — by the judges of the superior court. Rather, they became superior court employees merely by operation of law.Section 69904, subdivision (b) applies to superior court employees "appointed by the judges pursuant to this or any other section[.]" (Italics added.) Under section 70200, subdivision (b), unification required a majority vote of both the municipal and superior court judges. By opting for unification, the superior court judges effectively chose, or "appointed," the former municipal court employees to superior court positions. The fact that the transferred employees were not initially appointed by the superior court is not dispositive.
In any event, the Association's argument fails even if the former municipal court employees were not "appointed" to the superior court within the literal meaning of subdivision (b) of section 69904. "Literal construction of statutory language will not prevail if contrary to legislative intent apparent in the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Statutory language should not be given a literal meaning that results in absurd and unintended consequences. [Citations.]" ( Gomes v. People of Mendocino (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977, 986.)
The Legislature is deemed to have been aware of existing statutes regarding the "at-will" status of superior court employees (§ 69904, subd. (b)) and the civil service status of former municipal court employees (§§ 74348, subd. (b), 74749, subd. (b)), and to have enacted Senate Bill No. 2139 in light thereof. The Legislature also presumably sought to maintain a consistent body of rules. ( Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 6; People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 694; Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23, 27.) Notably, in enacting Senate Bill No. 2139, the Legislature did not amend section 69904 to provide that upon unification and abolition of the municipal court, the transferred employees would retain their civil servant status. In other contexts, the Legislature has demonstrated its ability to preserve such employment terms. For instance, it expressly retained the civil service status of officers and employees of the Human Relations Agency who were transferred to the Health and Welfare Agency or the Resources Agency. (§ 12809.)
The Legislature's lack of intent to preserve the civil servant status of the employees transferred from municipal court is further demonstrated by section 70217, subdivision (a). Again, it provides that upon unification, the transferred employees shall maintain their current classifications and pay, and other "benefits," including but not limited to "accrued and unused vacation, sick leave, personal leave, health and pension plans." (§ 70217, subd. (a).) The Legislature elected not to provide that any existing civil service status must continue to be recognized after court unification.
Further, no legislative intent to preserve civil service status can be implied from the language of section 70217, subdivision (a). "`"[W]here general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of . . . things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to . . . things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. . . . The rule is based on the obvious reason that if the legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense they would have made no mention of the particular classes." ( Martin v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1437.) Here, the specific examples qualifying the general word "benefits" are all of an economic nature, unlike civil service status, which relates to the cause and procedures required before disciplinary action may be imposed. Thus, any benefits retained under subdivision (a) of section 70217, but not expressly included therein, must also relate to the employee's economic status. Indeed, other statutes show the Legislature treats salary benefits and civil service status as distinct issues. (See, e.g., §§ 69904, subd. (b) [superior court employees entitled to economic benefits "at levels no less than those authorized for employees in the classified service of the county," despite lack of civil service status]; 74348, subds. (a) and (b) and 74749, subds. (a) and (b) [enumerated economic "fringe benefits" of former municipal court employees and civil service status set forth in separate subdivisions].)
Seidler v. Municipal Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1229, is illustrative. There, the court analyzed section 72608, whose general term "rights, programs and benefits" was qualified by "paid medical plans, management incentive and early separation programs, parking and cafeteria privileges, longevity pay, shooting allowance, uniform and equipment allowance, and the same rights to meet with those entities which prescribe their compensation, that are provided for or made applicable to the equivalent Los Angeles County employee classification." ( Id. at p. 1235.) The court held the general term did not embrace "due process or permanent employment rights related to the process of discharge," because with limited exception, the qualifying terms were all salary benefits. ( Ibid.)
Moreover, to any extent subdivision (a) of section 70217 is arguably ambiguous, the legislative history shows Senate Bill No. 2139 was intended to "preserv[e] the status quo on employment in the unified court," with regard to "salary, seniority, and benefit levels." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2139 (1997 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1998.) Again, these terms refer to monetary benefits as opposed to procedural ones. In sum, we conclude the transferred employees were subject to the "at-will" provision in subdivision (b) of section 69904 upon court unification.
"`When the [statutory] language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. [Citation.]'" ( Department of Fish Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.) "Faced with ambiguous statutory language, we endeavor to find the interpretation that will best further the statutory purposes. [Citation.] `[T]he court must consider the consequences that might flow from a particular construction and should construe the statute so as to promote rather than defeat the statute's purpose and policy.' [Citation.]" ( Escobedo v. Estate of Snider (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1214, 1223.)
The Association asserts the Legislature intended to preserve the status quo with regard to noneconomic as well as economic terms of employment. The legislative history materials it cites, however, do not support the assertion. For instance, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary commented that Senate Bill No. 2139 preserved "the status quo on employment in the unified court. Existing employees, officers, and personnel who serve the courts become employees, officers, and personnel of the unified court at their current salary, seniority and benefit levels." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2139 (1997 Reg. Sess.) June 9, 1998.) There is no indication "benefits" include civil service status. Additionally, the Legislature's intent to "ensure that existing contracts with court employees are not rendered invalid due to the unification of a county's trial courts" (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2139 (1997 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1998) is unhelpful, as there was no memorandum of understanding or other contract giving the former municipal court employees civil service status.
We reject the Association's assertion that section 70215, a provision of Senate Bill No. 2139, superseded section 69904. Section 70215 provides: "This article and other statutes governing unification of the municipal and superior courts in a county shall prevail over any inconsistent statutes otherwise applicable to the municipal or superior courts in the county, including, but not limited to, statutes governing . . . employees, and other personnel who serve the court." The Association points out no way in which section 69904 is inconsistent with any provision of Senate Bill No. 2139.
B
The Association essentially argues the superior court prematurely applied subdivision (b) of section 69904 to divest the transferred employees of their civil servant status, because the "Task Force on Trial Court Employees" had not yet rendered its recommendations. The Association relies upon the "Trial Court Funding and Improvement Act of 1997" (§ 77600 et seq.), under which a task force was established to "recommend an appropriate system of employment and governance for trial court employees." (§ 77600.)Among other things, the task force is charged with examining and outlining "issues relating to the establishment of a local personnel structure for trial court employees" under court, county or state employment. (§ 77603, subd. (g).) "The task force, in recommending options for employee status, shall consider the complexity of the interests of employees and various governmental entities. [Its] recommendations shall, to the greatest extent possible, recognize the need for achieving the concurrence of the affected parties. [¶] In outlining these issues, consideration shall be given to contractual obligations, minimizing disruption of the trial court work force, and protecting the rights accrued by employees under their current systems." ( Ibid., italics added.)
Originally, the task force's interim and final reports to the Judicial Council, the Legislature and the Governor were due by January 30, 1999, and June 1, 1999, respectively (§ 77604, subds. (c) and (d)), and the Legislature intended to enact a personnel system for trial court employees by January 1, 2001. (§ 77605, subd. (b).) However, the superior court advises that the task force was not expected to submit its interim report until May 1999 and the Association advises its final report is not expected until September 1999.
The Association claims the accrued rights of the transferred employees included their civil service status. Section 77603 assertedly "created a mechanism for dealing with employment issues that precludes unilateral actions such as the divestment of [the transferred employees'] civil service status." The Association points to the following comment of the California Law Revision Commission in its recommendation regarding Senate Bill No. 2139:
"Employment issues are among the most difficult matters to resolve in unifying the municipal and superior courts in a county. Hundreds of statutes in the Government Code specify employees' salaries, benefits, privileges, and so forth, in every municipal court district in the state. Bargaining rights, salary parity, seniority, and other issues must be addressed in each court that unifies. The proposed legislation does not attempt to deal with these issues. Because the statutes governing court employment in each judicial district are unique, it is not possible to generalize as to the effect of unification on salaries and other employment matters.
"Recent legislation addresses employee rights and establishes a mechanism for rationalizing the system — the Task Force on Trial Court Employees. It is likely, however, that immediate problems will be triggered by unification and will need to be statutorily addressed on an urgency basis before the Task Force is able to complete its work."
The superior court contends the task force was not created to address court unification issues. Its implementing legislation, Assembly Bill No. 233 (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, pp. 4738-4774), concerned state responsibility for funding trial courts and ways to increase their efficiency. The Legislature expressly intended that any measures undertaken would not reduce the salary or benefits of court employees. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 13 West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1999 pocket supp.) § 116.230, p. 37.) A December 3, 1997, staff memorandum of the California Law Revision Commission, however, states the "1997 trial court funding legislation created a Task Force on Trial Court Employees designed to address" employment issues arising upon court unification.
We reject the notion the superior court's designation of the transferred employees as "at-will" was contingent upon a task force recommendation thereon. Under Senate Bill No. 2139, it is not the task force, but the judges of the superior court who are to adopt a written personnel plan, subject to legislative approval. (§ 70217, subd. (a).) In the interim, the superior court was only required to follow section 70217, which entitled the transferred employees to retain their job classifications, salaries and other monetary benefits, and it discharged that duty. ( Ibid.) As discussed, there is no indication civil service status must be retained pending implementation of a written plan. While the Legislature may ultimately resolve the issue, in accordance with a proposed written plan or otherwise, the superior court did not err by, upon unification, treating all its employees uniformly as "at-will" under subdivision (b) of section 69904.
C
The Association also obscurely contends section 3506.1 "represents a limitation of the application" of section 69904 to the transferred employees which "super[s]edes [the superior court's] reliance upon Zumwalt v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 167." The Association refers to draft minutes from an August 1998 "Court Coordination Oversight Committee Meeting," which state: "Ken Martone reminded the oversight committee that 296 county clerk employees were transitioned to the superior court in 1990 without civil service protection as a result of the Zumwalt . . . lawsuit."
In Zumwalt, the San Diego county clerk sought a writ of mandate to restrain the County "from transferring certain court-related duties and the civil service employees who perform them from his control to that of a superior court executive officer, and to compel the superior court to rescind a local superior court rule that directs transfer of both the employees and their court-related duties from petitioner's control to that of the court executive officer." ( Zumwalt v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 170.) The issue in Zumwalt was whether article VI, section 4, of the California Constitution, providing in part that the "county clerk is ex officio clerk of the superior court in the county," conflicted with section 69898, subdivision (d), which authorized superior courts to transfer the duties of superior court clerk to an appointed court executive officer. The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of section 69898, subdivision (d). ( Zumwalt, supra, at p. 180; see also, Anderson v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1152, 1155.)
In these proceedings, the superior court places no reliance upon Zumwalt. The case is unhelpful as it did not concern section 69904, or its applicability to the transferred employees. ( In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered].) The Association nonetheless argues that any applicability of Zumwalt was abrogated by the Legislature's 1992 enactment of section 3501.6. It provides:
"(a) In any transfer of functions from county employees to superior or municipal court employees occurring on or after January 1, 1992, the court shall continue to recognize the employee organization which represented the employees performing those functions at the time of the transfer of duties. The court shall also be bound by the terms of any memorandum of understanding that is in effect as of the date of the transfer of functions for the duration thereof, or until replaced by a subsequent memorandum of understanding.
"(b) Notwithstanding Article 8 (commencing with Section 69890) of Chapter 5 of Title 8, merit personnel systems including the county civil service system and a system of discipline for cause only, shall be within the scope of representation by employee organizations for court employees affected by a transfer of functions as described in subdivision (a) unless otherwise prohibited by the charter of the county."
By its terms, section 3501.6 applies only where the functions of county employees are transferred to the municipal or superior court. Such is not the case here, where the former municipal court employees became superior court employees upon unification. Further, in January 1998 the Judicial Council adopted California Rules of Court, rule 2204(b), which provides that matters regarding "the merits and administration of the court system," and "coordination, consolidation, and merger of trial courts and support staff," are not within the scope of representation. Section 68650 provides that this and related rules which "create a mechanism for setting the terms and conditions of employment" among a trial court, its personnel and the parties' representatives, shall be given full force and effect.
IV. Due Process
Finally, the Association contends the superior court's designation of the transferred employees as "at-will" violates their constitutional due process rights. While unclear, the Association appears to take the position the transferred employees enjoyed unimpairable vested rights in the continuation of their civil service status.
"`The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution "places procedural constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the stature of `property' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause." [Citations.] The California Constitution contains a similar provision. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 946.) "Property interests that are subject to due process protections are not created by the federal Constitution. `Rather, they are created, and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . .' [Citations.]" ( Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1112; Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577.)
Under California law, a public employee subject to discharge only for cause has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206; Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 940 at p. 946.) Such an employee is thus generally entitled to notice of charges against him or her and an opportunity to respond before the imposition of any disciplinary action. ( Ibid.; Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1119.)
This case, however, does not concern termination or discipline issues, but whether the civil service status of the former municipal court employees was revocable. We conclude it was. "[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law. [Citations.] Nor is any vested contractual right conferred on the public employee because he occupies a civil service position since it is equally well settled that `[t]he terms and conditions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and not by contract.' [Citations.]" ( Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813-814.) "This rule applies at all levels of government[.]" ( Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1065.) In Miller, the court held the Legislature had the power to change plaintiff's mandatory retirement age from 70 to 67, thereby reducing the tenure of his civil service position. (( Miller, supra, at p. 814; accord, Schmier v. Board of Trustees (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 314, 317-318.)
In Hinchliffe v. City of San Diego (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 722, 725, this court noted, "[t]he public employee . . . can have no vested contractual right in the terms of his or her employment, such terms being subject to change by the proper statutory authority. [Citation.]" (Original italics.) In addition to Miller, we relied upon Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs. (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 32. In Risley, city employees objected that the pending merger of the department of water and power with private utility companies would result in the loss of vested promotion and seniority rights. The court addressed the issue as follows: "Plaintiffs' first two contentions may be considered together, as they involve the same fallacious concept, which is, that plaintiffs have a vested, contractual, right to have the terms of their employment continue unaffected by charter amendments. That they have rights, by virtue of the provisions of the charter, which the courts will protect against unauthorized infringement by the city or any of its legislative or executive officers or boards, is undoubtedly true, and is recognized in the large number of cases cited by the plaintiffs. But that these rights are vested, contractual, rights, protected by the state and federal constitutional provisions forbidding the impairment of contracts and the taking of `property' without due process, so that they cannot be changed, is not true . . . . The rights to which plaintiffs would cling are created by or under the provisions of the charter and are dependent upon those provisions. They may all be lost by the repeal of the provisions or modified by an amendment to the provisions, at the will of those who determine what the charter's terms shall be." ( Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 60 Cal.App.2d at p. 37.)
While promised compensation or other monetary benefits create contractual rights which, once vested, cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation ( Hinchliffe v. City of San Diego, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 726), there is no such claim here. Instead, the Association seeks to establish a vested right of the transferred employees to the terms of their employment predating the court unification. Civil service rights, however, are not "`vested' in the sense that they are constitutionally immune from modification or destruction." ( Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 60 Cal.App.2d at p. 38.) "[A] right may be vested so as to be the object of the court's protection, without being so vested that it may not be the subject of legislative control." ( Id. at p. 39.)
Virtually ignoring the above body of law, the Association argues public policy prohibits the elimination of civil service positions. The cases it relies upon, however, are inapplicable because they concerned county ordinances that specifically prohibited the supervisors from destroying or substantially impairing civil service systems absent voter approval. ( Rains v. County of Contra Costa (1951) 37 Cal.2d 263, 265; Placer County Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 555, 557.) Placer, in fact, notes "[d]ecisions in California and other states hold that the adoption of a civil service system does not restrict the governing body's power to effect structural reorganizations in the interests of economy and efficiency, even though it entails abolition of a civil service position. [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 559.) The Association's reliance upon cases concerning the state civil service system, under which work may not be contracted out if it can be adequately and competently performed by civil service personnel, is also misplaced. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 547; California State Employees' Assn. v. Williams (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 396; Allen v. City of Beverly Hills (9th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 367, 369.)
The Association also argues the superior court was without the power to divest the transferred employees of their civil service status; because such status was conferred by statute, only the Legislature could abrogate the policy. Terms of public employment are subject to modification "by the proper statutory authority. [Citation.]" ( Hinchliffe v. City of San Diego, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 725; Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 60 Cal.App.2d at p. 38.) Here, again, Proposition 220 and its implementing legislation provided that upon unification, the municipal court was abolished and its former employees automatically became employees of the superior court. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 23, subd. (a); §§ 70212, subd. (a); 70217, subd. (a).) While the Legislature did not expressly divest the former municipal court employees of their civil service status, such intent may be implied since court unification rendered the statutory basis for it moot, and, as discussed, it was not specified as a retained benefit.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. Petitioner to pay respondents' costs.
We concur:
HALLER, J. McINTYRE, J.