Opinion
2014-03-26
In the Matter of RUTHERFORD CHEMICALS, LLC, petitioner-respondent, v. ASSESSOR OF TOWN OF WOODBURY, et al., respondents-respondents; Monroe–Woodbury Central School District, intervenor-respondent; Elt Harriman, LLC, proposed intervenor-appellant.
Huff Wilkes, LLP, Tarrytown, N.Y. (David C. Wilkes and Joseph A. Danko of counsel), for proposed intervenor-appellant. Griffin, Coogan, Blose, Sulzer & Horgan, P.C., Bronxville, N.Y. (William E. Sulzer of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.
Huff Wilkes, LLP, Tarrytown, N.Y. (David C. Wilkes and Joseph A. Danko of counsel), for proposed intervenor-appellant. Griffin, Coogan, Blose, Sulzer & Horgan, P.C., Bronxville, N.Y. (William E. Sulzer of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.
Tarshis, Catania, Liberth, Mahon & Milligram, PLLC, Newburgh, N.Y. (Holly L. Reinhardt of counsel), for respondents-respondents.
Thomas, Drohan, Waxman, Petigrow & Mayle, LLP, Hopewell Junction, N.Y. (Daniel Petigrow and David H. Strong of counsel), for intervenor-respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and L. PRISCILLA HALL, JJ.
In related tax certiorari proceedings pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7, the proposed intervenor, ELT Harriman, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated May 17, 2012, which denied its motion, inter alia, for leave to intervene in the proceedings.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Intervention pursuant to either CPLR 1012 or 1013 requires a timely motion ( seeCPLR 1012, 1013; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Bisono, 98 A.D.3d 608, 609, 949 N.Y.S.2d 652;JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Edelson, 90 A.D.3d 996, 996–997, 934 N.Y.S.2d 847). Here, the proposed intervenor's motion was made more than four years after it purchased the subject property with the knowledge that these tax certiorari proceedings were pending, almost one year after it was informed that settlement negotiations among the parties had begun, and approximately three weeks after the parties had reached a settlement and submitted an executed consent judgment for approval by the Supreme Court. Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, that branch of the proposed intervenor's motion which was for leave to intervene ( see Matter of Arcelormittal Lackawanna LLC v. City of Lackawanna, 66 A.D.3d 1365, 1365–1366, 885 N.Y.S.2d 675;Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 274 A.D.2d 495, 496, 711 N.Y.S.2d 480;Rectory Realty Assoc. v. Town of Southampton, 151 A.D.2d 737, 737–738, 543 N.Y.S.2d 128;Matter of Buffalo Mall v. Assessor of Town of Clarence, 101 A.D.2d 701, 475 N.Y.S.2d 812).
The parties' remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination.