Opinion
Civil Action No.: 9:06-cv-1943-RBH.
March 13, 2008
ORDER
On May 23, 2007, this court dismissed Petitioner's habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) ("AEDPA"). Petitioner timely filed the pending [Docket Entry #21] motion to reconsider.
Standard of Review
Motions to reconsider under Rule 59 are not to be made lightly: "[R]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 59.30[4] (3d ed.). The Fourth Circuit has held such a motion should be granted for only three reasons: (1) to follow an intervening change in controlling law; (2) on account of new evidence; or (3) " to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). Rule 59 motions "may not be used to make arguments that could have been made before the judgment was entered." Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Nor are they opportunities to rehash issues already ruled upon because a litigant is displeased with the result. See Tran v. Tran, 166 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Discussion
Petitioner argues that relief under Rule 59 is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Petitioner contends that even if his petition was time-barred under § 2244(d), he is not barred from proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner states that the "Rules of Federal Procedure for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, . . ., require that the Petitioner bring the action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and once the issue of statute of limitations [is raised], it is the Petitioner's option to motion that the issues be heard under 28 U.S.C. § 2241." [Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, at pg. 1, Docket Entry #21]. Petitioner argues that this court erred when it denied review of his petition under § 2241. However, Petitioner misunderstands the interaction between §§ 2254 and 2241.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 was created by Congress as the method for state prisoners to overturn or attack their state court convictions. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997). On the other hand, § 2241, considered the general federal habeas corpus provision, is used for complaints related to parole matters, sentence computations, prison transfers, prison disciplinary matters, etc. See Bagley v. Warden of Kershaw Corr. Inst., C.A. No. 2:07-425-PMD-RSC, 2007 WL 1459699, at *2 (D.S.C. May 15, 2007).
The majority view is that § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for habeas corpus relief by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction. Gregory v. Coleman, 218 Fed. Appx. 266 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (recognizing majority view but declining to indicate whether the Fourth Circuit would join the majority of Circuit Courts); see, e.g., White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004); Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 277-79 (2d Cir. 2003); James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2002); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2000); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 722-23 (8th Cir. 2001); Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1058-62 (11th Cir. 2003); but see, Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869-71 (10th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Tennessee Dep't. of Corr., 265 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment and seeks to overturn or attack his state court conviction. On July 7, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree, and was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment by the Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson. Petitioner is not seeking relief which is usually sought via a § 2241 petition, for example, complaints related to parole matters, sentence computations, prison transfers, or prison disciplinary matters. See Bagley, 2007 WL 1459699, at *2. Petitioner seeks the relief expressly provided for by Congress in § 2254. Therefore, his petition, which was filed as a § 2254 petition, cannot now be construed as a § 2241 petition simply to allow Petitioner to avoid the statute of limitations. See, e.g., White, 370 F.3d at 1008 (noting that if they were to allow petitioner to proceed under § 2241, AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations would not apply).
Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that the Rules allow him to have his § 2254 petition considered under § 2241 once the statute of limitations has been raised. To accept Petitioner's argument would essentially nullify AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations because any state prisoner facing a statute of limitations issue could circumvent AEDPA by seeking review under § 2241.
Because Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment and seeks to overturn or challenge his state court conviction, his habeas corpus petition was properly construed as a § 2254 petition. Accord Bagley, 2007 WL 1459699, at *2; Davis v. Warden, Lieber Corr. Inst., C.A. No. 9:07-3318-HMH-GCK, 2007 WL 4322238, at *2 (D.S.C. December 6, 2007); Martin v. Johnson, C.A. No. 7:07-cv-436, 2007 WL 2746962, at *2 (W.D. Va. September 20, 2007). As a result, Petitioner's petition is governed by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons stated in this court's previous Order [Docket Entry #19], Petitioner's petition was untimely and appropriately dismissed.
Petitioner has failed to establish a clear error of law or manifest injustice sufficient to warrant relief under Rule 59. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner's [Docket Entry #21] motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.