Opinion
Case No. 20030598-CA.
Filed August 25, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Original Proceeding in this Court.
Thomas W. Peters, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Michelle Bush, Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Miller, and Matthew D. Wride, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County (the Board) appeals Respondent Utah State Tax Commission's (the Commission) valuation of Daniel and Vicky Baggett's (the Baggetts) contaminated land at $0 for the year 2002. We affirm.
The Commission differentiated between the value of the land and that of the building thereon — the Baggetts' home. To wit, while the Commission valued the land at $0, it valued the home at $244,900 because "there is still value in use as [the Baggetts] resided at the subject property and used it for its intended function without significant limitations." This method was also used by the Commission in Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Commission, 1999 UT 48, ¶ 5, 980 P.2d 690, discussed later in this decision.
The Board first argues that the Commission was incorrect to utilize the valuation methodology from Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Commission, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690, citing factual differences between Schmidt and the case at bar. "[T]he choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of fact." Id. at ¶ 6. "Therefore, we `grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard of review.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) (1996)). "We have interpreted this `substantial evidence' standard to mean `that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Bradshaw v. Wilkinson Water Co., 2004 UT 38, ¶ 37, 94 P.3d 242 (quoting Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, ¶ 15, 70 P.3d 47 (quotations and citation omitted)).
The Commission's reliance on the Schmidt valuation method is supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the facts of the instant case are substantially similar to those in Schmidt. For instance, in Schmidt, the Board challenged the Commission's valuation of the Schmidts' land at $0. See 1999 UT 48 at ¶¶ 1, 5. Like the Baggetts' property, the Schmidts' property was located in an area contaminated from late nineteenth century smelter operations. See id. at ¶ 2. Letters from the Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA) and Utah Department of Environmental Quality (the UDEQ) stated that testing of the Schmidts' soil revealed lead and arsenic levels warranting remediation; an environmental remediation company estimated that the cost of remediation would be $1,042,252.05; and "letters from several banks . . . denied permanent financing for the property after the contamination was discovered." Id. at ¶ 3. Based on this information, the Commission reduced the valuation of the Schmidts' land to $0 — subtracting the cost of remediation from the land's value. See id. at ¶ 5. Affirming the Commission's valuation of the land at $0, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the Commission's valuation was supported by substantial evidence. See id. at ¶ 11.
The facts of Schmidt closely track those of the instant case, with some differences. First, the Schmidts were unable to obtain financing, see id. at ¶ 3, whereas the Baggetts qualified for conventional financing to purchase their property. However, there is no evidence on the record that the Baggetts' lending institution knew about the contamination, and it is undisputed that the Baggetts did not know. Second, in the Schmidt case, the land was not in a Superfund site, see id. at ¶ 4, while the Baggett's property is. Yet, this is not germane because although the Baggetts' land is in a Superfund site, the remediation has not even commenced and there is no certainty about when it will be done. Thus, the facts in the case before us are sufficiently similar to warrant application of Schmidt.
Second, the Board asserts that the Commission improperly admitted, as expert testimony, Mr. Baggett's estimation of the remediation cost attributable to his land. Regardless of Mr. Baggett's qualifications as an expert, his estimate of remediation cost was a simple mathematical calculation, not requiring expert testimony. Therefore, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by admitting Mr. Baggett's testimony.
Finally, the Board contends that the Commission's $0 valuation of the Baggetts' land was not supported by substantial evidence. "The Commission has the discretion to take that conflicting evidence into account and to arrive at a number in between."Id. at ¶ 11. As in Schmidt, we afford the Commission this discretion. There was evidence on the record, in the form of Mr. Baggett's testimony, that remediation costs would exceed the Assessor's $103,700 valuation of the land, even if his estimates were off by fifty percent. Furthermore, the Board's evidence that comparables experienced little or no decline in value due to contamination was undercut by the dissimilarity of the comparables, in that they were not contaminated. Accordingly, because reasonable minds could be persuaded that the fair market value of the Baggetts' land was $0, the Commission's valuation is sustained by substantial evidence.
The Board called this court's attention to Nielsen v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, App. No. 04-0605 (Utah State Tax Comm'n Feb. 22, 2005), for the position that the Baggetts' land should not be valued at $0. However, while Nielsen's real property is in the same contaminated area as the Baggetts' land, Nielsen did not argue that the contamination warranted a reduction in the value of his land apart from the value of his home. See id. Therefore, Nielsen is not helpful.
We affirm the Commission's decision.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge and James Z. Davis, Judge.