Opinion
D082854
02-27-2024
In re A.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. P.V., Defendant and Appellant. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County Nos. J521236A-B Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KELETY, J.
P.V. (Mother) appeals jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued in the juvenile dependency cases of her children, A.S. and M.S. On appeal, Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support the court's findings that the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness as of the time of the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, because the father who had subjected them to risks was then out of the home and serving a five-year, four-month prison term. Based on the evidence in this case, we agree and therefore reverse the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2023, Mother had an 11-year-old son, A.S., and a two-year-old daughter, M.S. C.S. (Father) is the father of M.S. A.S. and M.S. lived with Mother and Father, along with Mother's two teenage daughters, E.S. and A.M.
A.S.'s father was deceased.
In April 2023, detectives with the San Diego Internet Crimes Against Children task force searched the family's home pursuant to a warrant. They found child pornography on Father's cellphone. Father admitted downloading child pornography. Detectives also found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the attached garage, which was where Father spent most of his time and which was readily accessible to the children. Marijuana was also found in various locations throughout the home. Mother told detectives that she had previously seen images of child pornography on Father's phone. She stated that when she confronted Father about those images, he told her it was "spam" and denied any wrongdoing. Detectives spoke with E.S., who told them that when she was 10 years old, Father asked her to shower. As she removed her clothing, she noticed he had set up a phone that was recording her. She stopped the recording and deleted the video. Since that incident, she felt scared and unsafe and checked the bathroom every time before she showered. Father was arrested for possession of child pornography, distribution of child pornography, and child endangerment and was taken into local custody. Detectives also obtained an emergency protective order for Mother and her four children because Father refused to agree to stay out of the home if he were released.
While the home was being searched, social workers from the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) arrived and interviewed family members. Mother stated that Father was a methamphetamine addict and had relapsed a couple of times the past year. Although in 2022 she had obtained an order requiring him to move out of the home, she allowed him back into the home after he "got his act together." She denied knowing that there was methamphetamine or paraphernalia in the garage. She stated that she and the children did not go into the garage where Father spent most of his time. After his arrest that day, Mother did not want Father to have any further contact with her children.
E.S. told the social workers that Mother and Father argued a lot, which arguments sometimes became physical. She denied knowing of any inappropriate videos or photos taken by Father of her or her siblings. A.M. told the social workers that Mother and Father frequently argued and once Father grabbed Mother. Father occasionally took M.S. with him to the garage. A.M. only went into the garage when she needed to get a helmet. A few months earlier, E.M. told her about the incident during which Father's phone recorded her while she prepared to shower.
Mother agreed with the Agency social workers on a safety plan to not allow Father back into the home, contact law enforcement officers if he came to the home, request a restraining order against him, drug test, and take the children for forensic interviews and M.S. for a physical examination. The following day, Mother tested positive for marijuana and alcohol. She admitted she sometimes used alcohol to help her cope and sometimes used marijuana, but stated she had removed all marijuana from the home after the home was searched.
The Agency social workers learned that Mother had obtained restraining orders against Father in 2018 and 2022 based on allegations that he was using methamphetamine and had been verbally and physically abusive to her in front of the children. In early May 2023, during a child and family team meeting with the Agency, Mother initially agreed to explore a possible voluntary case, but later stated she preferred to obtain services through the Union of Pan American Communities (UPAC). By mid-May, Mother was working at two jobs to pay her rent and provide for her children.
On May 25, 2023, the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions for A.S. and M.S., alleging that they came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). In particular, the petitions alleged that there was a substantial risk the children would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of their parent to supervise or protect them adequately. The petitions alleged that Mother inadequately supervised the children, citing the April 2023 search of the home and Father's arrest for possession of child pornography and possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the home, which were accessible to the children. The petitions further alleged that Mother admitted she knew Father had viewed child pornography and was using methamphetamine in the home. In its detention report, the Agency recommended that the children be detained with Mother in the home on the condition that Father remain out of the home and Mother receive family maintenance services. The Agency stated that it did not believe that Mother's two teenage daughters were at risk because their fathers were present, willing, and able to protect them from future harm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At the detention hearing, the court found that the Agency had made a prima facie showing that A.S. and M.S. were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness as alleged in the petitions and ordered that they remain placed with Mother on the condition that Father not reside in the home. The court also ordered that the Agency provide Mother with voluntary services and scheduled a jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
In its June 2023 report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency recommended that the court find the petitions' allegations to be true and order that the children remain placed with Mother and that she receive family maintenance services. The Agency reported that the children were comfortable and confident in their home. In particular, A.S. stated that he was happier since Father was no longer in the home. The Agency also reported that the prosecutor assigned to Father's criminal case stated that Father had agreed to plead guilty to possession and distribution of child pornography in exchange for a sentence of five years, four months and was expected to enter his plea in early July. The prosecutor also stated that neither A.S. nor M.S. were involved in the pornography that Father possessed and distributed.
When an Agency social worker asked Mother about the petitions' allegations, Mother stated that her children were no longer in danger of physical harm or illness because she supervised and protected them. Although Mother had confronted Father about a photo of child pornography she viewed on his phone, she believed his explanation that the child pornography had appeared on his phone because of a virus from the websites he visited. Nevertheless, after that confrontation, Mother never allowed Father to change M.S.'s diaper or bathe her. Father took M.S. to the park on weekends for about two hours each time. Mother stated that she had no knowledge there was methamphetamine in the garage. She stated that methamphetamine was not accessible to the children because she told them not to go down into the garage and had stacked boxes in front of the door leading to the garage. However, she admitted the children occasionally went into the garage to get their bicycles. Mother stated she and Father had an on and off relationship since 2014. Father would relapse or go to jail; she would end their relationship; and they would reunify when he was released or became clean and sober. Mother stated that she completed an alcohol treatment program in 2020. Although she had resumed drinking alcohol to cope with her relationship with Father, she had been sober for 23 days as of mid-June 2023 and no longer used marijuana. In mid-June, Mother tested negative for all substances, including alcohol. At a child and family team meeting, Mother stated that she did not want to participate in court-ordered services and was, instead, attempting to obtain services on her own. The Agency recommended that Mother receive in-home parenting education, have a parent partner, attend a sexual abuse non-protective parent group, undergo random drug testing, and participate in a 12-step program.
The Agency interviewed a maternal aunt who stated that before M.S.'s birth, Father and Mother attended a treatment program together because he was using methamphetamine and she was consuming alcohol. The aunt believed that the children were safe in Mother's care.
Based on Mother's relationship with Father and past failure to protect the children from the risks he posed, the Agency stated that it was "concerned that [Mother] will once again allow [Father], or another unsafe individual into her home without learning the dynamics on how to be a protective parent." The Agency also stated its concern that Mother "lacks insight [into] how she failed to protect the children." Accordingly, the Agency recommended that the court make true findings on the petitions and find the children dependents of the court. The Agency stated that it "would need to see that [Mother] is able, willing, and capable of safely caring for the children and making progress/gaining insight before the Agency's safety concerns could be remedied."
Mother's counsel requested a contested jurisdictional hearing, which was continued and ultimately held on September 13 and September 18.
In its September 1 addendum report, the Agency stated that its newly assigned social worker visited the home in late July and found it was clean and appropriate. Mother reported that she had enrolled in parenting and substance abuse programs through UPAC and was on a UPAC waiting list for therapy for her and the children. Mother also was attending church to help her with the trauma of the April 2023 incident. A.S. told the social worker that he had not had any contact with Father since his arrest and that he felt safe with Father out of the home. He also told him that he was happy in his home and liked being in Mother's care. Mother's cousin told the social worker that Mother was doing a great job protecting her children. As of late July, Father had entered a guilty plea and his sentencing hearing was set for mid-August. The prosecutor told the social worker that a three-year criminal protective order would be issued then, protecting Mother and the children from Father. In late July, Mother again tested negative for all substances, including alcohol. The Agency stated that its recommendations remained the same as set forth in its June jurisdiction and disposition report.
In its September 13 addendum report, the Agency repeated its previous recommendations, but also added a recommendation that the court deny Father visitation and enhancement services. The addendum noted that Father had been sentenced to a five-year, four-month prison term and attached a mid-August criminal court order from Father's sentencing hearing and a criminal protective order protecting E.S. and M.S. from Father. Although Father was incarcerated, the Agency stated its "concern remains [Mother's] ability to be a protective parent, which includes recognizing concerning behaviors and issues, and acting quickly and appropriately to ensure the children are not exposed to dangerous situations and people."
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on September 13, the court received in evidence the Agency's detention report, initial jurisdiction and disposition report, and two addenda, along with their attachments. Mother's counsel cross-examined the Agency's current social worker assigned to the children's cases. He knew that Father was in custody for five years. He visited the home twice and found it appropriate. He believed that Mother had a support system of family members and friends who helped with caring for the children. He had interviewed some of them who stated positive things about Mother's ability to protect her children. He testified that the Agency had concerns regarding Mother's "ability to make sure [Father] remains out of the home." He stated that although Father was then in custody for five years, four months, the Agency nevertheless would like to see that Mother would "not allow [Father] into the home, to comply with the restraining order" against him.
Mother testified that since Father's arrest in April 2023, he had not been back in the home. She had obtained a restraining order that protected her and the children from Father until 2028. She worked full-time for a bank and part-time on weekends for a restaurant. She stated that she was working on setting boundaries to place her family first and to exclude any person from her family's lives if there is a "red flag" (e.g., alcohol consumption, marijuana or other drug use, etc.). As of the date of the hearing, Mother did not believe she had an alcohol problem. She stated that she was participating in mental health services, public resources, and a substance abuse program through UPAC. Since Father's arrest, she had cleaned up the garage and it was now safe. Nevertheless, she used the garage solely for storage and did not allow the children to go down into the garage. Mother testified that she never again intended to have a relationship with Father or have him involved in the children's lives.
The court admitted in evidence two exhibits offered by Mother's counsel, consisting of supporting declarations of Mother, coworkers, employers, and family members. The court then continued the hearing until September 18 for closing arguments and its decisions.
At the September 18 continued hearing, after hearing arguments of counsel, the court found that the Agency had proved the truth of the allegations in the petitions by a preponderance of the evidence, declared A.S. and M.S. to be dependents of the court under the Agency's supervision, placed the children with Mother, and ordered family maintenance services for Mother as recommended by the Agency. The court then set a review hearing for mid-March 2024. Mother appealed the September 18 jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
DISCUSSION
I
Legal Principles Applicable to Jurisdictional Findings
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and may be adjudged a dependent child of the court if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the following: [¶] (a) [t]he failure or inability of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child...." The Agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over a child. (§ 355, subd. (a); In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11, 22 (Ma.V.).) Importantly, the juvenile court must make its jurisdictional finding based on the circumstances existing at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388 (Janet T.).) In so doing, the court may consider any pattern of a parent's past behavior that placed a child at risk, the severity of the risk posed by prior incidents, the age and vulnerability of the child, and the continuing presence of any dangers in the home. (In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 168-169; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824; In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900.)
On appeal, the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings must be upheld if substantial evidence supports them. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 (Heather A.).) The appellate court determines whether there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support those findings and, in so doing, draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders. (Heather A., at p. 193.) It reviews the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings and does not reweigh the evidence or the court's credibility determinations. (Ibid.; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) However, substantial evidence "indicates more than a smidgeon or trace; it must be meaningful and significant and cannot be merely speculative." (Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 22.) Substantial evidence may be based on inferences from the evidence, but those inferences must be reasonable and not the result of speculation or conjecture. (In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 (Cole Y.).)
II
Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Juvenile Court's Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends that the jurisdictional and dispositional orders must be reversed because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings that A.S. and M.S. were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness at the time of the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. In particular, she argues that because Father had been out of the home since his April 2023 arrest and was serving a five-year, fourmonth prison term at the time of the contested hearing and she had no intention of allowing him back into the home or entering into a relationship with another person who would pose similar risks to the children, there no longer was a substantial risk posed to the children as alleged in the petitions. We agree.
A
At the September 18, 2023 hearing, the Agency's counsel argued, among other things, that: "The Agency understands that [Father] is now outside of the home and believes and hopes the non-protective parent class and court intervention would prevent any future instances like this happening upon [Father's] release or if [Mother] were to be in a relationship with another individual that she would be able to recognize the signs of both drug use and the viewing of child pornography in the home."
After hearing arguments of counsel and considering the evidence admitted at the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court stated that the jurisdictional question before it was whether there was a substantial risk of future harm to the children even though Father was out of the home and serving a lengthy prison term. The court then found that the Agency had met its burden to prove that at the time of the hearing the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness in the future. In particular, the court cited Mother's "pattern of decision[-]making" and "lack of insight" regarding the risks to the children. The court also noted the risks to the children posed by Mother's allowing Father to remain in the home despite his substance use, her viewing of one photo of child pornography on his phone and believing his explanation, and past incidents of domestic violence between them. The court stated that it appeared Mother had more work to do on "setting boundaries" and had not yet engaged meaningfully in services.
After making its jurisdictional findings, the court declared A.S. and M.S. dependents of the court under the custody of the Agency, placed them with Mother on the condition that no persons move into the home without court approval, and ordered family maintenance services for Mother.
B
Based on our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings that at the time of the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness in the future. In making its findings, the court noted the past incidents of domestic violence between Mother and Father, his drug use and child pornography possession, and her failure to protect the children from the risks that Father posed to them. Citing Mother's pattern of decision-making and lack of insight, the court found that, despite Father's incarceration and absence from the home, there remained a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the children in the future.
To the extent the court found that there was a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing because of Mother's failure to protect them from the risks that Father posed to them, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding. At the time of the hearing, Father had been out of the home since April 2023 and had recently begun serving a five-year, four-month prison term. Father was also restrained by three-year criminal protective orders, which protected E.S. and M.S. Because of Father's lengthy prison term, he clearly could not pose a current risk to the children at the time of the hearing. As a result, at the time of the hearing, there was no current risk from Father's future conduct against which Mother could fail to protect the children, as alleged in the petitions.
Although the court (and the Agency) also cited concerns that Mother might in the future enter into a relationship with another person who posed similar risks as Father had (e.g., drug use, child pornography, domestic violence), we conclude that substantial evidence does not support a reasonable inference that that future possibility posed an actual, substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the children at the time of the hearing. In particular, there is nothing in the record showing that at the time of the hearing Mother was in, or contemplating entering into, a relationship with another person, much less a person who would pose risks similar to those Father had posed to the children.
As Mother argues, the record shows that in deciding not to file dependency petitions for E.S. and A.M., the Agency considered their fathers to be able to protect them against Father's conduct and, therefore, it presumably did not consider the fathers of her other children to pose, or to have in the past posed, risks to the children similar to those posed by Father. Therefore, as Mother argues, her past relationships with persons other than Father did not support a reasonable inference that she would in the future enter into relationships with persons who posed risks to the children. To the contrary, such an inference would be based wholly on speculation. As stated above, to constitute substantial evidence, inferences must be reasonable and not the result of speculation or conjecture. (Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 22; Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452.) Because there is no substantial evidence that at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing Mother would, or could, resume her relationship with Father and allow him back into the home for many years or that she would enter into a relationship with another person who would pose similar risks to the children, we conclude that the juvenile court erred by finding the petitions' allegations were true and declaring the children dependents of the court. In short, there is no substantial evidence showing that at the time of the hearing there was a current substantial risk against which Mother failed, or would fail, to protect the children.
The Agency does not cite any evidence that persuades us to reach a contrary conclusion. In particular, its assertion that Mother had a history of unhealthy relationships, or may have been involved with another man shortly after Father's arrest, is supported by its citations to statements by a maternal aunt and A.M.'s father, neither of whom elaborated on their statements or had knowledge of any actual relationships that Mother had at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Therefore, those assertions regarding Mother's past (or possible current) relationships provided only speculation, and not substantial evidence, there was a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness posed to the children in the future.
In its June 2023 jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency stated that the maternal aunt told it that Mother "has a history of unhealthy relationships in which arguments[ ] and drama were always present." However, the maternal aunt had removed herself from Mother's situation and could not provide a current update on how the family was doing. She also stated that she nevertheless believed the children were safe in Mother's care. The Agency also reported that A.M.'s father expressed his concern that Mother would "immediately get in to a new relationship as he was informed she had a man at her home the day after [Father] was arrested."
C
We note that other appellate courts have reached similar conclusions where there was no longer a current risk posed to the children and the juvenile court's concerns regarding future risks were merely speculative. In Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 11, the mother argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding. (Id. at pp. 13, 21.) At the time of the jurisdictional finding, it had been 10 months since her boyfriend had physically assaulted her and she had not had any contact with him or had any romantic relationship since that incident. (Id. at pp. 14, 18, 22.) The juvenile court found that there would be a substantial risk of harm if the children were returned to the mother based on her history of domestic violence and lack of insight. (Id. at p. 20.) On appeal, Ma.V. stated that it was undisputed that the boyfriend who had committed the prior domestic violence had left the home and the mother had ended her relationship with him and had had no contact with him in 10 months. (Id. at p. 22.) Also, the mother had not engaged in any new romantic relationships. (Ibid.) Ma.V. concluded that the juvenile court erred by focusing on the mother's past as a victim of domestic violence because it was no longer "a current risk." (Id. at p. 23.) Accordingly, the court concluded that substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional finding that the children would have been at risk if the mother had maintained custody of them. (Ibid.)
In In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10 (Steve W.), the juvenile court removed the child from the physical custody of his mother, the nonoffending parent, at the dispositional hearing. (Id. at p. 13.) On appeal, the mother challenged the removal of her child, arguing that there was no substantial danger of harm to her child. (Id. at p. 16.) Steve W. stated that in determining whether a nonoffending parent posed a future risk of harm to a child, a "relevant factor is whether the nonoffending parent allowed or might allow the offending parent to return and continue the abuse." (Id. at p. 22.) In that case, the court concluded that "all of the circumstances here indicate that [the nonoffending parent] will not resume her relationship with [the offending parent] or allow him access to the child. [The nonoffending parent] has expressed her clear desire to not have anything to do with [the offending parent], and she assisted in his prosecution. Furthermore, [the offending parent] has been sentenced to prison for six years." (Ibid.)
Steve W. stated: "The trial court's concern here was not so much that [the nonoffending parent] would resume her relationship with [the offending parent] but that she would enter a new relationship with yet another abusive type of person. This reasoning is troubling....It is not unreasonable to be concerned whether [the nonoffending parent] would enter a relationship which might threaten [the child's] well-being. But, the court cannot make this a basis of removing the physical custody of the child from the parent if its decision is based on pure speculation. It must be based on substantial evidence." (Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 22.) The court concluded that the juvenile court's finding was "supported by little more than speculation, and such does not suffice as substantial evidence to support removal." (Ibid.)
Although the dispositional finding in Steve W. required proof by clear and convincing evidence (Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 16-17, 23; § 361, subd. (c)), we nevertheless find its discussion regarding speculation as to future risks instructive in the instant context of jurisdictional findings that required proof by only a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a).)
In In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, the court stated: "[P]revious acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of future harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur." (Id. at p. 15; see also, In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 565 [same]; Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388 [although past events have some probative value as to current conditions, section 300, subdivision (b) jurisdictional finding requires showing of circumstances at time of jurisdictional hearing that it is "likely the children will suffer" the same type of serious physical harm or illness in the future]; cf. In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 [domestic violence between parents may support jurisdictional finding only if violence harmed children or placed them at risk and violence was ongoing or likely to continue]; In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128,140 [at time of jurisdictional finding, there was no evidence that father who posed risk to child in the past was or would be involved in child's life in future]; In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397-1398 [no substantial evidence, and only mere speculation, for finding at time of jurisdictional hearing that parents would in future place child with offending caregiver or another custodian who would sexually abuse her]; In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322, 326 ["There must be some reason to believe the [abusive] acts may continue in the future."]; In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 628 [no substantial evidence, and only speculation, that mother might take ill child from hospital in future].)
Underlying these analogous cases is the principle that a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), requires substantial evidence, and not mere speculation, that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing there was a current substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the child in the future (i.e., it is likely that the abusive or neglectful acts will continue or reoccur in the future). In the circumstances of this case, there was no substantial evidence, and only mere speculation, that Father would return to the home during this five-year, four-month prison term or thereafter, as Mother had obtained a restraining order against Father, and she testified that she intended to never resume her relationship with him or allow him back into the home. Furthermore, there was no substantial evidence, and only mere speculation, that Mother would in the future enter into a relationship with another person who posed risks to the children as Father had in the past. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings that at the time of the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) As a result, we must reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued on September 18, 2023 are reversed and the matters remanded with directions that the court vacate those orders and issue new orders: (1) finding A.S. and M.S. are not dependent children within its jurisdiction under section 300; (2) dismissing the Agency's section 300 petitions; and (3) ordering the children discharged from any detention or placement previously ordered.
WE CONCUR: DO, Acting P. J., BUCHANAN, J.