Opinion
No. 318 C.D. 2014
11-17-2014
Gregory Samuels, Appellant v. Jerome W. Walsh, et al., Captain Vincent Kopec, Lieutenant Zielen Sergeant Clark Sergeant Gibson Unit manager Kaye Sergeant Lewis Charles McKeown (4) unknown John Doe(s)
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
Gregory Samuels (Samuels), an inmate at State Correctional Institution - Dallas (SCI-Dallas), appeals pro se from the Luzerne County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) November 4, 2013 order sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) employees, Jerome W. Walsh, Vincent Kopec, Daniel Zielen, Timothy Clark, Jeffrey Gibson, Michael Kaye, William Lewis, Charles McKeown, and four additional unknown correction officer defendants (Defendants). The issue for this Court's review is whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Samuels failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. After review, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
Samuels initially instituted this action on February 9, 2012. On July 12, 2013, he filed an amended complaint (Amended Complaint), in which he alleged that after he was transferred to SCI-Dallas on a promotional transfer, he filed a grievance challenging the modification of his working hours and pay rate. Samuels further claimed that while working on SCI-Dallas' compound work detail on August 26, 2011, he was falsely accused of misconduct in retaliation for filing the grievance, and that he was immediately transferred to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) without being permitted to return to his cell. Samuels maintained that his personal property and legal documents were left unattended and unsecured in the cell he shared with another inmate. He also alleged that as a result of Defendants' negligence and/or intentional conduct in failing to secure his property while he was housed in the RHU, certain of his personal property and legal documents were lost. In addition, Samuels averred that he filed numerous grievances regarding the purported property loss, but the grievances were improperly investigated and denied in violation of his constitutional rights.
In documents related to one of the grievances, Samuels alleged that the unsecured property was taken by his cellmate who left the prison before Samuels returned from the RHU.
On July 24, 2013, Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Amended Complaint in the nature of a demurrer, contending that: (1) Samuels failed to state a claim against Defendants; (2) any loss of property was caused by intervening third parties; (3) Samuels failed to identify a duty and how its violation caused him damages; (4) Defendants are immune from suit for intentional torts; (5) Samuels' claim fails under an implied bailment analysis; and (6) the denial of inmate grievances does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. On November 4, 2013, the trial court sustained Defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed Samuels' action with prejudice.
In its dismissal, the trial court opined that because Samuels alleged negligence in his Amended Complaint, he was required to establish the four elements of negligence - duty, breach, causation and damages - and was further required to set forth specific facts necessary to support his claim. Without further explanation, the trial court held: "Upon review of [Samuels'] [A]mended [C]omplaint, it is apparent no legally cognizable claim has been stated. [Samuels] makes numerous allegations against Defendants which even if true, do not permit a recovery on his behalf. As a result, Defendants' preliminary objections must be sustained." Trial Ct. Op. at 3. The trial court did not directly address Samuels' intentional tort or retaliation allegations. Samuels appealed to this Court.
This Court has stated:
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When determining whether a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer was properly granted, an appellate court must accept as true all properly pleaded material facts. We must confine our analysis to the complaint and decide whether sufficient facts have been pleaded to permit recovery if the facts are ultimately proven. The demurrer may be granted only in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would certainly be a fruitless exercise.
Samuels contends that the trial court erred when it held that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. He specifically alleges that Defendants acted intentionally to deprive him of his property. He further asserts that Defendants were negligent - that upon his assignment to the RHU, Defendants had a duty to secure and protect his property; that Defendants were negligent in failing to do so; and as a result of their negligence, his property was lost or stolen. He also argues that sovereign immunity does not bar his claims. Finally, he maintains that Defendants' conduct was retaliatory.
Samuels' Amended Complaint alleges both intentional and negligent conduct by Defendants.
Samuels does not succinctly articulate individual legal claims in his Amended Complaint; however, it is sufficient for this Court to discern Samuels' causes of action.
It is well-settled that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is protected from civil suit under sovereign immunity, except where the General Assembly has specifically provided for a waiver of immunity. . . . The [act commonly referred to as the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8528 (Act)] provides that sovereign immunity is only waived for damages arising out of a negligent act where the common law or a statute would permit recovery if the injury were caused by a person not protected by sovereign immunity. However, in order for the Commonwealth to be found liable, a party must also establish that the cause of action falls under one of nine specifically enumerated exceptions to immunity. Because of the clear intent to insulate the government from liability, the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.Mullin v. Dep't of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 779 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). "[W]hen an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims." La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (emphasis added). Because Samuels' intentional tort allegations pertain to Commonwealth employees' conduct occurring in the scope of their work duties, those claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
However, the same is not true for Samuels' negligence claims. In Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), this Court held that where an inmate alleges negligence resulting in damage to property in the care, custody or control of prison employees, sovereign immunity will not bar the action. Id. The Williams Court stated:
Section 8522(b)(3) of the [Act] states that 'the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by . . . [t]he care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties, including . . . property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency. . . .' 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3). Williams sets forth a claim for damages to his television set caused by the care of the television set while it was in the possession of Commonwealth parties. Based on the plain language of [S]ection 8522(b)(3), the state employees may not raise sovereign immunity as a defense in this case. See Payton v. Horn, 49 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that [S]ection 8522(b) provides a remedy for inmates when a prison official negligently handles an inmate's personal property).Williams, 917 A.2d at 918 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
In the recent unreported case of Pelzer v. Property Officer PRY C01 (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 50 C.D. 2012, filed May 15, 2013), this Court, relying on Williams, rejected SCI employees' arguments that they were immune from suit arising from alleged mishandling of an inmate's television and other personal property. This Court stated:
Section 414 of this Court's Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.
Defendants . . . argue that, because they were acting in the scope of their official duties, they are entitled to sovereign immunity under Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522 (setting forth the exceptions to sovereign immunity for damages from negligent acts that would have been recoverable under common law or statute creating a cause of action that would otherwise be available had the injury not been caused by a person who can assert sovereign immunity). However, this Court has held that, where an inmate sets forth a claim for damage to the inmate's
personal property that is in the care, custody, or control of prison employees, those employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 8522(b)(3) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3) (relating to the care, custody, and control of personal property). Here, Pelzer's [a]ction is based on his claim that while his boxes of personal property and television were in Defendants' possession, Defendants negligently caused the loss or destruction of that property. Pursuant to Williams, Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity for such claims.Pelzer, slip op. at 10 n.6 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Defendants in the case at bar did not take physical custody of Samuels' personal property until three days after he was involuntarily moved to the RHU. However, as alleged in Samuels' Amended Complaint, his property became Defendants' responsibility upon his involuntary transfer to the RHU. Although Defendants may not have had physical custody at that time, Samuels alleges that his property was in Defendants' care and/or control. Accordingly, we conclude that Samuels is not prohibited from pursuing a negligence action against Defendants for the loss of his property.
Having determined that Samuels' negligence claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, we must review Samuels' Amended Complaint, accepting as true all properly pleaded material facts, to determine whether Samuels' Amended Complaint adequately states a negligence claim. "Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction; consequently, a pleading must not only apprise the opposing party of the asserted claim, it must also formulate the issues by summarizing those facts essential to support the claim." Richardson v. Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 356-67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
In Pelzer, this Court similarly reviewed an appellant's complaint, stating:
In his [a]ction Pelzer describes the Defendants' duties in their roles as property officers or security officers, which include transporting, receiving, inventorying, and searching inmate property at SCI-Houtzdale. It is
reasonable to infer that Defendants are to perform these duties in a non-negligent manner. Pelzer alleges that Defendants negligently performed their work duties, thereby causing the loss or destruction of his property. We are satisfied that Pelzer's allegations have sufficiently set forth the necessary elements for a negligence claim . . . .Pelzer, slip op. at 11 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In the instant matter, Samuels alleged the following in the "Facts" section of his Amended Complaint:
1). On April 28, 2011, [Samuels] was transferred to SCI-Dallas, on a promotional transfer, which (per) [Department] policy requires that [Samuels] keep his pay rate, and hours from previous [i]nstitution[,] but SCI-Dallas [E]mployment Coordinator[,] Mr. Dougalas [sic][,] assigned [Samuels] to [c]ompound work detail, [and] cut [Samuels'] work hours. [Samuels] later filed [G]rievance # 312824 to resolve[] this matter, however, [Samuels] was approached by his supervisor[,] Officer Brown, Unit Officer Evan, and several others who informed [Samuels] that he need[ed] to withdraw that grievance, and adjust his attitude before he [found himself] in the [RHU], without a job.
2). [Samuels] did not take heed to their immediate threats, and during that time period [Samuels] received two misconducts . . . . Grievance #312824 was the adverse reaction that trigger[ed] [S]ergeant Lewis to write those false charges, and the contributory retaliatory actions brought by [D]efendants. . . .
3). [O]n [August 26, 2011] . . . [Samuels] was escorted from the compound work detail . . . and . . . taken directly to the [RHU] . . . .
4). [Samuels'] personal and legal property were left behind, abandoned, not by his own choice but by force, because of [a] false accusation against [Samuels] . . . . [Samuels was not] allowed to secure[] or have his personal and[/]or legal property secured before being carted off to isolation, and said property was left on the housing Unit, where the Officers working the Unit could have secured [Samuels'] property (per [the Department's] policies standards) . . . .
5). [Samuels] contends that [L]t. Zielen who is in[] charge of property room and the [RHU] should have ordered [Samuels'] property to be brought to the [RHU] immediately after [Samuels'] arrival in the [RHU] (as per policy) . . . .Amended Complaint, "Facts" section.
6). [Samuels'] personal and legal [property] weren't just left abandoned for three days; the [D]efendants considered their duty and [Samuels'] property unimportant, as a result, the [D]efendants['] negligence cause[d] [Samuels'] property to be lost. [Department] policies required that inmate property be accounted for, secure[d] safely if that inmate is ATA, [h]ospitalized, [t]ransferring, and or in [i]solation. . . .
. . . .
14). [I]t is [Lt. Zielen and Sgt. Clark's] job to secure[], maintain[] all inmate property at SCI-Dallas. It was [D]efendants['] responsibility to secure[] [Samuels'] property once [Samuels] was served with a misconduct and confined to the [RHU].
Further, in the "Legal Claims" section of the Amended Complaint, Samuels alleged that:
2). On Aug[ust] 26, 2011, [D]efendants negligently le[ft] [Samuels'] legal and personal [property] abandoned for days, as a result of their negligent act, [Samuels] was unable to provide evidence in support of . . . lost wages, adequately present a defense in his criminal case, [D]efendants negligent[ly] inflicted distress[,] suffering, and mental pain, and [as a result, Samuels] incurred lost expenses of over $4[,]000.00 that was paid to Professional [L]egal National researchers.
3). [Samuels'] property bec[ame] the responsibility of [D]efendants immediately after he was placed into the [RHU] (per Policy), and served with a misconduct. [D]efendants have a legal active duty to perform[] which require[s] them to act according[] to a [s]tatute, rules, and regulations of the [Department's] policies. [D]efendants' failure to secure[] [Samuels' property] is a violation or
infringement of a legal duty or sworn duty owed to handle inmate property with due care, as provided by . . . [D]epartment policy. [D]efendants['] failure discharge a duty resting on them, as a result[,] [Samuels'] legal and personal property are lost.Amended Complaint, "Legal Claims" section.
4). [H]ad [D]efendants act[ed] as a reasonably prudent [person] would under the circumstances, [Samuels'] property would have been secured. Breaking a legal duty in[a]dvertently, negligently or by accident is clearly a case of negligen[ce.] [W]hen [D]efendants decided that their duty or [Samuels'] property is unimportant or purposely violates a duty resting on them to use due care[, Defendants are] in breach of a[n] active or legal duty to use due care. [D]efendants['] actions were not accident, [Samuels'] property was abandoned because [D]efendants failed to fulfill[] or perform[] their duty so recklessly as to consider [Samuels'] property unimportant.
5). [Samuels] avers that [D]efendants negligently, maliciously, and intentionally left [Samuels'] property abandoned because . . . of [G]rievance # 312824, as a result of their retaliatory actions, [D]efendants failed to act[,] or performed their duty in a reckless manner, and which result[ed] in a breach of duty.
The aforementioned averments clearly include facts to support Samuels' allegations that consistent with Department policies and regulations, Defendants had a duty to secure and protect Samuels' property. The averments further contain facts supporting Samuels' allegations that Defendants breached their duty to do so and, as a result, Samuels' property was lost. We reject Defendants' assertion that the intervening acts of those who allegedly stole Samuels' property relieve Defendants of negligence liability. It is well-established that "[i]n determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause, the test is whether the intervening conduct was so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable." Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. 1995). A factfinder could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable that in a prison, an inmate's personal property would be misplaced or stolen if not secured. Thus, we conclude that Samuels' Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for negligence.
"It is reasonable to infer that Defendants are to perform these duties in a non-negligent manner." Pelzer, slip op. at 11.
Defendants also contend that Samuels' claims fail under a common law bailment analysis since the confiscation constituted a bailment solely for Samuels' benefit and thus, Samuels must demonstrate gross negligence to prevail. Defendants' Br. at 13-14. Defendants do not cite any case law or other authority characterizing the confiscation of a prisoner's property incidental to RHU assignment as a bailment. In fact, this Court has previously found that the confiscation and withholding of an inmate's property pursuant to the inmate's involuntary assignment to the RHU falls within the Department's authority to exercise discipline, does not demonstrate mutual assent of the parties, and, thus, is not a bailment. See Dep't of Corr. v. Bd. of Claims, 580 A.2d 923, 926 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
We further conclude that Samuels' Amended Complaint adequately states a retaliation claim.
[T]his [C]ourt [has] held that a prisoner who alleges retaliation by prison employees for the filing of grievances has invoked the First Amendment right of access to the courts. [FN5]
Bush v. Veach, 1 A.3d 981, 985 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Here, Samuels alleges that because he filed the grievance challenging the improper modification of his working hours and pay rate, Defendants falsely accused him of an unrelated incident of misconduct, they placed him in the RHU, and they left his property unsecured in his cell leading to its loss. Because Samuels' Amended Complaint sufficiently states a retaliation claim, the trial court erred when it sustained Defendants' preliminary objections.[FN5] To state a retaliation claim, [a complainant] need[s] to allege that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, that prison officials took adverse action and that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the action. Adverse action is one which is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. . . .
Sovereign immunity does not bar Samuels' First Amendment retaliation claim. "[T]he supremacy clause of the United States Constitution prevents a state from immunizing state actors from liability imposed under federal law, even when the suit to redress federal rights is brought in a state court . . . ." Heinly v. Commonwealth, 621 A.2d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); see also Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
Although Samuels' Amended Complaint does not specifically describe his retaliation claim as a claim raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), the Amended Complaint contains sufficient facts, if accepted as true, to support a violation of his First Amendment right of access to the courts. As a fact-pleading jurisdiction, Pennsylvania courts are
presumed to know the law, and plaintiffs need only plead facts constituting the cause of action, and the courts will take judicial notice of the statute involved. Accordingly, a plaintiff filing a complaint in the courts of this Commonwealth is not required to specify the legal theory or theories underlying the complaint. He or she may merely allege the material facts which form the basis of a cause of action. If the facts as pled place a defendant on notice that the plaintiff will attempt to prove a defendant deprived him or her of a federally guaranteed right while acting under the color of state law, the mere failure to specifically plead Section 1983 will not doom the complaint.
Finally, we find that Samuels' claim challenging the manner in which Defendants investigated and resolved his personal property grievances was properly dismissed. It is well established:
Prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to a grievance procedure and the state creation of such a procedure does not create any federal constitutional rights. Prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their grievances from the government, but that right is the right of access to the courts, and this right is not compromised by the failure of the prison to address his grievances.Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citations omitted), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998). Therefore, Samuels may not pursue the claim that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by allegedly failing to investigate and resolve his grievances.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's order is affirmed as to Samuels' intentional tort claims and grievance challenges, and is reversed with regard to Samuels' negligence and retaliation claims, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2014, the Luzerne County Common Pleas Court's November 4, 2013 order is affirmed as to Appellant's intentional tort claims and grievance challenges, and is reversed as to Appellant's negligence and retaliation claims. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 158-59 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citations omitted).
Heinly, 621 A.2d at 1215 n.5 (citation omitted).