Opinion
# 2020-058-023 Claim No. 121743
03-03-2020
BRYAN L. RUPLE v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Bryan L. Ruple, Pro Se Hon. Letitia James, Attorney General By: Thomas Trace, Esq., Associate Attorney
Synopsis
Claim alleging Defendant failed to protect Claimant from an attack by a fellow inmate and violated Claimant's constitutional rights dismissed after trial.
Case information
| UID: | 2020-058-023 |
| Claimant(s): | BRYAN L. RUPLE |
| Claimant short name: | RUPLE |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 121743 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CATHERINE E. LEAHY-SCOTT |
| Claimant's attorney: | Bryan L. Ruple, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Letitia James, Attorney General By: Thomas Trace, Esq., Associate Attorney |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | March 3, 2020 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant Bryan L. Ruple, a pro se inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained while incarcerated at Mid-State Correctional Facility as well as a purported "violation of [his] New York constitutional 5th Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment" (Claim No. 121743 ¶ 2). In particular, the Claim alleges that Claimant was assaulted by another inmate because Claimant self-describes as an "Aryan and a White Supremacist" (id. ¶ 3), and Defendant failed to protect him. The trial of this Claim was conducted by videoconference on January 16, 2020, with the parties appearing at Marcy Correctional Facility and the Court presiding in Albany, New York. Claimant testified on his own behalf. Claimant called one witness, DOCCS Counselor Lanaux (Lanaux). Defendant presented two witnesses, Lanaux and Correction Officer Becker (Becker), and offered one exhibit which was received into evidence by stipulation. At the conclusion of Claimant's case and trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the Claim. After considering all the testimony and evidence received at trial, reviewing the applicable law, and arguments made by the parties, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of trial and dismisses the Claim.
Exhibit A consists of 16 pages, which includes a one-page Inmate Misbehavior Report; five pages which contain four "to/from" memoranda; a one-page Protective Custody Waiver Form; four pages of an Unusual Incident Report; two pages of a Superintendent Hearing Disposition Rendered Report; a one-page Hearing Record Sheet; a one-page SHU Double-Cell Information Sheet; and one page entitled "Certification."
FACTS
Claimant testified that he identifies as a white supremacist and a member of the "Aryan Nation gang." Claimant contends that approximately six months before the incident, he had a cell mate who was African American. At that time, Claimant purportedly spoke with a correction sergeant to complain and, thereafter, that cell mate was removed. Claimant further testified approximately a week to 10 days before the incident of June 3, 2012, he learned of a new cell mate assignment. Claimant testified he notified security that he wanted a white cell mate and would not accept a cell mate of a different race. Claimant was allegedly told that he had to keep his new cell mate, who was African American, until they could find another. Claimant testified that, on May 25, 2012, the day the new cell mate moved in, he and the cell mate had an argument after Claimant told his cell mate that he was a white supremacist. Claimant testified he was attacked in his cell by his cell mate on June 3, 2012. As a result of this incident, Claimant sustained injuries, including lacerations to his face requiring stitches and fractured nasal bones (Exhibit A8). Notably, Claimant did not request to be placed in protective custody or seek any redress after his initial argument with his new cell mate on May 25, 2012.
All quotations not otherwise attributed are taken from the electronic recording of the trial.
Lanaux testified that he served as Claimant's counselor and conducted Claimant's initial interview when he entered the Special Housing Unit (SHU). Lanaux credibly testified that when Claimant first arrived at the SHU, Claimant never informed him that he was a white supremacist, nor did Claimant advise Lanaux at any time Lanaux served as Claimant's counselor that he identified as a white supremacist. Lanaux also testified that prior to the May 25, 2012 cell assignment, he had no knowledge Claimant was an Aryan Nation gang member nor was he made aware by any other person, including any superior officers, of his white supremacy beliefs. Lanaux explained he was responsible for Claimant's cell change on May 25, 2012 and testified there was "no reason to believe there would be any issues with the move." Lanaux wrote a memorandum after the incident, admitted at trial as Exhibit A14, which comports with his trial testimony (see Exhibit A14 ["I could find no evidence in Offender Ruple's history confirming he is an 'Aryan Brother.' At the time (I decided to bunk Claimant with the new African American cell mate), Offender Ruple did not inform me that he was an 'Aryan Brother'"]).
Becker testified he responded to the incident which took place on June 3, 2012 in Claimant's cell and had no independent recollection of the incident, relying solely on the documents contained in Defendant's Exhibit A.
DISCUSSION
Claimant's allegation is that Defendant is liable for his injuries because the attack on him by another inmate was foreseeable, and Defendant failed to protect him. Claimant contends that Defendant was aware he was a white supremacist and prone to attack by other inmates.
The State, which has "assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, . . . owes a duty of care to safeguard [the] inmates [in its correctional facilities], even from attacks by fellow inmates" (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252 [2002]; see Flaherty v State of New York, 296 NY 342, 346 [1947]). The duty does not, however, render the State an insurer of inmate safety (see Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253; Melendez v State of New York, 283 AD2d 729, 729 [3d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 649 [2001]). Rather, the "scope of the State's duty to protect inmates is limited to risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable" (Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253).
"It requires a special set of circumstances or a clear pattern of events for the risk of harm to a particular inmate from gang-related violence to be considered foreseeable" (Samper v State of New York, UID No. 2007-028-003 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., Jan. 26, 2007]). Liability may therefore arise from what the State knew or should have known regarding (1) the risk of harm to a class of inmates based on the institutional expertise or experience (see Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 254; Pitts v State of New York, 166 AD3d 1505, 1506 [4th Dept 2018]; Brown v City of New York, 95 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2d Dept 2012]; compare Vasquez v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1275 [3d Dept 2009]), (2) the dangerous propensities of the assailant (see Adeleke v County of Suffolk, 156 AD3d 748, 749 [2d Dept 2017]; Wassmann v County of Ulster, 144 AD3d 1470, 1472 [3d Dept 2016]; Blake v State of New York, 259 AD2d 878, 879 [3d Dept 1999]; Littlejohn v State of New York, 218 AD2d 833, 834 [3d Dept 1995]), or (3) the risk of an assault and the failure to prevent it despite an opportunity to do so (see Huertas v State of New York, 84 AD2d 650, 650-651 [3d Dept 1981]).
Here, Claimant seems to allege as a predicate for liability the last category of circumstances set forth above; namely, Mid-State Correctional Facility was aware Claimant identified as a white supremacist and would be subject to attack as a result. There was no credible evidence adduced at trial which supports Claimant's contention. First, based upon the credible evidence adduced at trial, DOCCS and/or Mid-State Correctional Facility was not aware Claimant identified as an Aryan Brother or white supremacist. Second, Lanaux, Claimant's counselor who conducted Claimant's initial interview when entering the SHU and who saw Claimant regularly, was never made aware from Claimant or any other person that Claimant was a white supremacist. Although it is undisputed Claimant was involved in an altercation and sustained injuries from that altercation, there is no evidence presented at trial that the Defendant had notice of any reasonably foreseeable harm to Claimant and failed to protect him. Claimant provided no facts or evidence establishing that he was known to be at risk at Mid-State Correctional Facility, that the State failed to take steps to protect him, that his assailant was known to be dangerous, or that the State failed to prevent the altercation. In short, Claimant has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the altercation in which he was engaged was reasonably foreseeable and Defendant failed to protect him.
To the extent that Claimant's allegations can be construed as asserting violations of his Federal constitutional rights, the law is settled that "claims for damages against the State based upon alleged deprivation of rights under the US Constitution are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims" (Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1151 [3d Dept 2009]; see Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2d Dept 2001]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503, 504 [2d Dept 1989]; Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420, 423 [3d Dept 1986]; Russell v State of New York, UID No. 2017-041-501 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Mar. 2, 2017]). Consequently, to the extent that Claimant asserts Federal constitutional violations, his remedy lies elsewhere.
To the extent the Claim asserts a cause of action for a violation of Claimant's State constitutional rights, the Court notes that, in Brown v State of New York (89 NY2d 172 [1996]), the Court of Appeals "recognized that, when certain requirements are met, a violation of the NY Constitution may give rise to a private cause of action" (Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180, 1181 [3d Dept 2006]; see Wagoner v State of New York, UID No. 2008-029-014 [Ct Cl, Mignano, J., Apr. 2, 2008]). In Martinez v City of Schenectady (97 NY2d 78, 83 [2001]), however, the Court of Appeals made it clear that Brown establishes a "narrow remedy," applicable in cases where no other remedy is feasible to provide citizens with "an avenue of redress" when their private interests have been harmed by constitutional violations (see also Waxter, 33 AD3d at 1181). Where an adequate remedy could be provided, however, "'a constitutional tort claim . . . is [not] necessary to effectuate the purposes of the State constitutional protections . . . [invoked] nor appropriate to ensure full realization of [claimants'] rights'" (Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d 676, 679 [3d Dept 2003], quoting Martinez, 97 NY2d at 83).
Here, recognition of the State constitutional cause of action is neither necessary nor appropriate to ensure the full realization of Claimant's rights, because the alleged wrongs could have been redressed by an alternative remedy, namely in a Federal Court action asserting violations of the Federal Constitution (see e.g. Van Denburg v State of New York, UID No. 2019-040-082 [Ct Cl, McCarthy, J., Sept. 10, 2019]).
Upon consideration of the testimony of Claimant and the witnesses who testified, observing their demeanor while testifying, as well as examining the documentary evidence received at trial, it is the finding of this Court that Claimant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that Defendant failed to protect Claimant.
Accordingly, Claim Number 121743 is dismissed. Any and all other evidentiary rulings or motions on which the Court may have previously reserved or which were not previously determined, are hereby denied.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
March 3, 2020
Albany, New York
CATHERINE E. LEAHY-SCOTT
Judge of the Court of Claims