Opinion
March 23, 1936.
Attorneys — Discipline — Employment of runners — Obtaining information from police officials to secure representation of persons arrested — Conspiracy to compromise private prosecutrix of respondent's client — Improper representation of private prosecutrix by respondent's employee — Disbarment — Findings of trial court — Matters for consideration upon application for reinstatement.
1. On appeal from a decree of disbarment, evidence held sufficient to establish that respondent employed and paid a runner, in the guise of a bail procurer, to solicit cases, and obtained clients by such runner through an arrangement of bribery of police officials to furnish information as to arrests of persons for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, for the purpose of enabling respondent to secure representation of those arrested, frightening the prisoners as to the possible consequences of the charges against them, and obtaining exorbitant fees as the result of the fear thus aroused in them and the hope held out to them of results to be obtained otherwise than through the due processes of the law; to establish that respondent, who represented a person charged with a criminal offense, conspired to have an affidavit made by a third person, falsely accusing the private prosecutrix of a statutory offense, to have the warrant issued pursuant to the affidavit placed in the hands of a private detective for the direct purpose of compromising the prosecutrix, and, when the prosecutrix was arrested by the detective and his associates, to have an employee in his office represent the prosecutrix, for the purpose of working on her credulity and fear and forcing her into a position where she would drop her charges against respondent's client; and to warrant the decree appealed from. [104-6]
2. On appeal from a decree of disbarment entered in a proceeding to discipline a member of the bar for professional misconduct, the findings of the trial court are of especially persuasive influence upon the appellate court. [105-6]
3. Where, in such proceeding, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusions of the trial court, the appellate court will be slow to interfere. [105-6]
Appellant was disbarred for unprofessional conduct in the employment and payment of runners to solicit business and professional misconduct in connection with the Kroekel case. The preceding opinion of the court entitled "In Re Disbarment Proceedings," as it relates to this appellant, is made part of this opinion.
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the decree of disbarment. The judges of the courts below thoroughly reviewed the facts in their opinion. They found that the appellant was fully cognizant of the drunken drivers racket as detailed in the brief of facts in the opinion above noted and took part therein. Appellant assumed full responsibility for the acts of his office in connection with this charge. He expressly stated that he had knowledge and supervision of such cases and would know whether any alliances had been made with members of the police force or others; he denied that any unprofessional methods had been pursued in obtaining these criminal cases. The evidence was such the court below came to the conclusion that appellant had full knowledge of the manner in which this practice had been secured and participated in remuneration therefor; hence he could not escape the consequences.
The credibility of the witnesses was a question for these judges to determine. They were most emphatic in their expressions particularly as to the so-called loan checks and the payments to Blasband, the runner. The judges stated that they were "of the firm opinion that these so-called loan checks to Blasband were really commissions or flat sums" paid to him for services in obtaining the representation by the Salus office of the drunken drivers in the manner and method described. Having employed and paid runners who secured criminal business, appellant must assume the responsibility.
Appellant's conduct in connection with the Kroekel case is distressing. No attorney is justified in taking such steps to free a client from trouble. He has a wide field in which to defend his client and any proper use of ordinary methods for that purpose cannot be condemned, but it is impossible for any court to overlook the facts in connection with the disposition of this case. They are exposed in all their severity as a matter of record.
We do not doubt that appellant had a firm conviction that his client Kroekel was innocent. That did not justify the extremes to which he went. The employment of a trained investigator by an attorney to discover facts concerning a case where he is retained is the legitimate right of every practicing attorney; he is not to be denied a full and fair investigation of his client's case, but this contemplates legitimate acts of discovery, not such as have been narrated in this case. We need not comment on this further.
We have reviewed the case and as stated in Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, "In no class of cases are the findings of the trial court, based upon the evidence, of more persuasive influence upon an appellate court than in a case such as this, involving the integrity of a member of the bar. Where, as in this case, there is sufficient evidence to warrant its conclusions we will be slow to interfere." And, as stated in Dixon v. Minogue, 280 Pa. 128, "In no class of cases ought the result reached by a trial court, where it is based on evidence, be of more binding influence on a court of appeal than in a proceeding such as this, involving, as it does, the integrity of one of the members of the bar ministering justice before it. The court of first instance knows the lawyer, his standing, character, credibility and fidelity to trust in a way we cannot. When the tribunal which hears the proofs, reaches a conclusion, as the court in this proceeding did, of the respondent's bad faith . . . and we find in the record supporting evidence of the misdeeds alleged, it is not for us to interfere." See also Gery's Case, 284 Pa. 121, 123.
An earnest appeal has been made to this court for a modification of the order of disbarment, it being urged that this respondent has been a member of the bar for over forty years, that he has never before been charged with any dereliction of duty as an attorney, and that his time was so much occupied with service in public office that he was not able to devote to his private law practice the attention which it properly demanded. These, however, are matters for consideration by the court below, if an application for reinstatement be hereafter made to it by the respondent.
The order of the court below is affirmed.