Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-0760 (CKK)
2023-03-08
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants.
Emily Blythe Lubin, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, New Orleans, LA, Gia L. Cincone, Pro Hac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jeffrey H. Fisher, Susan W. Pangborn, Pro Hac Vice, William E. Dorris, Pro Hac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, John Timothy Bergin, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Washington, DC, Sarah Rich, Pro Hac Vice, Stephanie M. Alvarez-Jones, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiff. Daniel Patrick Schaefer, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, James Joseph Walker, David J. Byerley, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Michael Anthony Celone, Sheetul Sheth Wall, U.S. Department of Justice Immigration Litigation-District Court Section, Washington, DC, Yamileth G. Davila, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section, Washington, DC, Ruth Ann Mueller, Christopher Thomas Lyerla, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Kevin Charles Hirst, Richard Gordon Winstead Ingebretsen, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Claire Trickler-McNulty, Tae Johnson, Nathalie Asher, Sean Gallagher, Matthew T. Albence, Kevin K. Mcaleenan, Derek N. Benner, Enrique Lucero, Trey Lund.
Emily Blythe Lubin, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, New Orleans, LA, Gia L. Cincone, Pro Hac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jeffrey H. Fisher, Susan W. Pangborn, Pro Hac Vice, William E. Dorris, Pro Hac Vice, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, John Timothy Bergin, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Washington, DC, Sarah Rich, Pro Hac Vice, Stephanie M. Alvarez-Jones, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiff. Daniel Patrick Schaefer, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, James Joseph Walker, David J. Byerley, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Michael Anthony Celone, Sheetul Sheth Wall, U.S. Department of Justice Immigration Litigation-District Court Section, Washington, DC, Yamileth G. Davila, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section, Washington, DC, Ruth Ann Mueller, Christopher Thomas Lyerla, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Kevin Charles Hirst, Richard Gordon Winstead Ingebretsen, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Claire Trickler-McNulty, Tae Johnson, Nathalie Asher, Sean Gallagher, Matthew T. Albence, Kevin K. Mcaleenan, Derek N. Benner, Enrique Lucero, Trey Lund.
ORDER
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendants' [216] Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue. A little under three years ago, the Court denied Defendants' last request to sever this case and transfer each portion to other district courts. ECF No. 61. Defendants now move for reconsideration, arguing that transfer is now warranted because the Court has narrowed the scope of litigation in subsequent orders. E.g., SPLC v. DHS, 605 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2022). Motions for reconsideration are generally "disfavored" and granting them are an "unusual measure." Walsh v. Hagee, 10 F. Supp. 3d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2013). Moreover, a motion for reconsideration is usually warranted only where there has been "an intervening change in the law; [ ] the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or [ ] a clear error of law in the first order.' " Keystone Tobacco Co., Inv. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D.D.C. 2003).
For the purposes of resolving the pending Motion, the Court assumes the reader's familiarity with this case. The Court refers the reader to this opinion for further legal and factual background.
Although the Court has limited the scope of Plaintiffs' claims, public interests still weigh against transfer. Among the factors the Court must consider in weighing a request to transfer a matter is the "transferee[ court's] familiarity with the governing laws [and] [ ] the relative congestion of the calendars of the transferor and transferee courts[.]" Douglas v. Chariots for Hire, 918 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2013). In other words, the Court must consider the impact of transfer upon judicial economy, both in the transferor's district and in the transferee's district. Here, this case has been pending for over five years, a case-wide injunction is in place, the parties have substantially litigated compliance with that injunction, and the parties are well into discovery. Based on this extensive record, with which only this Court is familiar, neither the public's interest in judicial economy nor the parties' interest in the swift and correct resolution this litigation would be served by severance and transfer. See Douglas, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35. Therefore, Defendants have not satisfied their burden for reconsideration.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendants' [216] Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.