Opinion
May 18, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the, motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
The evidence presented by the appellants established prima facie that the plaintiff's injuries were not serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Thus, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact as to whether he suffered a serious injury ( see, Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955). The affirmation by the plaintiff's chiropractor is not in admissible form, and thus, cannot be considered ( see, CPLR 2106; Hoo v. Uribe, 248, A.D.2d 440; Gill v. O.N.S. Trucking, 239 A.D.2d 463). In addition, the affirmations by the plaintiff's physician were insufficient to establish an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff suffered a "permanent consequential limitation or use of a body organ or member", or a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system" as they did not provide any information concerning the nature of the plaintiff's medical treatment or any explanation for the more than five-year gap between the plaintiff's last medical treatment in April 1991 and his subsequent visit to the physician in November 1996 ( see, Medina v. Reis Assocs., 239 A.D.2d 394; Marshall v. Albano, 182 A.D.2d 614). Moreover, the plaintiff's self-serving, unsubstantiated allegation that he was totally incapacitated from running his business for a period of approximately six months following the accident is insufficient to establish a serious injury. Thus, the appellants were entitled to summary judgment ( see, Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230).
Rosenblatt, J.P., Sullivan, Joy, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.