Opinion
C.A. No. 98A-08-013 (JEB).
Submitted: April 7, 2000.
Decided: August 3, 2000.
APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION -On appeal from a decision of the Human Relations Commission -Reversed
Appearances: Neilli Mullen Walsh, Rodney Square North-11th Floor, P.O. Box 391, Wilmington, DE 19899-0391, Attorney for Appellant.
ORDER
Appellant Salty Sam's Pier 13 ("Sam's") appeals a decision of the Human Relations Commisssion ("the HRC") relating to the HRC's finding that Sam's discriminated against the Appellees because of their race in violation of the Delaware Equal Accommodations Law. Because the HRC's Panel Decision lacks substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Appellees were discriminated against, the decision of the Human Relation commission is Reversed .
I. FACTS
On May 28, 1999, the appellees arrived at Sam's for a graduation party. The appellees desired to join twenty members of the Carter party who were already seated in a reserved banquet room at Sam's. The banquet room was filled to its serving capacity, and the appellees sought a busboy's help in setting up extra tables in the room. The extra tables blocked the doorways to the banquet room. Judy Vincent, the hostess and manager of Sam's noticed the overcrowded banquet room and hollered at the busboy for setting up additional tables without her permission. Ms. Vincent offered to seat appellees elsewhere in the restaurant, who agreed and followed her out of the banquet room. Several appellees testified that they felt that Ms. Vincent was polite to them at this point.
As Ms. Vincent escorted the appellees to their table, Christopher Joiner told Tennise Lee that he had stopped coming to the restaurant in the past because the food and service were bad. Ms. Vincent overheard Mr. Joiner, took offense to his comments, and suggested that if he did not like the restaurant then he could eat somewhere else.
Mr. Joiner and Ms. Lee became upset and told Ms. Vincent that she had no business intruding upon their private conversation. Mr. Joiner and Ms. Lee became agitated and loud, and Ms. Vincent asked them to leave Sam's. Ms. Vincent testified that she was upset and she walked away to the hostess station. Mr. Joiner followed her to the hostess station, yelled at her, and pointed his finger in her face.
Waitress Mary Setyanto was standing nearby and testified that Mr. Joiner's "demeanor was intimidating", she herself was scared, and that customers overheard Mr. Joiner yelling. Ms. Vincent testified she was afraid of Mr. Joiner's confrontational nature and she did not respond to him. Rodger Monroe, a waiter and relief manager, overheard Mr. Joiner's initial comments to Ms. Lee from twenty-two feet away. Mr. Monroe testified that Mr. Joiner sounded angry and gesticulated with his hands in close proximity to Ms. Vincent, and that Richard Washam began yelling at Ms. Vincent and threatening to picket the restaurant. Mr. Monroe also testified that he observed other customers watching the situation unfold.
There is a dispute as to whether or not Ms. Vincent asked the entire party of appellees to leave the restaurant. One of the waitresses began to apologize to the appellees and Ms. Vincent yelled at the waitress to mind her own business. The party eventually left Sam's. The twenty-member Carter party remained in the banquet room and finished their dinner.
No witnesses testified that any employee of Sam's made any racial epithets or derogatory remarks to the appellees. Ms. Vincent and other employees of Sam's testified that they believed Ms. Vincent's conduct was not racially discriminatory towards the appellees. Several of the appellees testified that they were discriminated against, and that they assumed they were asked to leave because of their skin color.
On February 8, 1999 and March 1, 1999, the HRC conducted hearings. On August 9, 1999, the HRC issued its decision, signed by two panel members, who found that Ms. Vincent discriminated against the appellees by asking them to leave Sam's solely because they were African-American. The third HRC member issued a dissenting opinion, arguing that while Ms. Vincent may have demonstrated poor managerial skills, her conduct was not racially motivated.
On August 27, 1999, the appellant filed an appeal from the decision of the Commission. The basis of the appeal is that the HRC's decision was not predicated upon substantial evidence and that the decision was fraught with legal error.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision of the Human Relations Commission, the Superior Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free from legal error. "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. "[I]f the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence of record, or are not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, then the decision cannot stand."
Quaker Hill Place v. Saville, Del. Super., 523 A.2d 947, 953 (1987); 29 Del. C. § 10142 (d) and 10161(5).
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores. Inc., Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994) (quotingOlney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981)).
Olney at 614.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (1965).
Quaker Hill Place, 523 A.2d at 952 (citingBaker v. Connell, Del. Supr., 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (1985)); Gamble v. Thompson, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-12-004, 1998 WI., 109858, at *2, Herlihy, J. (Feb. 27, 1998).
III. DISCUSSION
The Delaware Equal Accommodations Law, 6 Del. C. § 4500-4512, provides in part:
"No person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person, on account of race, age, marital status, creed, color, sex, handicap or national origin, any of the accommodations, facilities, advantages or privileges thereof."
See 6 Del. C. § 4504 (a), "Unlawful Practices".
The United States Supreme Court has established a three-part burden-shifting test for complainants to prove a denial of public accommodations claim. The procedure is as follows:
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Uncle Willie's Deli v. Whittington. et al., Del. Super., CA. No. 98A-04-006, 1988 LEXIS 463, at *12, Lee, J. (Dec. 31, 1998).
(1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
(2) Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff access.
(3) After this production of evidence, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuading by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 801-802; Ezold v. Wolf. Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 3rd Cir., 983 F.2d 509, 522 (1992); Uncle Willie's Deli at *12; Gallucio's v. Kane. Del. Super., No. CA. No. 94A-12-010, 1995 WL 656818, at *3, Cooch, J. (Oct. 19, 1995);Quaker Hill Place v. State Human Relations Comm'n, Del. Super., 498 A.2d 175, 183 (1985); Giles v. Family Court, Del. Supr., 411 A.2d 599, 601-02 (1980).
In order to establish a prima facie case and satisfy the very first part of this burdenshifting test, the plaintiffs must show three elements: (1) that they are members of a protected class, (2) that they were denied access to public accommodations, and (3) that nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably.
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 522; Uncle Willie's Deli, 1988 LEXIS 463 at *12-13; Gallucio's, 1995 WL 656818 at *3; Giles, 411 A.2d at 601.
In the instant case, the evidence shows only two of the three elements needed to establish a prima facie case were presented. The appellees are members of a protected class-African-Americans-who were denied access to Salty Sam's Pier 13 when Ms. Vincent asked some or all of them to leave the restaurant. However, there was no evidence presented whatsoever to show that non-blacks were treated more favorably than the appellees, and so the third prong required for a prima facie case was not established.
As in Uncle Willie's Deli, the only evidence that race was a factor in the dispute was that Ms. Vincent was white and the appellees were black. "The fact that this episode, however unpleasant, occurred between . . . a white manager and . . . black customer[s] is not sufficient to support a prima facie finding of racial discrimination."
Uncle Willie's Deli at *13; see Giles at 603.
In its seventeen-page decision, the HRC devotes just four sentences to the rationale for its decision. Their brevity merits quoting here:
Based upon the weight of the evidence presented at the hearing, the Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent's conduct amounted to racial discrimination. The Panel finds that, even if it were to accept that Ms. Vinson [sic] had a legitimate basis to ask Mr. Joiner to leave the restaurant based upon his comments and conduct, there was no basis for her to request that the entire party leave. The Panel concludes that once Mr. Joiner challenged Ms. Vinson [sic] she improperly discriminated against the rest of the party and decided to kick them all out solely because they were African-American. The Panel concludes that a reasonable person could conclude that the remaining members of the party were discriminated upon based on their race.
The HRC's finding that Ms. Vincent "improperly discriminated . . . solely because [appellees] were African-American" is not supported by relevant, substantial evidence, or even a scintilla of evidence. The mere fact that the parties in this unfortunate event were of different races does not justify a presumption of racial discrimination. The overwhelming evidence in the record is that Mr. Joiner and his party were asked to leave because of his conduct and not the color of his skin. The logical nexus required to connect appellant's actions and charges of racial discrimination is sorely lacking here. The HRC's decision is a conclusion that is neither justified by a sufficient factual basis nor is the product of a rational deductive process.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Human Relations Commission is REVERSED .
IT IS SO ORDERED .