Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 96-286, SECTION "L".
March 13, 1997
Considering the motion by defendants Morris Holmes, Maudelle Davis-Cade, Dr. J. Berengher Brechtel, Gail Moore Glapion, Carolyn Green Ford, and Cheryl Q.W. Cramer for summary judgment, such motion is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This case arises out of the discharge of plaintiff, Carlos Samuel, from his employment as a Staff Auditor for the Orleans Parish School District. His termination became final at a school board meeting on January 16, 1996. The factual background surrounding this event is set forth with sufficient detail in the parties' memoranda.
The movants contend that plaintiff's claims against them in their individual capacities should be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable. With respect to defendants Davis-Cade, Brechtel, Glapion, Ford, and Cramer, the Court agrees, at least with respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claim. These Board Members were presented by the Superintendent with a written recommendation for discharge, together with facially valid reasons therefor in accordance with La. R.S. § 17:522(A), (West Supp. 1997). Plaintiff offers no evidence or authority to support a finding by this Court that the Board Members' actions in reliance thereon were unreasonable. Accordingly, as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims for violation of procedural and substantive due process, the Court finds that the Board Members are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
As for defendant Holmes, however, the Court is unable to reach a similar conclusion. Holmes does not deny that he knew that the plaintiff was entitled to three levels of hearings under the Orleans Parish School Board ("OPSB") Policy 4118.12-R. His argument is that he was unable to provide plaintiff with a Level I hearing because questions existed as to whether the plaintiff's supervisor, who was tenured, would be suspended from his employment. Even assuming that this uncertainty would provide a cloak of reasonableness with respect to Holmes' failure to provide a Level I hearing, it does not explain his failure to provide a Level III hearing in accordance with OPSB Policy 4118.12-R (e.g. the opportunity to present witnesses, have counsel present, rebut evidence, etc.). Accordingly, the Court finds that genuine issue exists as to whether Holmes' actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Certainly, a reasonable jury could find that they were not. The Court finds, therefore, that Holmes has not established that he is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
With respect to plaintiff's claims of retaliatory discharge under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), and the Louisiana Whistle Blower Statute, La. R.S. § 42:1169(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1997), the movants fail to cite any authority suggesting that the doctrine of qualified immunity is applicable in the context of such claims. The very essence of this retaliatory discharge claim is that the plaintiff was terminatedbecause of his lawful acts in investigating and/or reporting an alleged act of impropriety — in this case, an alleged violation of the False Claims Act. To succeed on his claims against the movants in their individual capacities, plaintiff must show that defendant Holmes recommended discharge and that each Board Member voted for discharge because of actions by plaintiff that were protected by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) and La. R.S. § 42:1169(A)-(C). As plaintiff suggests, the doctrine of qualified immunity is inconsistent with these causes of action because the purpose behind the False Claims Act and the Louisiana Whistle blower statute is to protect public employees who expose their employer's improprieties. There is no discretion allowed on the part of the employer. If the reason behind the movants' actions was retaliation for protected acts on the part of plaintiff, then the movants' acts were, ipso facto, unreasonable. For these reasons, the Court finds that the defendants have failed to establish that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion by defendants Morris Holmes, Maudelle Davis-Cade, Dr. J. Berengher Brechtel, Gail Moore Glapion, Carolyn Green Ford, and Cheryl Q.W. Cramer for summary judgment is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART, in that plaintiff's § 1983 claims against defendants Davis-Cade, Brechtel, Glapion, Ford, and Cramer in their individual capacities are dismissed, and DENIED IN PART, in that it is denied in all other respects.