Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. BC350806 Ernest George Williams, Judge.
Jitu Sadiki, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Lance G. Greene and Lance G. Greene for Defendant and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Appellant Jitu Sadiki (Sadiki) appeals from a trial court judgment entered in favor of respondent Jacqueline Smith (Smith). Because we find no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2004, Otis James Smith (father), the father of both Sadiki and Sadiki’s half-sister Smith, filed a complaint against Sadiki to quiet title to certain real property. Sadiki answered the complaint on March 29, 2004.
On September 20, 2004, father and Sadiki participated in some sort of alternative dispute resolution proceeding and entered into a stipulation re settlement (sometimes referred to as the agreement) resolving their dispute. Specifically, the agreement required Sadiki to pay father $25,000 as follows: $5,000 by cashier’s check within two weeks, and provide father with a promissory note for the balance ($20,000), secured by a notarized deed of trust. Father then filed a request for dismissal of his action; the case was dismissed with prejudice on November 18, 2004.
On June 3, 2005, father assigned his interest in the note and deed of trust to Smith.
Father died on October 8, 2005.
While Sadiki apparently made many of the payments, at some point he became delinquent. A notice of default was recorded on January 18, 2006.
On April 17, 2006, Sadiki initiated the instant action against Smith, alleging six causes of action. The thrust of his verified complaint alleges that Smith unduly influenced father and fraudulently attempted to gain control of the subject property.
Smith filed her verified answer on May 17, 2006.
A bench trial commenced on November 9, 2006.
On November 17, 2006, the trial court rendered its statement of decision and judgment in favor of Smith.
This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
In urging us to reverse the judgment, Sadiki raises several arguments. We address each in turn, keeping in mind the following: An appellate court presumes that the judgment appealed from is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.)
In his reply brief, Sadiki asks that Smith’s respondent’s brief be stricken for violating a host of procedural requirements. While he correctly points out that Smith’s brief does not contain a table of authorities (presumably because no authorities are cited in the brief) and does not offer any specific citations to the appellate record, we exercise our discretion to consider the brief and the arguments raised therein.
First, Sadiki claims that the trial court’s judgment violates the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. He bases his theory upon “the prior judgment entered November 18, 2004, giving [Sadiki] sole ownership of [the subject] real property.”
We cannot agree. There was no prior judgment awarding the subject property to Sadiki. And, there was no stipulated judgment. While Sadiki and father entered into a stipulated agreement, Sadiki offers no legal authority to support the propositions that (1) the stipulation re settlement bars Smith’s defenses to the claims raised herein, and (2) the stipulation re settlement precludes Smith from challenging Sadiki’s compliance with the terms of that agreement.
Second, Sadiki asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he “defaulted on his condition in the stipulated agreement.” Substantial evidence supports the trial court judgment, namely the notice of default. While Sadiki cites to his testimony to support his contention that he complied with all of the terms of the stipulation re settlement, it is well-established that when we review a judgment for substantial evidence, we have “‘no power to judge the effect or value of, or to weigh the evidence; to consider the credibility of witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence.’” (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 194–195.) Thus, in the face of evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment, we cannot rely upon Sadiki’s contrary and self-serving testimony to reverse the judgment.
Third, Sadiki challenges the trial court’s statement of decision on the grounds that it does not adequately recite the ultimate facts. When the trial court provides a statement of decision that allegedly omits critical findings, the aggrieved party must object in the trial court to the statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133–1134.) Failure to object waives any claim on appeal that the statement of decision is defective. (Tusher v. Gabrielsen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 131, 140–141.) As Sadiki implicitly concedes, he waived this argument by failing to object below. Our analysis stops here.
Fourth, Sadiki claims that “there is no existence of a quitclaim deed that would support the trial court’s ruling voiding a quitclaim deed.” In other words, father never executed a quitclaim deed in favor of Sadiki. This point is irrelevant. Given the trial court’s determination that any quitclaim deed executed by father in favor of Sadiki is void, it makes no difference whether a quitclaim deed was ever granted by father to Sadiki. If one exists, it is now void.
Fourth, Sadiki objects to the trial court’s conclusion that a fiduciary relationship existed between father and Sadiki. Sadiki correctly points out that: “Consanguinity of itself does not create a fiduciary relationship.” (Estate of Lingenfelter (1952) 38 Cal.2d 571, 585; Estate of Llewellyn (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 562 [“[w]hile asserting, and we think correctly, that blood relationship is an important and material circumstance in considering the question whether in fact, a confidential relationship exists, respondents concede that the relationship existing as here, between brothers, is not in itself a fiduciary relationship”].) However, what Sadiki fails to illustrate or explain is why the trial court’s allegedly erroneous finding compels reversal of the judgment.
“‘The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. It is entitled to the assistance of counsel [or the litigant if, as here, the litigant chooses to represent himself]. Accordingly every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ [Citation.] [¶] It is the duty of [appellant], not of the courts, ‘by argument and the citation of authorities to show that the claimed error exists.’ [Citation.]” (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.) Moreover, Sadiki’s election to act as his own attorney on appeal does not entitle him to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure; otherwise, ignorance unjustly is rewarded. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208–209.)
Applying these principles, we conclude that there are no grounds to reverse the judgment based upon the trial court’s finding that Sadiki owed father a fiduciary duty.
Finally, Sadiki complains about the trial court’s finding that there was no consideration for the quitclaim deed transferring title to the property to him. Given Sadiki’s default on his obligations under the terms of the stipulation re settlement, the trial court properly determined that the conveyance of the subject property to Sadiki, if it occurred at all, was not supported by ample consideration.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Smith is entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., CHAVEZ, J.