Opinion
No. 05-01-01653-CR
Opinion issued October 30, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F99-36979-WI. AFFIRMED
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
OPINION
Michael Rea Rush appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. In one point of error, appellant contends the trial judge erred in failing to stop the revocation proceeding and sua sponte order a competency hearing for appellant. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The State argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to address appellant's complaint because there is no appeal "from the trial court's determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt." Although the court of criminal appeals has not yet decided this issue, several of our sister courts have addressed it with differing results. See Nava v. State, 110 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.) (concluding that article 42.12, section 5(b) prohibition against appealing decision to adjudicate "does not permit an appellate court to review the evidence to determine if the evidence `brought to the judge's attention' raises a `bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's competency to stand trial.); Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (concluding appellate court had jurisdiction because Marbut's issues on appeal pertained to validity of proceedings and not to trial court's decision or determination to adjudicate guilt); Arista v. State, 2 S.W.3d 444, 445-46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (concluding appellate court lacked jurisdiction because court of criminal appeals "has suggested that any decision not related to the trial court's jurisdiction is intrinsically part of the trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt and is therefore not appealable."); see also Gilbert v. State, 852 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, no pet.) (concluding appellate court had jurisdiction because issue of appellant's competency was "possible error of constitutional magnitude on the part of the trial court in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of appellant's competency to stand trial."). After reviewing these cases, we conclude we need not determine the jurisdictional question because even assuming we have jurisdiction, appellant's argument lacks merit. Initially, we note appellant does not cite this Court to where in the record the issue of his competency was raised, e.g., what evidence of appellant's incompetency should have raised a bona fide doubt in the trial judge's mind as to appellant's competence to stand trial. See Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) ("Only if such a bona fide doubt exists need the court conduct such an inquiry, and only after such inquiry does the second clause of Section 2(b) operate, requiring the judge to determine whether there is `evidence sufficient to support a finding of incompetency' and, if so, to commence a competency hearing before a jury.). Nor does appellant discuss any specific facts in his application of the law to the facts of this case; in fact, his entire application discussion consists of the following statement: "The record in this case raises issues of competency of defendant in this case and was not effectively dealt with at the plea hearing." As an appellate court, it is not our task to pore through the numerous pages of record in an attempt to verify an appellant's claims. Nor is it our task to speculate as to the nature of an appellant's legal theory. Because appellant has not complied substantially with our briefing rules, we conclude he has failed to present anything for our review. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 100 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (holding that failure to adequately brief points waived any error); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Even assuming we were to address his complaint, we would conclude appellant's claim that the trial judge should have ordered a competency hearing are meritless. Nothing in the record shows appellant could not communicate with his attorney or did not understand the proceedings. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Rather, the evidence in this case showed appellant used marijuana and "a little cocaine," had an "anger control problem," and did not attend all of the counseling meetings scheduled for him. None of this evidence raises a bona fide doubt about appellant's ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or of his rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (bona fide doubt is raised only if evidence indicates recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by defendant). Because there is no evidence in the record to support appellant's contention, we conclude the trial judge did not err by failing to conduct sua sponte an inquiry into appellant's competency to stand trial. We overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Although the State and appellant refer to appellant as Michael Ray Rush, the indictment and judgment list appellant's full name as Michael Rea Rush.