Opinion
No. LLI-CV-09 6001101 S
November 8, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action was brought by Fiorouzeh Salime (plaintiff) claiming a constructive trust against Ronald Pizzarelli (defendant). In June 2005, the defendant purchased 4 acres of land in Roxbury, Connecticut. That property is the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiff stated that her claim for fifty percent of the gross proceeds from the sale of the house is based on defendant's promise that she would have half the house.
The complaint alleges that the parties agreed to contribute their efforts to acquire and accumulate property with the intention that such property would be owned legally and/or equitably by them jointly and for their mutual benefit and that the plaintiff contributed her efforts to the parties' joint enterprise in the acquisition of valuable and substantial property. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff devoted the bulk of her time to the remodeling and redecorating of the premises which was to be the future residence of the parties, and, as a result of the defendant's statements, conduct and the surrounding circumstances, reasonable expectations were derived by the plaintiff, including reasonable expectations of support as well as an equitable ownership of and interest in the property. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff devoted approximately 6 years of her life to the defendant's emotional and physical needs and to his pecuniary advancement in justifiable reliance on his express and implied representations, promises and warranties. Finally, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff performed all of her obligations and relied to her financial detriment upon representations, promises and warranties which the defendant made and subsequently breached.
FACTS
The parties met at a cosmetics conference in New York in 2002 or 2003. At the time, the defendant was a manufacturer's representative for companies in the cosmetics industry. His business, Ronaco Industries, was located in Stamford, Connecticut. The plaintiff had a line of organic nail treatment and would work on shoots, commercials, and on QVC. Sometime after the initial meeting, the parties began dating. At the time, the defendant was married to someone else. In 2004, at the suggestion of the defendant, the plaintiff moved from New York City to an apartment in Stamford, Connecticut. Defendant paid the rent and sometimes stayed at the apartment. After his divorce was final and after her lease term was up in June 2005, the plaintiff moved into the defendant's home in Roxbury. Shortly thereafter, the defendant purchased the property which is the subject of this lawsuit.
Plaintiff testified that they met in 2002. Defendant testified that they met in 2003.
Initially and for some time, the parties enjoyed a seemingly close and loving relationship. Plaintiff introduced into evidence the defendant's Valentines Day and Christmas cards in which he wrote loving messages which suggested a future together. Defendant paid all of plaintiff's living expenses except the monthly payments on the car he leased for her. He paid for their vacations. He gave her money when she needed it for travel or other expenses. She kept her own earnings from her nail business. She generally paid her own credit cards. The couple had a joint credit card; however, they never shared bank accounts.
Defendant used the proceeds from the sale of a house he owned in Sherman, Connecticut to pay for the property and for the renovations. Plaintiff testified that the house was to be their "love nest" and that the defendant told her that she would have "half the house." Plaintiff said that the defendant promised to put her name on the house when it was finished. Plaintiff's friend, Faye Homayouni recalled a conversation with the defendant in the summer of 2006 during which he indicated that he would share the house with the plaintiff because she had worked very hard on it. She had the impression from speaking with the plaintiff that the two would marry. Defendant said that he never intended to marry the plaintiff, and he stated that he never told her they would be married. He did testify that he had fallen in love with her.
According to the plaintiff, both parties devoted a great deal of time to the reconstruction, remodeling, refurbishing, and redecorating the property. They met with vendors and artisans. She followed up and kept track of the expenses. The plaintiff claims that she worked on the house from two to six days a week with the understanding that she and the defendant were doing this together. Plaintiff kept diaries and two wall calendars during the years 2005 and 2006. She claims that the diaries show the time she spent working on the house. According to her records, she spent a great deal of time with artisans and subcontractors. She said that she paid the bills although the evidence shows that all the checks were signed by the defendant. She said that her work on the house was a massive undertaking, and that she gave up her own business to spend time working on the house. She said the 4,173 hours she calculated was a conservative estimate of the time she spent on the house. The court finds the plaintiff's testimony regarding the hours to be not credible. As an example of the time she claims to have put in to planning and working on the house, plaintiff noted that she, on a single day spent seven or eight hours with "Ed" and "Nancy," the engineer and the architect. Testimony from Edward Silva, the engineer, refuted her claim as to the number of hours she claimed that she spent with him or with the architect who was his wife, Caren (not Nancy) Silva. The builder, Kevin Keenan, testified that, although he recalled going over the plans with both parties, the plaintiff never gave him any instructions with respect to the work. He always spoke with the defendant when decisions were to be made. Any change orders were signed by the defendant. Elwood Maynard owns a company in Roxbury, Connecticut known as Elm Designs. He did work on the house and dealt with both Pizzarelli and Salime. However, his records indicate that he spent a total of six hours with them. With regard to the plaintiff's diary in which she references a meeting with Mr. Maynard lasting seven hours, he testified that he did not meet with her on the date she indicated and also that a meeting lasting seven hours with her was impossible.
Plaintiff became a real estate agent in 2004 and sometime thereafter began working for Portfolio Properties. The property which was to have been the parties' "love nest" was listed for sale in 2006 or 2007. Plaintiff erroneously represented herself as "owner/agent" in the ads. Defendant saw the ads and did not object to her misrepresentations concerning ownership of the property. On the actual contract, however, only defendant was listed as owner. Plaintiff was listed as agent.
The parties' relationship began to deteriorate in 2008. Defendant said he began feeling that he could not trust the plaintiff. He claimed that she wanted him to assign half of his pension and half of the proceeds of his life insurance policy to her. She denied asking him to do this, and she said that it was the defendant who suggested making her a beneficiary on his life insurance policy. She did not deny using his credit card to purchase items from Saks Fifth Avenue so that her son, who was employed there, could get a bonus. She then returned the items.
The plaintiff became involved in a business venture called ACN and began using his Marriott Points for rooms in connection with her business travel. She also invited his friends to their home in order to give presentations on products she was selling. According to the defendant, these actions of the plaintiff led to his asking her to leave the home. The parties attempted to negotiate a financial settlement, but they could not agree. Defendant hired an attorney who served plaintiff with a notice to quit in May 2009. She left the home in October 2009.
DISCUSSION
'The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 856, 784 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 947, 788 A.2d 95, 96, 97 (2001); see also Restatement, Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts § 160, comment (c), p. 642 (1937). Sullivan v. Delisa, 101 Conn.App. 605, 617, 923 A.2d 760 (2007). "A constructive trust arises . . . when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it . . . The issue raised by a claim for a constructive trust is, in essence, whether a party has committed actual or constructive fraud or whether he or she has been unjustly enriched." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Stornawaye Properties v. O'Brien, 94 Conn.App. 170, 176 (2006). "[A] constructive trust arises . . . against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy . . . Moreover, the party sought to be held liable for a constructive trust must have engaged in conduct that wrongfully harmed the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendell Corp. Trustee v. Thurston, 239 Conn. 109, 113-14, 680 A.2d 1314 (1996). Citing Millard v. Green, 94 Conn. 597, the Appellate Court (Gruendel, J.) recently observed, "[t]he specific instances in which equity impresses a constructive trust are numberless, — as numberless as the modes by which property may be obtained through bad faith and unconscientious acts." The function of the court is "to determine . . . [whether] the defendants' actions [were] among those numberless instances of bad faith or unconscientious acts that warrant the imposition of a constructive trust." Jarvis v. Lieder, 117 Conn.App. 129, 131, 978 A.2d 106 (2009).
In 1987, our Supreme Court held that, in accordance with contemporary mores, our public policy does not prevent the enforcement of agreements regarding property rights between unmarried cohabitants in a sexual relationship, and, "[i]n the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case." Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 340-41, 521 A.2d 142 (1987). "[W]here the parties have established an unmarried, cohabiting relationship, it is the specific conduct of the parties within that relationship that determines their respective rights and obligations, including the treatment of their individual property . . . [However,] [a]ny such finding must be determined by reference to the unique circumstances and arrangements between the parties present in each case. Those matters are questions of fact . . . and can only be determined by evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and weighing conflicting evidence." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barber v. Barber, 121 Conn.App. 96, 103, 994 A.2d 284 (2010).
Plaintiff argues that she has a right to a fifty percent interest in the property by reason of the defendant's promises to her. She asserts that the defendant's representations to her friends and to the public as well as his conduct evidence an express and/or implied agreement that she would be a half owner of the property. It appears that the defendant initially intended a long-term relationship with the plaintiff and probably told the plaintiff that the house would be their home. From the evidence, the court infers that the defendant went along with the plaintiff's decision to falsely hold herself out as an owner for purposes of real estate ads and the magazine article about the property. In that regard, he was less than honest. But neither the defendant's words nor his actions provide the court with evidence of any contract, express or implied. It was the defendant only who acquired the property. He paid for the acquisition, the renovations, and all expenses associated with it.
Plaintiff urges the court to apply the reasoning of Judge Berdon in Warren v. Gay, CV 054031182, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven, May 12, 2009. In that case, the court found that there was an implied agreement, a tacit understanding between the parties that if they ceased to cohabitate, the defendant would repay to the plaintiff the money she had advanced on his behalf, reimburse her for the services she rendered, the credits the defendant received as a result of the plaintiff and other advantages the defendant received as a result of the cohabitation with the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff had a right to recover under the principles of implied contract and under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. In Warren v. Gay, evidence showed that the plaintiff rendered professional services for the defendant as an architect, devoted the bulk of her time to the start up and operation of the veterinary hospital owned in part by the defendant, and allowed $6,000 owed to her by the seller of the home purchased by the defendant to be used as a credit toward the purchase price. The plaintiff in this case rendered no professional services to the defendant; nor did she pay for anything. She did not help to acquire or financially maintain the property. There is no credible evidence of an express or implied contract breached by the defendant.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant is unjustly enriched as a result of her efforts in renovating the property. "To establish a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiff for which the defendant unjustly did not pay and the defendant's failure to pay for that benefit was to the plaintiff's detriment." Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409 (2001); Weisman Trustee v. Kaspar, 233 Conn. 531, 550 (1995). The plaintiff's evidence regarding the number of hours she spent working on the house is not credible. Moreover, whatever time she did contribute was fully compensated. The plaintiff lived rent-free, and the defendant paid for many of her expenses, including vacations. The defendant was not unjustly enriched.
The facts in this case do not warrant the imposition of a constructive trust. Based on the foregoing, the court finds the issues for the defendant, Ronald Pizzarelli.